| Matter of State of New York v Farnsworth |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 04168 [107 AD3d 1444] |
| June 7, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of The State of New York, Respondent, vDaniel Farnsworth, Appellant. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Zainab A. Chaudhry of counsel),for petitioner-respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Chautauqua County (Timothy J.Walker, A.J.), entered December 1, 2011 in a proceeding pursuant to Mental HygieneLaw article 10. The order, among other things, committed respondent to a securetreatment facility.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed withoutcosts.
Memorandum: Respondent appeals from an order determining that he is a dangeroussex offender requiring confinement pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law article 10. The juryfound that respondent was sexually motivated in committing his crimes and that hesuffers from a mental abnormality (see § 10.03 [i]). Respondent contendsthat Supreme Court abused its discretion and violated his right to due process by denyinghis motion to bifurcate the jury trial on the issues whether he was sexually motivated inhis commission of the underlying crimes and whether he suffered from a mentalabnormality. According to respondent, the jury may have been confused by the differentlegal standards applicable to the issues, i.e., whether petitioner established the first issueby proof beyond a reasonable doubt and whether petitioner established the second issueby clear and convincing evidence (see Matter of State of New York v Farnsworth, 75 AD3d14, 28 [2010], appeal dismissed 15 NY3d 848 [2010]). We note at the outsetthat respondent failed to preserve for our review his contention that due process requireda bifurcation of the jury trial. In any event, we reject respondent's contentions that thecourt abused its discretion in denying his motion for bifurcation and that he was therebydenied his due process rights. Mental Hygiene Law article 10 does not authorizerespondent's proposed bifurcation, and "a court cannot amend a statute by insertingwords that are not there, nor will a court read into a statute a provision which theLegislature did not see fit to enact" (Matter of Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Assn. vJorling, 85 NY2d 382, 394 [1995], rearg denied 85 NY2d 1033 [1995][internal quotation marks omitted]). Moreover, in a previous appeal by respondent, weconcluded that "the application of the two different [legal] standards would not confuse ajury" such that bifurcation would be required (Farnsworth, 75 AD3d at 28).Indeed, "the trial record is devoid of evidence indicating the [*2]existence of juror confusion" with respect to the differentlegal standards such that bifurcation would have assisted in clarification or simplificationof issues (Wylder v Viccari, 138 AD2d 482, 484 [1988]; see generally 22NYCRR 202.42 [a]).
Contrary to respondent's contention, we conclude that the court properly denied hismotion for a directed verdict at the close of proof in the jury trial on the ground that theevidence of sexual motivation in committing the underlying crimes was legallyinsufficient. "A court may set aside a jury verdict as legally [insufficient] and enterjudgment as a matter of law only where there is simply no valid line of reasoning andpermissible inferences [that] could possibly lead rational [people] to the conclusionreached by the jury on the basis of the evidence presented at trial" (Matter of State of New York vGierszewski, 81 AD3d 1473, 1473 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 702[2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, in his statement to the police,respondent admitted that he entered a residence for a sexual purpose. The evidencefurther established that respondent unlawfully entered the bedroom of another minoraround the same time period, and we conclude that the jury could reasonably infer thathis intent in entering that bedroom was the same as his admitted intent in theaforementioned incident (seePeople v Judware, 75 AD3d 841, 844-845 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d853 [2010]). In addition, based upon a review of respondent's criminal and mental healthhistory, petitioner's expert opined that respondent was sexually motivated in hiscommission of those two crimes. Thus, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficientto establish that respondent had a sexual motivation in committing the underlying crimes.
Finally, we reject respondent's further contention that the court erred in failing toconsider the least restrictive alternative, i.e., placement in a group home or confinementin a secure treatment facility staffed with personnel from the Office of Persons withDevelopmental Disabilities (OPWDD). Upon a judicial finding that a detained sexoffender is "dangerous" and "requir[es] confinement" owing to the sex offender's"predisposition to commit sex offenses" and "inability to control behavior [such] that therespondent is likely to be a danger to others," a court must order that the sex offender "becommitted to a secure treatment facility" (Mental Hygiene Law § 10.07 [f]).Alternatively, the court may find that a sex offender requires only "strict and intensivesupervision" (id.). In this case, the uncontroverted testimony of petitioner's expertestablished that respondent was not a suitable candidate for strict and intensivesupervision. Petitioner's expert also testified that, although respondent had adevelopmental disorder, he did not have a developmental disability that would qualifyhim for placement with OPWDD, and respondent did not offer any evidence to thecontrary. Present—Scudder, P.J., Peradotto, Sconiers, Valentino and Martoche, JJ.