| People v Perkins |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 04373 [107 AD3d 1157] |
| June 13, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v David L. Perkins, Appellant. |
—[*1] Richard J. McNally Jr., District Attorney, Troy (Kelly L. Egan of counsel), forrespondent.
Egan Jr., J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Rensselaer County(Ceresia, J.), rendered October 11, 2011, which resentenced defendant following hisconviction of the crimes of rape in the first degree, rape in the third degree (three counts),sodomy in the third degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, sexual misconduct (twocounts), unlawfully dealing with a child in the first degree (six counts) and endangeringthe welfare of a child (three counts).
Following a 2003 jury trial, defendant was convicted of multiple crimes,including—insofar as is relevant here—rape in the first degree and sexualabuse in the first degree and, in this regard, was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of25 years on the rape conviction and seven years on the sexual abuse conviction. In July2011, the sentencing court was advised by the Department of Corrections andCommunity Supervision that defendant had not been sentenced to the mandatory periodof postrelease supervision for such crimes and, further, that he was a "designated person"subject to resentencing under Correction Law § 601-d. A resentencing hearing washeld in October 2011, at which time County Court resentenced defendant to the originalterms of imprisonment followed by five years of postrelease supervision with respect to[*2]the rape conviction and three years of postreleasesupervision as to the sexual abuse conviction.[FN*]This appeal ensued.
We affirm. Defendant, as so limited by his brief, contends that the resentencingprocedure was untimely within the meaning of Correction Law § 601-d (4) and/orCPL 380.30. Both this Court and the Court of Appeals have made clear, however, thatthe failure to comply with the time limits set forth in Correction Law § 601-d (4)does not require reversal (seePeople v Velez, 19 NY3d 642, 647-649 [2012]; People v Walker, 100 AD3d1149, 1150 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1066 [2013]; People v Campbell, 93 AD3d996, 997 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 862 [2012]). Further, even assumingthat the time limits set forth in CPL 380.30 apply to resentencing matters (see People v Williams, 14NY3d 198, 213 [2010], cert denied 562 US —, 131 S Ct 125 [2010]),the relevant time period here is not—as defendant contends—theapproximately 8½ years that elapsed between his original sentencing date and hissubsequent resentencing but, rather, the roughly 10 weeks that elapsed betweendefendant being deemed a designated person within the meaning of Correction Law§ 601-d and the resulting resentencing hearing (see People v Williams, 14NY3d at 213). As such delay was not unreasonable, we discern no violation of CPL380.30 (see People vMehmel, 98 AD3d 1256, 1256 [2012]; People v Howard, 96 AD3d 1691, 1692 [2012], lvdenied 19 NY3d 1103 [2012]).
Lahtinen, J.P., Stein and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isaffirmed.
Footnote *: The periods ofpostrelease supervision merge by operation of law (see Penal Law § 70.45[5] [c]; People v Passino,104 AD3d 1060, 1061 [2013]).