| Matter of Price v New York State & Local Employees'Retirement Sys. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 04405 [107 AD3d 1212] |
| June 13, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Michael A. Price, Petitioner, v New YorkState and Local Employees' Retirement System et al.,Respondents. |
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Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (William E. Storrs of counsel), forrespondents.
Spain, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by orderof the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination ofrespondent Comptroller which denied petitioner's application for a refund ofcontributions.
Petitioner was employed as a lifeguard by New York State in 1968 and, periodically,in other state positions until April 1975, when he left state service. He did not apply tojoin respondent New York State and Local Employees' Retirement System (hereinafterrespondent) during that period,[FN1] and he was reportedly never advised in 1968 that he was a mandatory tier 1 member ofrespondent. In January 1980, he reentered state employment with the Onondaga CountyDistrict Attorney's office and became a contributory tier 3 member. In 1996, petitioner'sapplication to be retroactively reinstated to tier 1 pursuant to Retirement and SocialSecurity Law § 803 was denied because he had not "served continuously" in stateservice (Retirement and [*2]Social Security Law §803 [b] [2]). This apparently caused respondent to review petitioner's retirement status,and it soon thereafter determined that he had been employed in a noncompetitive positionin 1968 for which he was a mandatory tier 1 member. In 1997, without notice topetitioner, he was administratively given a retroactive tier 1 membership with servicecredit for the initial years he had worked (1968-1975). However, upon further review,that reconstructed tier 1 membership was deemed by respondent to have automaticallyterminated in 1975 for inactivity under Retirement and Social Security Law § 40former (f) (1).
Thereafter, petitioner applied for reinstatement to tier 1 pursuant to Retirement andSocial Security Law § 645, which was ultimately granted in 2008. Retirement andSocial Security Law § 645, which was adopted in 1998, allows current members ofrespondent who had reentered state service to apply for reinstatement to their originaltier, under certain circumstances. Petitioner then requested a refund of the contributionshe had made since 1980 as a tier 3 member. His request was denied on the ground that hedid not qualify for a refund under the foregoing statute pursuant to which he wasreinstated (see Retirement and Social Security Law § 645 [2] [lastsentence]). After a hearing, the Hearing Officer denied his request for a refund ofcontributions in a written decision later upheld by respondent Comptroller. Petitionerthen commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the determination denyinghis request for a refund of the contributions he had made as a tier 3 member prior to hisreinstatement to tier 1, a noncontributory tier, which proceeding Supreme Courttransferred to this Court.
We confirm. The essential facts are not disputed. Pursuant to Retirement and SocialSecurity Law § 645, petitioner was reinstated to tier 1 in 2008, retroactive to hisinitial employment date of July 4, 1968, based upon his employment from 1968 to 1975in a position for which tier 1 membership was then mandatory. The only issue is whetherhe is entitled to a refund of the tier 3 contributions he had made from 1980 to 2008.Under the unambiguous terms of that statute, "[a]ny contribution made to [respondent]pursuant to article [14] or [15] of this chapter by a member who rejoined his or hercurrent system on or after [July 27, 1976] shall not be refunded" (Retirement andSocial Security Law § 645 [2] [emphasis added]). Where, as here, theComptroller's application and interpretation of the relevant statutes are not "irrational,unreasonable or contrary to the statutory language," its determination will be upheld (Matter of Lewandowski v NewYork State & Local Police & Fire Retirement Sys., 69 AD3d 1027, 1029[2010]). Resort to legislative history is unnecessary given that the statutory directive isclear and unambiguous (seeMatter of Hession v New York State & Local Employees' Retirement Sys., 24 AD3d1008, 1009 [2005]). The Comptroller correctly determined that petitioner rejoinedtier 1 after that statutory date of July 27, 1976 and, therefore, he is precluded fromobtaining a refund of contributions made while a tier 3 member (see Matter of Walroth v New YorkState & Local Employees' Retirement Sys., 14 AD3d 918, 919 [2005]). As thatdetermination is supported by substantial evidence, it will be upheld (see Matter ofJennings v New York State Off. of Mental Health, 90 NY2d 227, 239-240 [1997]).
Petitioner's contention that he was (or should be considered to have been)continuously a tier 1 member since July 1968, which membership could not be and wasnot terminated, is unavailing. Under the law as it then existed in 1975, his reconstructedtier 1 membership terminated by operation of law as of December 1, 1975, after anaggregate of 60 total months (five years) of inactivity since July 4, 1968 (seeRetirement and Social Security Law § 40 former[*3][f] [1]).[FN2] Since he did not then have five full years of service credit, the statutory terminationtolling provisions were not available to petitioner when he left state service on April 1,1975 and became employed by the federal government (see Retirement andSocial Security Law § 40 former [f] [1]). As his reconstructed tier 1 membershipautomatically terminated in 1975, and he rejoined respondent after July 27,1976—the commencement date for tier 3 membership—pursuant toRetirement and Social Security Law § 645 (2), he is precluded by that statute frombeing refunded for contributions subsequently made while a tier 3 member.
Likewise, petitioner did not have the 10 years of service required for vesting in 1975and, thus, was subject to Retirement and Social Security Law § 40 (f) (5). Thisstatute required that he request "termination of membership on a form prepared by the[C]omptroller" when he left state service in that year in order to benefit from thatrejoinder provision. Petitioner did not request termination of his membership when heleft state service in 1975 but, rather, his membership automatically terminated forinactivity under Retirement and Social Security Law § 40 former (f) (1), asdiscussed. Thus, he did not qualify under Retirement and Social Security Law § 40(f) (5) for tier 1 reinstatement in 1980 when he resumed state service; instead, only afterRetirement and Social Security Law § 645 was enacted in 1998 did he qualify forsuch reinstatement. Thus, applying the law as it existed to the circumstances here, theresult would be the same whether petitioner's membership was reconstructed in 1980 orin 1997.
Again, that 1998 statute under which petitioner was reinstated—whichexpanded the rights of current members to apply for reinstatement to their originaltier—specifically precludes a refund of contributions made as a contributorymember for any member who rejoined on or after July 27, 1976, the end date for tier 2membership (see Retirement and Social Security Law § 645). Indeed, thevery design of that remedial statute is to allow current contributory tier 3 (and higher)members to be reinstated to their original, lower, noncontributory tier (i.e., tiers 1 or 2)with more generous benefits, but not to permit them to recoup contributionsmade while in the contributory tier.[FN3] This is clearly spelled out in the tier reinstatement application. The statute makes nodistinctions for purposes of eligibility for a refund of contributions; the decisive and solequalifying factor is the date the member rejoined, which disqualifies petitioner.
Finally, erroneous advice by petitioner's employer, misplacement by respondent in a[*4]contributory tier or delayed reinstatement to anoncontributory tier "cannot estop the Comptroller from performing his duties anddenying any reinstatement [or refund of contributions] that is contrary to the statutes"(Matter of Hession v New York State & Local Employees' Retirement Sys., 24AD3d at 1010; see Matter of Leisten v McCall, 285 AD2d 897, 899 [2001],lv denied 97 NY2d 605 [2001]). Under settled principles, "[t]he doctrine ofestoppel will not provide eligibility where by statute a person clearly does not qualify"(Matter of Burns v Regan, 87 AD2d 944, 946 [1982], appeal dismissed57 NY2d 954 [1982]; see Goodman v Regan, 151 AD2d 958, 960 [1989]).Petitioner's remaining claims do not warrant a different conclusion.
Rose, J.P., Stein and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.
Footnote 1: Those who joined on orbefore June 30, 1973 became tier 1 members of respondent, and those joining thereafter(but before July 27, 1976) were in tier 2 (see 2 NYCRR 325.2 [a], [b]).
Footnote 2: Retirement and SocialSecurity Law § 40 former (f) (1) provided, in 1975, that membership would beterminated: "When the government service of a member shall amount to less than fiveyears in any period of ten consecutive years provided, however, that no part of either ofsuch periods shall run during such time as a member, with at least five years of memberservice credit, shall serve . . . [in] the federal government." The latter tollingprovision is inapplicable, as petitioner did not have five years of service credit when heleft in 1975 due to the intermittent nature of his state service between 1968 and 1975.
Footnote 3: Respondent establishedat the hearing that such contributions and interest are transferred to the PensionAccumulation Fund to offset the increased cost of tier 1 benefit improvements(see Retirement and Social Security Law § 23).