| Matter of Kilduff v Rochester City Sch. Dist. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 04472 [107 AD3d 1536] |
| June 14, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of Roseann Kilduff, Appellant, v RochesterCity School District et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Edwin Lopez-Soto, General counsel, Rochester (Cara M. Briggs of counsel), forrespondents-respondents.
Appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court, Monroe County(Evelyn Frazee, J.), entered August 3, 2012 in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78.The judgment denied the petition.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed onthe law without costs, the petition is granted, the determination is annulled andrespondents are directed to reinstate petitioner to her position as a tenured teacherforthwith with full back pay and benefits and to remove all references to the disciplineimposed from petitioner's personnel file.
Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78seeking, inter alia, to annul the determination suspending her for 30 days without payfrom her position as a tenured teacher with respondent Rochester City School District.Supreme Court denied the petition, and petitioner appeals.
We agree with petitioner that respondents failed to comply with the requirements ofEducation Law § 3020 (1) when they disciplined petitioner without affording her ahearing pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a. When presented with a question ofstatutory interpretation, "courts should construe unambiguous language [in a statute] togive effect to its plain meaning" (Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v Spitzer, 7 NY3d 653,660 [2006]). We agree with petitioner that the plain language of Education Law §3020 (1) provides that a tenured teacher facing discipline, and whose terms andconditions of employment are covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) thatbecame effective on or after September 1, 1994, is entitled to elect either the disciplinaryprocedures specified in Education Law § 3020-a or the alternative procedurescontained in the CBA. Here, the CBA at issue went into effect on July 1, 2006. Thus,petitioner [*2]was entitled to choose whether to bedisciplined under the procedures set forth in the CBA or those set forth in section 3020-a,which allowed petitioner to elect a hearing (see § 3020-a [c]).Respondents, however, incorrectly denied petitioner's written request for a section3020-a hearing. We therefore reverse the judgment, grant the petition, annul thedetermination, and we direct respondents to reinstate petitioner with back pay andbenefits retroactive to the date of her suspension, and to remove all references to thediscipline imposed from petitioner's personnel file (see generally Matter of Winter vBoard of Educ. for Rhinebeck Cent. School Dist., 79 NY2d 1, 9 [1992], reargdenied 79 NY2d 978 [1992]; Matter of Diggins v Honeoye Falls-Lima Cent. School Dist., 50AD3d 1473, 1474 [2008]). Present—Smith, J.P., Fahey, Carni, Sconiers andWhalen, JJ.