| Matter of Trenasia J. (Frank J.) |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 04805 [107 AD3d 992] |
| June 26, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Trenasia J., an Infant. Administration forChildren's Services, Respondent; Frank J., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matterof Raymond J., an Infant. Administration for Children's Services, Respondent; Frank J.,Appellant. (Proceeding No. 2.) In the Matter of Tavia J., an Infant. Administration forChildren's Services, Respondent; Frank J., Appellant. (Proceeding No. 3.) In the Matterof Brije D., an Infant. Administration for Children's Services, Respondent; Frank J.,Appellant. (Proceeding No. 4.) |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Larry A. Sonnensheinand Diana Lawless of counsel), for respondent. Karen P. Simmons, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Barbara H. Dildine of counsel), attorney for thechildren Trenasia J., Raymond J., and Tavia J. Steven Banks, New York, N.Y. (Tamara A. Steckler and Marcia Egger of counsel),attorney for the child Brije D.
In related child abuse and neglect proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article10, the father appeals (1) from a fact-finding order of the Family Court, Kings County(Turbow, J.), dated May 10, 2012, which, after a hearing, found that he abused the childBrije D., and derivatively neglected the children Trenasia J., Raymond J., and Tavia J.,and (2) from an order of disposition of the same court dated November 26, 2012, which,upon the fact-finding order and after a hearing, [*2]interalia, placed him under the petitioner's supervision for a period of six months.
Ordered that the appeal from the fact-finding order is dismissed, without costs ordisbursements, as the fact-finding order was superseded by the order of disposition; andit is further,
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the fatherunder the petitioner's supervision for a period of six months is dismissed, without costsor disbursements; and it is further,
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs ordisbursements.
The appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant under thesupervision of the petitioner for a period of six months must be dismissed as academic, asthat portion of the order has expired by its own terms (see Matter of Chaim R. [KeturahPonce R.], 94 AD3d 1127, 1129 [2012]; Matter of Ndeye D. [Benjamin D.], 85 AD3d 1026 [2011];Matter of Amber C., 38AD3d 538, 539 [2007]). However, since an adjudication of abuse or neglect"constitutes a permanent and significant stigma that might indirectly affect the appellant'sstatus in future proceedings," the appeal from the order of disposition, which brings upfor review the findings of abuse and derivative neglect in the fact-finding order datedMay 10, 2012, is not academic (Matter of Ndeye D. [Benjamin D.], 85 AD3d at1027).
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court correctly found him to be aperson legally responsible for his niece, the child Brije D., within the meaning of theFamily Court Act (see Family Ct Act § 1012 [g]; Matter of YolandaD., 88 NY2d 790, 797 [1996]; Matter of Christopher W., 299 AD2d 268[2002]; Matter of Marta B., 233 AD2d 667, 668 [1996]).
The petitioner established by a preponderance of the evidence (see Family CtAct § 1046 [b] [i]), that the appellant abused the child Brije D. by attempting tosexually abuse her (see Family Ct Act § 1012 [e] [iii]; Penal Law§§ 110.00, 130.60 [2]; Matter of Kimberly Z. [Jason Z.], 88 AD3d 1181 [2011];People v Santiago, 16AD3d 600 [2005]). In light of the conflicting testimony presented at the fact-findinghearing, the factual findings of the Family Court turned largely on its assessment ofwitnesses' credibility, which is entitled to great weight (see Matter of Kyanna T. [WinstonR.], 99 AD3d 1011, 1013 [2012]; Matter of Taylor T. [Darren T.], 73 AD3d 1075 [2010]; Matter of Jose I., 13 AD3d446, 447 [2004]; Matter of Cassandra C., 300 AD2d 303 [2002]). There isno bases here to question that assessment.
Although a finding of abuse of one child does not, by itself, establish that otherchildren in the household have been derivatively neglected (see Matter of Kyanna T.[Winston R.], 99 AD3d at 1013; Matter of Lauryn H. [William A.], 73 AD3d 1175, 1177[2010]), here, the appellant's attempt to sexually abuse his niece while his two youngdaughters were home, at a time when he was the sole adult present, evinced a flawedunderstanding of his duties as a parent and impaired parental judgment sufficient tosupport the Family Court's finding of derivative neglect of his three children, Trenasia J.,Raymond J., and Tavia J. (see Matter of Kyanna T. [Winston R.], 99 AD3d at1013-1014; Matter of Lauryn H. [William A.], 73 AD3d at 1177; Matter of Grant W. [RaphaelA.], 67 AD3d 922 [2009]).
The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit. Eng, P.J., Balkin, Leventhaland Miller, JJ., concur.