| Matter of Uriah M. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 04809 [107 AD3d 997] |
| June 26, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Uriah M.,Appellant. |
—[*1] John Ciampoli, County Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (David A. Tauster of counsel), forrespondent.
In two related juvenile delinquency proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article3, Uriah M. appeals from (1) a fact-finding order of the Family Court, Nassau County(Singer, J.), dated January 23, 2012, which, after a hearing, found that he committed actswhich, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of attempted burglaryin the second degree under docket No. D-11632-11, (2) a fact-finding order of the samecourt, also dated January 23, 2012, which, after a hearing, found that he committed actswhich, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of attempted burglaryin the second degree under docket No. D-11751-11, and (3) two orders of disposition ofthe same court (one in each proceeding), both dated February 1, 2012, which adjudgedhim to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him in the custody of the New York StateOffice of Children and Family Services for a period of 15 months. The appeals bring upfor review the denial of the appellant's motion to suppress his written statement to lawenforcement officials.
Ordered that the appeals from the fact-finding orders are dismissed as superseded bythe respective orders of disposition, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,
Ordered that the appeals from so much of the orders of disposition as placed theappellant in the custody of the New York State Office of Children and Family Servicesfor a period of 15 months are dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements, asthe period of placement has expired; and it is further,
Ordered that the orders of disposition are affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costsor disbursements.
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court properly determined thatthere was probable cause for the arresting officer to take the appellant into custody, since"[t]he facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer would have warranted areasonable person, who possessed the same expertise as the officer, to conclude that acrime was being or had been committed and that the appellant committed it" (Matterof Eric C., 281 AD2d 543, 544 [2001]; see People v Mercado, 68 NY2d 874,877 [1986], cert denied 479 US 1095 [1987]; Matter of Starsha R., 96 AD3d 952, 952 [2012]).[*2]
The Family Court also properly declined tosuppress the appellant's written statement provided to law enforcement officials, sincethe statement was made after the administration of Miranda rights (seeMiranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 [1966]) and, thus, the statement was the product ofa knowing waiver (see People vWhite, 40 AD3d 662, 663 [2007], affd 10 NY3d 286 [2008], certdenied 555 US 897 [2008]; People v Santos, 38 AD3d 574, 575 [2007], certdenied 552 US 960 [2007]). Further, contrary to the appellant's contention that thesubject statement should have been suppressed because he was represented by counselwith respect to an unrelated open case pending against him at that time, the appellant wasnot precluded from waiving his right to counsel without an attorney present with respectto this matter (see People v Steward, 88 NY2d 496, 502 [1996]; People v Cowan, 92 AD3d794, 795 [2012]; People vMadison, 22 AD3d 684, 685-686 [2005]).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (seeMatter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]; Matter of Quamel D., 78 AD3d 1050, 1051 [2010]), theevidence was legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellantcommitted acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime ofattempted burglary in the second degree (see Penal Law §§ 110.00,140.25 [2]). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent reviewof the weight of the evidence (see Matter of Javan P., 81 AD3d 833, 834 [2011]; Matter of Hasan C., 59 AD3d617, 617-618 [2009]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder'sopportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (seeMatter of Javan P., 81 AD3d at 834; Matter of Hasan C., 59 AD3d at 618;Matter of Victor I., 57AD3d 779 [2008]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the FamilyCourt's fact-finding determinations were not against the weight of the evidence (seeFamily Ct Act § 342.2 [2]; cf. People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit. Balkin, J.P., Lott, Austinand Sgroi, JJ., concur.