Matter of Tinger v Tinger
2013 NY Slip Op 05090 [108 AD3d 569]
July 3, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 21, 2013


In the Matter of Michael Tinger,Appellant,
v
Heather Tinger, Respondent. (Proceeding No. 1.) In the Matter ofHeather Tinger, Respondent, v Michael Tinger, Appellant. (Proceeding No.2.)

—[*1]Howard M. File, Esq, P.C., Staten Island, N.Y., for appellant.

Kathleen M. Garrigan (John Z. Marangos, Staten Island, N.Y., of counsel), forrespondent.

Marc A. Berk, Staten Island, N.Y., attorney for the children.

In related child custody proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, thefather appeals from (1) an order of the Family Court, Richmond County (Oakes, Ct. Atty.Ref.), dated June 14, 2012, which, after a hearing, awarded the mother sole custody ofthe parties' children, and (2) an order of the same court, also dated June 14, 2012, whichgranted the mother's motion for attorney's fees.

Ordered that the orders are affirmed, with one bill of costs.

"In making an initial custody determination, the courts must consider the bestinterests of the child by reviewing such factors as maintaining stability for the child, thechild's wishes, the home environment with each parent, each parent's past performance,relative fitness, ability to guide and provide for the child's overall well-being, and thewillingness of each parent to foster a relationship with the other parent" (Matter of Swinson vBrewington, 84 AD3d 1251, 1253 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]). "'Custody determinations are ordinarily a matter of discretion for the hearing court, whosedetermination will not be set aside on appeal unless it lacks a sound and substantial basisin the record' " (Matter ofWilliams v Dowgiallo, 90 AD3d 942, 943 [2011], quoting Matter of Ortiz v Maharaj, 8AD3d 574, 574 [2004]). Here, the Family Court's determination that the children'sbest interests would be served by awarding sole custody to the mother had a sound andsubstantial basis in the record.

Furthermore, the award of attorney's fees to the mother was a provident exercise of[*2]discretion (see Domestic Relations Law§ 237 [b]; Matter ofBaribault v Sauvola, 101 AD3d 865, 866 [2012]), "based on the financialcircumstances of the parties and the circumstances of the case as a whole," including therelative merits of the parties' positions (Matter of O'Neil v O'Neil, 193 AD2d 16,20 [1993]). Rivera, J.P., Dillon, Dickerson and Austin, JJ., concur.


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