People v Twoguns
2013 NY Slip Op 05143 [108 AD3d 1091]
July 5, 2013
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 21, 2013


The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vHershel J. Twoguns, Appellant.

—[*1]The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Robert B. Hallborg, Jr., ofcounsel), for defendant-appellant.

Frank A. Sedita, III, District Attorney, Buffalo (Ashley R. Small of counsel), forrespondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (M. William Boller,A.J.), rendered July 29, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty,of driving while intoxicated, a class E felony, failure to drive on right side of road,following too closely and resisting arrest.

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously modified onthe law by granting defendant's omnibus motion insofar as it sought dismissal of countstwo and three of the indictment and dismissing those counts, and as modified thejudgment is affirmed.

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty offelony driving while intoxicated (Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1192 [3];1193 [1] [c] [i]), resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30), and two traffic infractions,defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in denying that part of his omnibus motionseeking dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the arresting police officer lackedauthority to arrest defendant outside the geographical area of the officer's employment.We agree in part with defendant and therefore grant that part of his omnibus motion withrespect to counts two and three of the indictment, which charge defendant with the trafficinfractions.

The authority of a police officer to arrest an individual for a "petty offense" is limitedto circumstances in which the officer "has reasonable cause to believe that such personhas committed such offense in his or her presence" (CPL 140.10 [1] [a]), and "only when. . . [s]uch offense was committed or believed by him or her to have beencommitted within the geographical area of such police officer's employment or withinone hundred yards of such geographical area" (CPL 140.10 [2] [a]). The term "pettyoffense" is defined as "a violation or a traffic infraction" (CPL 1.20 [39]). Here, thearresting officer is employed by the Village of Gowanda, and it is undisputed that thearrest did not take place within 100 yards of the village limits. Thus, we conclude that theofficer exceeded his jurisdictional authority when he arrested defendant for committingthe traffic infractions, and the court should have granted defendant's motion insofar as itsought dismissal of those counts.

We further conclude, however, that the court properly refused to dismiss counts oneand [*2]four of the indictment, charging defendant withfelony driving while intoxicated and resisting arrest, respectively. Pursuant to CPL140.10 (3), a police officer may arrest a person for a crime, as opposed to a petty offense,"whether or not such crime was committed within the geographical area of such policeofficer's employment, and he or she may make such arrest within the state, regardless ofthe situs of the commission of the crime." Thus, the fact that defendant was arrestedoutside the Village of Gowanda does not bar prosecution of the crimes charged in theindictment.

Although defendant contended in his motion papers that counts one and four of theindictment must be dismissed as fruit of the poisonous tree, he has since abandoned thatcontention and now contends only that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop hisvehicle. We reject that contention. The arresting officer testified at the pretrial hearingthat he received an anonymous telephone call from someone at the Iroquois Gas Station.According to the caller, there was a man at the gas station who had exited a vehicle andwas stumbling around as if he were drunk. The caller provided a description of thevehicle and identified its license plate number. When the officer arrived at the gas stationseveral minutes later, he observed a vehicle pulling into the roadway that matched thedescription provided by the caller. In addition, the vehicle's license plate number was thesame as that provided by the caller. The vehicle, upon entering the roadway, crossed overthe center line in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1120 (a), and then pulledup closely behind another vehicle in the same lane of traffic, in violation of Vehicle andTraffic Law § 1129 (a). The officer then activated his emergency lights andstopped the vehicle. We conclude that the specific nature of the anonymous call, whencombined with the officer's first-hand observations, provided the requisite reasonablesuspicion to stop defendant's vehicle (see generally People v Moss, 89 AD3d 1526, 1527 [2011],lv denied 18 NY3d 885 [2012]; People v Jeffery, 2 AD3d 1271, 1272 [2003]).Present—Smith, J.P., Peradotto, Lindley and Valentino, JJ.


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