Moore v Johnson
2013 NY Slip Op 05163 [108 AD3d 1125]
July 5, 2013
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, August 21, 2013


Robert D. Moore et al., Respondents, v Richard S. Johnsonet al., Appellants.

—[*1]Lipsitz Green Scime Cambria LLP, Buffalo (Jeffrey F. Reina of counsel), fordefendants-appellants.

Wright, Wright and Hampton, Jamestown (Edward P. Wright of counsel), forplaintiffs-respondents.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Chautauqua County (James H. Dillon,J.), entered March 13, 2012. The order denied the motion of defendants for summaryjudgment dismissing the complaint and for an award of damages on their counterclaim.

It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on thelaw by granting that part of the motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaintto the extent that it sought damages for undistributed goodwill, and as modified the orderis affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Plaintiffs, Robert D. Moore and William S. Myott, originallycommenced this action against their former partners in an accounting firm, seeking anaccounting and damages for undistributed goodwill of the partnership. We note at theoutset that William S. Myott thereafter died, and his wife, as executrix of his estate, wassubstituted for him as a party. We nevertheless refer to Robert D. Moore and William S.Myott, where applicable, as the plaintiffs herein. In their answer, defendants asserted acounterclaim alleging that, upon the voluntary dissolution of the partnership, plaintiffswere overpaid for their share of the partnership's net assets. Following discovery,defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and for an award ofdamages on their counterclaim. Supreme Court denied the motion in its entirety, anddefendants now appeal.

We agree with defendants that the court should have dismissed the complaint insofaras it sought damages for the partnership's undistributed goodwill. At the time ofdissolution, the partnership consisted of five accountants, i.e., plaintiffs and defendants(collectively, partners), who operated out of two offices in different locations. Plaintiffsworked in the Jamestown office and owned a 48.4% equity interest in the partnership,while defendants worked in the Fredonia office and owned the remaining 51.6% equityinterest. On May 4, 2006, the partners voted unanimously to dissolve the partnership.Upon dissolution, plaintiffs each received a cash distribution of $48,412 from thepartnership. None of the partners received payment for the partnership's goodwill.Plaintiffs thereafter formed a new partnership, and they continued to [*2]work out of the same office in Jamestown. Defendants alsoformed a new partnership and stayed in the same office in Fredonia. In March 2008,almost two years after the partnership dissolved, plaintiffs demanded that defendants paythem for their share of the partnership's goodwill. Plaintiffs also requested an accountingof the partnership's financial records. Defendants refused to pay anything to plaintiffs forgoodwill, and plaintiffs therefore commenced this action.

"The term 'goodwill' represents an elusive concept, but is broadly defined as 'theadvantage or benefit, which is acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere value ofthe capital, stock, funds, or property employed therein, in consequence of the generalpublic patronage and encouragement, which it receives from constant or habitualcustomers, on account of its local position, or common celebrity, or reputation for skill oraffluence, or punctuality, or from other accidental circumstances or necessities, or evenfrom ancient partialities or prejudices' " (Dawson v White & Case, 88 NY2d 666,670-671 n 2 [1996]; see Spaulding v Benenati, 57 NY2d 418, 424 n 3 [1982]). "'Good will, when it exists as incidental to the business of a partnership, is presumptivelyan asset to be accounted for like any other by those who liquidate the business' "(Dawson, 88 NY2d at 671, quoting Matter of Brown, 242 NY 1, 6[1926]). "The course of dealing, however, can stamp it with a different quality. Partnersmay contract that good will, though it exist[s], shall not 'be considered as property or anasset of the co-partnership' " (Brown, 242 NY at 6). "The contract may 'beexpressly made,' or it may 'arise by implication, from other contracts and the acts andconduct of the parties' " (id.).

Here, even assuming, arguendo, that the partners' course of dealings or partnershipagreement provided that goodwill is a distributable asset of the partnership, we concludethat defendants met their initial burden on that part of the motion for summary judgmentdismissing the complaint to the extent it sought damages for undistributed goodwill.Indeed, defendants established that there is no goodwill to distribute because thepartnership has been dissolved and no longer exists. In the circumstances presented here,it is incomprehensible that the partnership's goodwill could survive the demise of thepartnership, and the Court of Appeals decision in Dawson does not suggestotherwise. In Dawson, although the Court of Appeals indicated that a dissolvingpartnership may have distributable goodwill, the partnership in that case was dissolvedbut was immediately reformed with the same partners, minus one, with the same firmname, using the same offices and servicing the same clients. Thus, in essence, thepartnership was dissolved in name only. Here, in contrast, the same partnershipdid not reform after dissolution. Instead, two entirely new partnerships were formed.Thus, plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of fact with respect to the existence of goodwillafter the dissolution of the partnership (see generally Zuckerman v City of NewYork, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). We therefore conclude that the court erred indenying that part of defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaintinsofar as it sought damages for undistributed goodwill, and we modify the orderaccordingly.

Finally, we reject defendants' further contention that the court should have grantedthat part of their motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim. Even assuming,arguendo, that defendants met their initial burden on that part of the motion, we concludethat plaintiffs raised myriad issues of fact in opposition thereto (see generallyZuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562). Present—Scudder, P.J., Centra, Fahey, Carniand Lindley, JJ.


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