| Ramcharran v New York Airport Servs., LLC |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 05195 [108 AD3d 610] |
| July 10, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Tridesh Ramcharran, Respondent, v New YorkAirport Services, LLC, Appellant, et al., Defendant. |
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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant New YorkAirport Services, LLC, appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Hart, J.), entered July 16, 2012, which denied its motion pursuant to CPLR 3103 (a), fora protective order striking the plaintiff's notice to admit.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of thedefendant New York Airport Services, LLC, for a protective order striking the plaintiff'snotice to admit is granted.
This action arises from an incident that occurred at LaGuardia Airport. In hiscomplaint, the plaintiff alleged that on December 6, 2009, he was struck by a motorvehicle owned by the defendant New York Airport Services, LLC (hereinafter thedefendant), and operated by its employee, the defendant John Doe. Issue was joined onMarch 15, 2012. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff served a notice to admit, seeking oneadmission: "That on December 6, 2009, the motor vehicle owned and operated by thedefendants was in contact with the plaintiff." The defendant made a timely motion for aprotective order pursuant to CPLR 3103 (a). The Supreme Court denied the motion.
"The supervision of disclosure and the setting of reasonable terms and conditionstherefor rests within the sound discretion of the trial court" (Lolly v Brookdale Univ. Hosp. &Med. Ctr., 45 AD3d 537, 537 [2007]). However, in the instant matter, theSupreme Court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a protectiveorder pursuant to CPLR 3103 (a).
"The purpose of a notice to admit is only to eliminate from the issues in litigationmatters which will not be in dispute at trial. It is not intended to cover ultimateconclusions, which can only be made after a full and complete trial" (DeSilva vRosenberg, 236 AD2d 508, 508 [1997]; see Priceless Custom Homes, Inc. v O'Neill, 104 AD3d 664[2013]; Sagiv v Gamache,26 AD3d 368, 369 [2006]). Here, the plaintiff's notice to admit improperly soughtthe defendant's admission concerning a matter that went to the heart of the controversy inthis case (see Priceless Custom Homes, Inc. v O'Neill, 104 AD3d at 664-665; Lolly v Brookdale Univ. Hosp. &Med. Ctr., 45 AD3d 537 [2007]; see also Kahan v Spira, 88 AD3d 964 [2011]; Nesper v Goldmag HackingCorp., 77 AD3d 598 [2010]). Moreover, " 'the purpose [*2]of a notice to admit is not to obtain information in lieu ofother disclosure devices, such as the taking of depositions before trial' " (Lolly vBrookdale Univ. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 45 AD3d at 537, quoting DeSilva vRosenberg, 236 AD2d at 509). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have grantedthe defendant's motion for a protective order.
The defendant's remaining contention need not be addressed in light of ourdetermination. Rivera, J.P., Hall, Cohen and Miller, JJ., concur.