| Matter of Aarismaa v Bender |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 05397 [108 AD3d 1203] |
| July 19, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of Jaan Aarismaa, IV, Petitioner, v Dennis F.Bender, Surrogate Court Judge, et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Victor Paladino of counsel), forrespondents Honorable Dennis F. Bender, Surrogate Court Judge and Jane Lawson,Chief Court Clerk. Harris Beach PLLC, Ithaca (Mark B. Wheeler of counsel), for respondents John L.Wagner, as Executor and Mark B. Wheeler, Attorney. Frank R. Fisher, County Attorney, Waterloo, respondent pro se and for Cristina L.Lotz, Seneca County Clerk.
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in the Appellate Division of theSupreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department pursuant to CPLR 506 [b] [1]) tocompel respondent Honorable Dennis F. Bender to issue a default judgment in the Matterof the Estate of Stanley A. Wagner, deceased, and for other relief.
It is hereby ordered that said petition is unanimously dismissed with costs.
Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this original proceeding pursuant to CPLRarticle 78 seeking, inter alia, to compel respondent Honorable Dennis F. Bender to issuehim a default judgment in an estate matter in Surrogate's Court, Seneca County. Weagree with respondents that the petition should be dismissed in its entirety. It is wellsettled that "[a] CPLR article 78 proceeding may not be used to seek review of issues thatcould have been raised on direct appeal" (Matter of Estate of Rappaport v Riordan, 66 AD3d 1018,1018 [2009]; see Matter of Tyler v Forma, 231 AD2d 891, 891 [1996];Matter of Venture Mag. v White, 103 AD2d 450, 451 [1984]). Petitioner'scontentions in this proceeding all involve challenges to an October 2011 judgment anddecree that, inter alia, granted the motion of respondent John L. Wagner, who is theexecutor of the estate of decedent, for summary judgment dismissing the petition in theestate matter, and to a November 2011 decision and decree imposing sanctions uponpetitioner for frivolous and abusive litigation conduct. Those challenges could andshould have been raised on direct appeal [*2]from thedecrees at issue and are not properly the subject of a CPLR article 78 petition (seeEstate of Rappaport, 66 AD3d at 1018; Matter of Wong v Chetta, 271 AD2d451, 451 [2000]; Hodge v LoRusso, 181 AD2d 1009, 1009 [1992]). Althoughpetitioner filed notices of appeal with respect to the relevant decrees, he failed to perfectthe appeals in a timely manner (see 22 NYCRR 1000.12).
Petitioner's contention that respondents prevented him from preparing a record onappeal is likewise not properly before us and, in any event, that contention is withoutmerit. Petitioner neither submitted a proposed record to Wagner for his stipulation normoved to settle the record in Surrogate's Court.
With respect to petitioner's claim for relief in the nature of mandamus compellingSurrogate's Court and respondent Cristina L. Lotz, Seneca County Clerk, to enter adefault judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215 (a), we conclude that "the extraordinaryremedy of mandamus does not lie . . . because petitioner has failed toestablish a clear legal right to the relief sought or that the relief sought involves theperformance of a purely ministerial act" (Matter of Platten v Dadd, 38 AD3d 1216, 1217 [2007],lv denied 9 NY3d 802 [2007]; see Matter of Tefft v Hutchinson, 93 AD3d 1332, 1333[2012]; Matter of Neal vWhite, 46 AD3d 156, 161 [2007]). CPLR 3215 (a) provides that, "[w]hen adefendant has failed to appear, plead or proceed to trial of an action reached and calledfor trial, or when the court orders a dismissal for any other neglect to proceed, theplaintiff may seek a default judgment against him. If the plaintiff's claim is for a sumcertain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, application may be madeto the clerk within one year after the default. The clerk, upon submission of the requisiteproof, shall enter judgment for the amount demanded in the complaint or stated in thenotice served pursuant to subdivision (b) of rule 305, plus costs and interest. . . Where the case is not one in which the clerk can enter judgment, theplaintiff shall apply to the court for judgment." Here, Wagner did not fail to appear in theestate matter; rather, he filed an answer with counterclaims and moved for summaryjudgment dismissing the petition. Thus, CPLR 3215 (a) does not apply, and Lotzproperly rejected petitioner's attempt to file a default judgment against Wagner.
With respect to petitioner's claims against Wagner and respondent Mark B. Wheeler,who was the attorney for Wagner in the estate matter, we agree with their contention thatthey are not "bod[ies] or officer[s]" against whom relief may be sought pursuant to CPLRarticle 78 (CPLR 7802 [a]). In any event, petitioner's claims against Wagner andWheeler, all of which arise from the assertion that their summary judgment motion waspremature pursuant to CPLR 3212 (a), are without merit. We further agree withrespondents that many, if not all, of petitioner's claims are barred by the four-monthstatute of limitations applicable to CPLR article 78 proceedings (see CPLR 217[1]; Wong, 271 AD2d at 452) and that petitioner's claims for money damagesagainst several of the respondents are barred by judicial immunity and quasi-judicialimmunity (see Welch v State of New York, 203 AD2d 80, 81 [1994]; seegenerally Mosher-Simons v County of Allegany, 99 NY2d 214, 219-220 [2002]).Petitioner's remaining claims for relief are unavailable in a CPLR article 78 proceedingand/or are wholly without merit (see generally Matter of Parry v County of Onondaga, 51 AD3d1385, 1386-1387 [2008]).
Finally, in light of the frivolous nature of this proceeding and petitioner's continuedabuse of the judicial system, we conclude that imposition of costs is appropriate (seegenerally Matter of Young v Costantino, 281 AD2d 988, 988 [2001]).Present—Scudder, P.J., Peradotto, Lindley and Sconiers, JJ.