| Blake v United States of Am. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 05609 [109 AD3d 504] |
| August 14, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Nancy Blake, Appellant, v United States ofAmerica, Respondent. |
—[*1] Kathryn Keneally, Assistant Attorney General of the United States (Joan I.Oppenheimer, Steven K. Uejio, pro hac vice, and Loretta E. Lynch, United StatesAttorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. [Peter Norling], of counsel), for respondent.
In an action pursuant to RPAPL article 15 for the determination of claims to realproperty, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County(Iannacci, J.), entered April 1, 2011, which denied her motion pursuant to CPLR 3215for leave to enter a judgment against the defendant upon the defendant's default in timelyanswering the complaint, and thereupon deemed the defendant's answer to be timelyserved.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
"To successfully oppose a motion for leave to enter a default judgment based on thefailure to appear or timely serve an answer, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonableexcuse for its delay and the existence of a potentially meritorious defense" (Wassertheil v Elburg, LLC, 94AD3d 753, 753 [2012]; seeWeinstein v Schacht, 98 AD3d 1106, 1107 [2012]; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. vRoldan, 80 AD3d 566, 567 [2011]). In its discretion, the court may accept lawoffice failure as an excuse (see CPLR 2005; Star Indus., Inc. v Innovative Beverages, Inc., 55 AD3d903, 904 [2008]; Papandreav Acevedo, 54 AD3d 915, 916 [2008]; Goldstein v Meadows Redevelopment Co Owners Corp. I, 46AD3d 509, 511 [2007]; Chiarello v Alessandro, 38 AD3d 823, 824 [2007]). Theclaim of law office failure should, however, be supported by a "detailed and credible"explanation of the default or defaults at issue (Henry v Kuveke, 9 AD3d 476, 479 [2004]). Law officefailure should not be excused where allegations of law office failure are conclusory andunsubstantiated (see WellsFargo Bank, N.A. v Cervini, 84 AD3d 789, 789-790 [2011]; Petersen v Lysaght, Lysaght &Kramer, P.C., 47 AD3d 783, 784 [2008]; Wechsler v First Unum Life Ins.Co., 295 AD2d 340, 341 [2002]).
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in accepting the defendant'sexcuse of law office failure, as the defendant provided detailed affidavits of personnelexplaining the delay in timely serving an answer. Moreover, contrary to the plaintiff'scontention, the defendant met its burden of demonstrating the existence of a potentiallymeritorious defense (see Matter of Feinberg, 18 NY2d 499 [1966]; see generally EvolutionImpressions, Inc. v Lewandowski, 59 AD3d 1039, [*2]1040 [2009]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properlydenied the plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a judgment of default against thedefendant.
Under the circumstances presented here, the Supreme Court providently exercised itsdiscretion in deeming the defendant's answer, which was annexed to its oppositionpapers to the plaintiff's motion, to be served, even in the absence of a formal notice ofcross motion seeking leave to serve a late answer (see Fried v Jacob Holding,Inc., 110 AD3d 56 [2013]; Fugazy v Fugazy, 44 AD3d613, 614 [2007]; Wechslerv People, 13 AD3d 941, 942 [2004]; Tulley v Straus, 265 AD2d 399,401 [1999]; Fox Wander W. Neighborhood Assn. v Luther Forest CommunityAssn., 178 AD2d 871, 872-873 [1991]; Catania v Lippman, 98 AD2d 826,826-827 [1983]). Mastro, J.P., Hall, Lott and Sgroi, JJ., concur.