| Matter of Gonzalez v Village of Port Chester |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 05691 [109 AD3d 614] |
| August 21, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Dolores Gonzalez et al.,Respondents, v Village of Port Chester et al.,Appellants. |
—[*1] Collins, Fitzpatrick & Schoene, LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Ralph F. Schoene ofcounsel), for respondents.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 in the nature of mandamus, inter alia, tocompel the Village of Port Chester and the Office of the Village Clerk of Port Chester togrant four applications of the petitioners for taxicab licenses, the appeal is from ajudgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Cacace, J.), entered February 17,2012, which granted the petition and directed the appellants to issue the subject taxicablicenses.
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the petition is denied,and the proceeding is dismissed.
On February 25, 2009, the Village Clerk of the Village of Port Chester issued to thepetitioner Dolores Gonzalez a taxicab dispatching license for the petitioner Coqui TaxiCorporation (hereinafter Coqui). On September 9, 2009, Coqui submitted an applicationto the Village for a taxicab license and, on September 10, 2009, Gonzalez submitted tothe Village three additional applications for taxicab licenses. On November 6, 2009, afterthe Village had failed to issue the four taxicab licenses, the petitioners commenced thisproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78. The petitioners alleged that the Village hadplaced them on a waiting list for taxicab licenses and that, as of the time they commencedthis proceeding, their four applications remained pending and had not been granted ordenied. The petitioners sought a judgment, inter alia, compelling the Village to grant thesubject applications and to issue the four taxicab licenses.
In answer to the petition, the Village relied, among other things, upon a provision inthe Village Code of the Village of Port Chester (hereinafter the Village Code), whichprovides, in relevant part, that "[p]ursuant to the authority granted to the Board ofTrustees under § 181 of the General Municipal Law, there shall not be more than75 taxi licenses in the Village of Port Chester at any time" (Village Code § 295-11[B]). The Village alleged that its placement of the petitioners on a waiting list was notarbitrary and capricious but, rather, was supported by valid and rational considerations inthat all 75 licenses authorized by the Village Code had been issued at the time theirapplications had been submitted.[*2]
In support of their petition, the petitioners reliedupon, inter alia, a study on taxicab service reform commissioned by the Village, whichculminated in a final report dated February 20, 2009, making several proposals, includinga gradual phase-out of the cap on the number of taxi licenses. In determining the instantpetition, the Supreme Court concluded that, given the evidence of a strong need forregulatory revision of its taxicab policies and a Village Code which "is clearly flawed,"the Village's failure to take any action on the petitioners' taxicab license applications wasarbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. Thus, the Supreme Court granted thepetition and directed the Village to issue the four licenses.
"The extraordinary remedy of mandamus is available in limited circumstances only tocompel the performance of a purely ministerial act which does not involve the exercise ofofficial discretion or judgment, and only when a clear legal right to the relief has beendemonstrated" (Matter of RoseWoods, LLC v Weisman, 85 AD3d 801, 802 [2011]; see Klostermann vCuomo, 61 NY2d 525, 539 [1984]; Matter of Robinson v Spinner, 101 AD3d 1130 [2012]). "Adiscretionary act involves the exercise of reasoned judgment which could typicallyproduce different acceptable results whereas a ministerial act envisions direct adherenceto a governing rule or standard with a compulsory result" (New York Civ. Liberties Union vState of New York, 4 NY3d 175, 184 [2005] [internal quotation marks andbrackets omitted]; see Tango v Tulevech, 61 NY2d 34, 41 [1983]). Thus,mandamus may be employed "to compel acts that officials are duty-bound to perform"(Klostermann v Cuomo, 61 NY2d at 540). However, mandamus will not lie tocompel the performance of a purely legislative function (see Matter of Structural Tech., Inc.v Foley, 56 AD3d 677, 678 [2008]; Matter of Wolff v Town/Village of Harrison, 30 AD3d432, 432-433 [2006]). "[T]he courts must be careful to avoid . . . thefashioning of orders or judgments that go beyond any mandatory directives of existingstatutes and regulations and intrude upon the policy-making and discretionary decisionsthat are reserved to the legislative and executive branches" (Klostermann vCuomo, 61 NY2d at 541).
Here, the petitioners did not merely seek to compel the Village to make adetermination on their applications for taxicab licenses. Rather, the petitioners sought tocompel a particular result, namely, the granting of their applications and the issuance ofthe subject licenses. The relief sought by the petitioners was not in the nature of aministerial act which the Village was duty-bound to perform. To the contrary, the Villagewould have violated Village Code § 295-11 (B) had it issued the licenses. Therelief sought by the petitioners, in effect, required an amendment to the Village Code toremove the cap on the number of taxicab licenses, a legislative act which cannot becompelled by mandamus in a CPLR article 78 proceeding (see Matter of StructuralTech., Inc. v Foley, 56 AD3d at 678; Matter of Wolff v Town/Village ofHarrison, 30 AD3d at 433).
Accordingly, the petitioners failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the reliefsought, and the Supreme Court should have denied the petition and dismissed theproceeding. Angiolillo, J.P., Chambers, Roman and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.