| People v Uribe |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 05843 [109 AD3d 844] |
| September 11, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Juan Carlos Uribe, Appellant. |
—[*1] Kathleen M. Rice, District Attorney, Mineola, N.Y. (Judith R. Sternberg, Sarah S.Rabinowitz, Ilisa Fleischer, and Monica M.C. Leiter of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County(Sullivan, J.), rendered January 30, 2012, convicting him of vehicular manslaughter inthe second degree, reckless endangerment in the second degree, reckless driving, drivingwhile ability impaired by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug ordrugs in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (4-a), and speeding, upon ajury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People vContes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that the evidence was legally sufficient toestablish the defendant's guilt of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree beyond areasonable doubt. Moreover, upon our independent review pursuant to CPL 470.15 (5),we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to vehicular manslaughter in the second degreewas not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
The trial court's original charge to the jury with respect to the definition of "cause ofdeath," which was in accordance with the language contained in the Criminal JuryInstructions, was proper (see CJI2d[NY] Penal Law art 125—Causation;People v Prospect, 50AD3d 1064, 1064 [2008]; People v Lubrano, 43 AD3d 829, 830 [2007]; People v Pedro, 36 AD3d832, 833 [2007]; People v McDonald, 283 AD2d 592, 593 [2001]).Contrary to the defendant's contention, the court responded meaningfully to the jury'sinquiry during deliberations regarding the scope of reasonable foreseeability by rereadingthe original charge (see Peoplev Santi, 3 NY3d 234, 248-249 [2004]; People v Malloy, 55 NY2d 296,303 [1982], cert denied 459 US 847 [1982]; People v Dawkins, 151AD2d 495, 497 [1989]; see generally People v Almodovar, 62 NY2d 126, 131[1984]).
The County Court correctly imposed an interlock ignition requirement as an elementof the defendant's sentence (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1192[4-a]; 1198 [2]). The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte,90 AD2d 80 [1982]). Dillon, J.P., Dickerson, Austin and Miller, JJ., concur.