| People v Inoa |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 06090 [109 AD3d 765] |
| September 26, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Jose Inoa, Appellant. |
—[*1] Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Christopher P. Marinelli ofcounsel), for respondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Gregory Carro, J.), renderedDecember 14, 2010, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of murder in the first andsecond degrees, attempted murder in the second degree, conspiracy in the second degree,assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second and thirddegrees, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of 73
The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting a detective to testify as anexpert with regard to coded or unexplained language contained in recordedconversations, and the detective did not go beyond the proper bounds of expert testimony(see People v Polanco, 50AD3d 587, 587 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 834 [2008]; see alsoPeople v Brown, 97 NY2d 500, 505 [2002]). The expert's opinion was based on"facts in evidence or on those personally known and testified to by the expert"(People v Jones, 73 NY2d 427, 430 [1989]), and he properly relied oninformation "of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable" or provided by "a witnesssubject to full cross-examination" (id.). "In interpreting the codedcommunications . . . the expert properly placed them in light of other factsalready in evidence, including facts personally known and testified to by him" (People v Contreras, 28 AD3d393, 394 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 847 [2006]). To the extent anyof the expert testimony could be viewed as improper, we find the error to be harmless(see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975]).
We do not find that there was anything in the testimony of the People's principal factwitness that warrants reversal. While the People employed some leading questions, andthe witness sometimes gave her interpretation of facts in evidence, the court acted withinits discretion in according the People appropriate leeway in these matters, and thewitness's testimony was not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Anyhearsay in the witness's testimony constituted declarations made by coconspirators duringthe course and in furtherance of the conspiracy (see People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 148 [2005]), or wasotherwise admissible. In any event, we likewise find any error to be harmless.
To the extent defendant is raising a Confrontation Clause argument concerning anyalleged hearsay introduced through either of the above-discussed witnesses, we find that[*2]argument to be without merit. The People did notintroduce any testimonial statements made by nontestifying declarants (see generallyCrawford v Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]).
We have considered and rejected defendant's challenges to the sufficiency of theevidence establishing that he murdered the victim for hire as set forth in Penal Law§ 125.27 (1) (a) (vi) and to the admissibility of evidence of an uncharged crime.Concur—Sweeny, J.P., DeGrasse, Manzanet-Daniels and Clark, JJ.