| Ramos v Hughes |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 06129 [109 AD3d 1121] |
| September 27, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Burt G. Ramos, Respondent, v Timothy P. Hughes,Appellant. |
—[*1] Kenney Shelton Liptak Nowak LLP, Buffalo (Thomas Digati of counsel), forplaintiff-respondent.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Diane Y. Devlin, J.),entered June 19, 2012. The order, among other things, granted that part of the motion ofplaintiff seeking dismissal of defendant's fourth and fifth counterclaims.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously modified on thelaw by denying that part of the motion seeking dismissal of the fourth and fifthcounterclaims and reinstating those counterclaims and as modified the order is affirmedwithout costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking partition of real propertyowned by the parties. In his answer, defendant asserted various counterclaims, includingfor breach of an unwritten domestic partnership agreement (fourth and fifthcounterclaims). Thereafter, plaintiff moved, inter alia, to dismiss the counterclaims. Asrelevant to this appeal, Supreme Court granted that part of the motion seeking dismissalof the fourth and fifth counterclaims.
We agree with defendant that he asserted legally cognizable counterclaims for breachof a domestic partnership agreement. On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211,pleadings are to be liberally construed (see Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87[1994]; see also CPLR 3026). The court is to "accept the facts as alleged in the[pleading] as true, accord [the proponent of the pleading] the benefit of every possiblefavorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within anycognizable legal theory" (Leon, 84 NY2d at 87-88). "[T]he criterion is whetherthe proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he [or she] has statedone" (id. at 88 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Parker v Leonard, 24AD3d 1255, 1256 [2005]). With respect to domestic partnership agreements, "NewYork courts have long accepted the concept that an express agreement betweenunmarried persons living together is as enforceable as though they were not livingtogether . . . , provided only that illicit sexual relations were not 'part of theconsideration of the contract' " (Morone v Morone, 50 NY2d 481, 486 [1980]).Additionally, there is no statutory requirement that such a contract be in writing (seeid. at 488). We conclude that here defendant sufficiently pleaded counterclaims forbreach of a domestic partnership agreement and that the court therefore erred indismissing the fourth and fifth counterclaims (see id. at 485-488). Thus, wemodify the order accordingly. Present—Scudder, P.J., Peradotto, Carni, Valentinoand Whalen, JJ.