| People v Worthy |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 06148 [109 AD3d 1140] |
| September 27, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vDevine Worthy, Appellant. (Appeal No. 1.) |
—[*1] Frank A. Sedita, III, District Attorney, Buffalo (David A. Heraty of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Erie County Court (Thomas P. Franczyk, J.),rendered September 23, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a nonjuryverdict, of criminal contempt in the first degree (two counts) and endangering the welfareof a child.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: In appeal No. 1, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting himfollowing a nonjury trial of two counts of criminal contempt in the first degree (PenalLaw § 215.51 [c]) and one count of endangering the welfare of a child (§260.10 [1]). In appeal No. 2, defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him,following the same nonjury trial, of two counts each of criminal contempt in the firstdegree (§ 215.51 [c]) and criminal contempt in the second degree (§ 215.50[3]). All of the criminal contempt convictions arise from defendant's multiple violationsof a no-contact order of protection issued for the benefit of his girlfriend, who is also themother of his child. We reject defendant's contention that the evidence is legallyinsufficient to establish that he intended to violate the order of protection. A copy of theorder of protection was served on defendant in court, where he was advised of itsprincipal terms, including the meaning of "no-contact," and the evidence conclusivelyestablishes that defendant violated the order of protection with respect to each count.Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People vContes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]), we conclude that "there is a valid line ofreasoning and permissible inferences that could lead a rational person to conclude thatdefendant knew of the existence of the order of protection and intentionally violated it"(People v Harris, 72 AD3d1492, 1492 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 774 [2010]; see generally Peoplev Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Contrary to defendant's further contention,viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes in this nonjury trial (see People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of theevidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495).
We reject defendant's further contention that his interview with a Child ProtectiveServices (CPS) caseworker was "so pervaded by governmental involvement" that itconstituted state action in violation of his right to counsel (People v Ray, 65NY2d 282, 286 [1985]; cf.People v [*2]Wilhelm, 34 AD3d 40, 46-48[2006]; People v Greene, 306 AD2d 639, 640-641 [2003], lv denied 100NY2d 594 [2003]). In any event, any error in admitting defendant's statements to theCPS caseworker is harmless because, "[i]n light of the totality of the evidence, there is noreasonable possibility that the error affected [County Court's] verdict" (People v Douglas, 4 NY3d777, 779 [2005]; seegenerally People v Lopez, 16 NY3d 375, 386-387 [2011]; People v Doll, 98 AD3d356, 367 [2012]). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.Present—Smith, J.P., Carni, Sconiers and Valentino, JJ.