| Summers v Spada |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 06198 [109 AD3d 1192] |
| September 27, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Glenn B. Summers, Respondent, v Peter A. Spadaet al., Appellants. |
—[*1]
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Joseph R. Glownia, J.),entered May 8, 2012. The order, among other things, denied the motion of defendants forsummary judgment.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed withoutcosts.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action seeking damages for injuries heallegedly sustained when the vehicle he was driving collided with a vehicle owned bydefendant Barbara Ann Spada and operated by defendant Peter A. Spada. Defendantsmoved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiff didnot sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Wenote at the outset that, although plaintiff failed to allege in his bill of particulars that hesustained a serious injury under any of the categories set forth in the statute, the partiesaddressed the permanent consequential limitation of use, significant limitation of use and90/180-day categories in their motion papers and briefs on appeal, and we likewiseaddress those categories.
Supreme Court properly denied the motion. Defendants' own submissions in supportof the motion raise triable issues of fact whether plaintiff sustained a serious injury underthe permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories.The physician who conducted independent medical examinations of plaintiff concurredwith the reports of imaging studies of plaintiff's spine, which provided the requisiteobjective evidence of injury (see generally Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98NY2d 345, 350 [2002]), and he further provided a "designation of a numeric percentageof . . . plaintiff's loss of range of motion [that] can be used to substantiate aclaim of serious injury" (id.; see Matte v Hall, 20 AD3d 898, 899 [2005]). Thephysician's conclusion that the abnormalities in plaintiff's imaging studies are age-relatedand unrelated to the accident is inconsistent with his contemporaneous conclusion thatplaintiff "has no medical condition not related to the accident" and is thus insufficient toestablish defendants' entitlement to judgment on the issue of causation (see generally Jackson v Leung,99 AD3d 489, 489 [2012]; McCree v Sam Trans Corp., 82 AD3d 601, 601 [2011]).[*2]
Defendants also failed to meet their burden withrespect to the 90/180-day category of serious injury inasmuch as defendants' ownsubmissions also raise triable issues of fact with respect to that category (see Zeigler v Ramadhan, 5AD3d 1080, 1081 [2004]). The employment and medical records submitted bydefendants indicate that, during the two years following the accident, plaintiff was absentfrom work or his duties were significantly restricted at the direction of his treatingchiropractor (see Matte, 20 AD3d at 899; see also Limardi v McLeod, 100 AD3d 1375, 1377 [2012];Sewell v Kaplan, 298 AD2d 840, 841-842 [2001]). In light of defendants' failureto meet their initial burden on the motion, there is no need to consider the sufficiency ofplaintiff's opposition thereto (see Matte, 20 AD3d at 899).Present—Scudder, P.J., Fahey, Sconiers and Valentino, JJ.