| Matter of Opportune N. v Clarence N. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 06315 [110 AD3d 430] |
| October 1, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| In the Matter of Opportune N.,Respondent, v Clarence N., Appellant. |
—[*1] Geanine Towers, P.C., Brooklyn (Geanine Towers of counsel), for respondent. Julian A. Hertz, Larchmont, attorney for the child.
Order, Family Court, New York County (Carol J. Goldstein, Ref.), entered on orabout September 2, 2010, which, after a fact-finding hearing in proceedings broughtpursuant to article 8 of the Family Court Act, determined that respondent husband hadcommitted the family offenses of attempted assault in the second degree; attemptedassault in the third degree; menacing in the third degree; disorderly conduct; harassmentin the second degree (two counts), and aggravated harassment in the second degree (twocounts), unanimously affirmed, without costs.
It is undisputed that respondent submitted to the jurisdiction of the Family Court byappearing in the family offense proceeding commenced by petitioner wife, who was thenresiding in a shelter in New York State, and the Family Court therefore had personaljurisdiction over him. Family Court's subject matter jurisdiction over a family offense isnot limited by geography (see Family Ct Act §§ 812, 818), and thecourt therefore could receive evidence and make fact-findings concerning incidents thatoccurred in Pennsylvania before respondent's wife moved to New York with herdaughters (see Matter ofRichardson v Richardson, 80 AD3d 32, 37-38 [2d Dept 2010]).
The determination that respondent committed the family offenses as enumeratedabove is supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence (see Family Ct Act§§ 812 [1]; 832). The court's credibility determinations are supported by therecord, and there is no basis to disturb them (see Matter of Lisa S. v William V., 95 AD3d 666 [1st Dept2012]).
Respondent's arguments concerning the order of protection issued on August 24,2012 are not properly before this Court since he did not appeal from that order. In anyevent, an appeal from that order, except to the extent it gives rise to a permanent andsignificant stigma that might [*2]adversely affectrespondent in future proceedings, would be moot since it has expired by its terms (see Matter of Diallo v Diallo,68 AD3d 411 [1st Dept 2009], lv dismissed 14 NY3d 854 [2010]).Concur—Andrias, J.P., Sweeny, Acosta, Saxe and Clark, JJ.