| People v Gordon |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 06382 [110 AD3d 736] |
| October 2, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Christopher Gordon, Appellant. |
—[*1] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Ann Bordley,and Adam M. Koelsch of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Garnett, J.), rendered November 18, 2009, convicting him of grand larceny in thesecond degree, grand larceny in the third degree, petit larceny, and criminal possession ofa forged instrument in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposingsentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his present contentionsregarding the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial groundspursuant to CPL 30.30 (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Beasley, 16 NY3d 289, 293 [2011]; People vLuperon, 85 NY2d 71, 78 [1995]; People v Robinson, 47 AD3d 847, 848 [2008]). In anyevent, although the Supreme Court (Walsh, J.) erred in basing its denial on CPL 30.30(4) (f), the motion was properly denied on other grounds. "CPL 30.30 (1) (a) mandatesthat the People be ready for the trial of a felony within six months . . . fromthe commencement of the criminal action. Failure to be ready within six months willresult in dismissal of the indictment unless the prosecution can show that certain timeperiods should be excluded" (People v Chavis, 91 NY2d 500, 504-505 [1998];see People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795, 798 [1998]). Here, the People validlydeclared their readiness at the time they commenced the criminal action by filing theindictment. While the People will be charged with periods of "postreadiness" delaywhere "it is the People's dereliction that is preventing the defendant's trial from goingforward . . . postreadiness delay attributable to the court is not charged tothe People" (People v Goss, 87 NY2d 792, 797 [1996] [citation and internalquotation marks omitted]; see People v McKenna, 76 NY2d 59, 64 [1990]). Thepostreadiness delay at issue here occurred between the filing of the indictment on March21, 2008, and the defendant's arraignment on September 25, 2008. Because "[a]rraigninga defendant upon indictment is exclusively a court function" (People v Goss, 87NY2d at 797; see CPL 210.10), "[r]esponsibility for scheduling an arraignmentdate and securing a defendant's appearance lies with the court, not the People.Consequently, the People cannot be charged with the delay between the People'spre-arraignment declaration of readiness and defendant's arraignment[ ]" (People vCarter, 91 NY2d at 799 [citation omitted]; see People v Goss, 87 NY2d at797; People v Beltre-Pineda, 244 AD2d 962 [1997]).[*2]
The defendant's argument that the evidence waslegally insufficient to support his convictions is partially unpreserved for appellatereview (see CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light mostfavorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983]),we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond areasonable doubt (see People v Johnson, 65 NY2d 556 [1985]). Moreover, infulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of theevidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we neverthelessaccord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony,and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], certdenied 542 US 946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not againstthe weight of the evidence (seePeople v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]). Dillon, J.P., Angiolillo, Leventhal andLott, JJ., concur.