| Guzzo v Guzzo |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 06546 [110 AD3d 765] |
| October 9, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Barney Guzzo, Respondent, v Susanne Guzzo,Appellant. |
—[*1] Barney Guzzo, Sayville, N.Y., respondent pro se.
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant appeals from an order ofthe Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Quinn, J.), dated January 23, 2012, which grantedher application for an award of an attorney's fee only to the extent of awarding her anattorney's fee in the sum of $35,000.
Ordered that on the Court's own motion, the notice of appeal is treated as anapplication for leave to appeal, and leave to appeal is granted (see CPLR 5701[c]); and it is further,
Ordered that the order is modified, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, bydeleting the provision thereof awarding the defendant an attorney's fee in the sum of$35,000, and substituting therefor a provision awarding the defendant an attorney's fee inthe sum of $100,000; as so modified, the order is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.
The parties were married in 1997. In 2006, the plaintiff commenced this action for adivorce. After the parties entered into a stipulation of settlement, the defendant appliedfor an award of an attorney's fee in the sum of $161,707.21. The Supreme Court grantedthe defendant's application to the extent of awarding her an attorney's fee in the sum of$35,000.
An award of reasonable counsel fees in a matrimonial action is a matter within thediscretion of the trial court (see Domestic Relations Law § 237;DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879, 881 [1987]; Quinn v Quinn, 73 AD3d887 [2010]). In determining an application for such fees, the trial court mustconsider, inter alia, the relative financial circumstances of the parties (see Siskind v Siskind, 89AD3d 832 [2011]; Quinn vQuinn, 73 AD3d 887 [2010]; Raynor v Raynor, 68 AD3d 835, 839 [2009]; Peritore v Peritore, 50 AD3d874, 875 [2008]). Further, the trial court may also take into account whether oneparty has engaged in conduct or taken positions resulting in delay or unnecessarylitigation (see Khan vAhmed, 98 AD3d 471, 473 [2012]; Chaudry v Chaudry, 95 AD3d 1058 [2012]; Siskind v Siskind, 89 AD3d832 [2011]; Aloi vSimoni, 82 AD3d 683, 686-687 [2011]; Quinn v Quinn, 73 AD3d 887 [2010]; Levy v Levy, 4 AD3d398, 398-[*2]399 [2004]).
Here, there is a significant income disparity between the parties, and, as the SupremeCourt recognized, the plaintiff's egregious tactics unnecessarily prolonged the litigationand caused the defendant to incur additional legal fees. Under these circumstances, thedefendant should have been awarded $100,000 of her outstanding attorney's fee of$158,207 (see Khan v Ahmed, 98 AD3d at 473; Raynor v Raynor, 68AD3d at 839; Peritore v Peritore, 50 AD3d at 875; Levy v Levy, 4 AD3dat 398-399). Skelos, J.P., Balkin, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.