| Matter of Marquis B. v Alexis H. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 06561 [110 AD3d 790] |
| October 9, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Marquis B., Appellant, v Alexis H.et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Mitra K. Zervos, Great Neck, N.Y., for respondent Alexis H. William A. Sheeckutz, East Meadow, N.Y., for respondent Rason B. John M. Zenir, Mineola, N.Y., attorney for the child.
In a child custody proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the petitionerappeals from an order of the Family Court, Nassau County (Eisman, J.), dated April 3,2012, which, after a hearing, granted the motion of the attorney for the child to dismissthe proceeding on the ground that the petitioner lacked standing to commence theproceeding.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
This Court previously affirmed a determination that the appellant is equitablyestopped from asserting that he is the biological father of the child (see Matter of Rason S.B. v AlexisH., 101 AD3d 710, 711 [2012]; Matter of Juanita A. v Kenneth Mark N., 15 NY3d 1[2010]; Matter of Shondel J. vMark D., 7 NY3d 320, 326 [2006]). Contrary to the appellant's contention, thedetermination that he was equitably estopped from claiming paternity has res judicataeffect in the instant case and precludes him from claiming that he is a parent of the child(see Matter of Weaver vDurfey, 93 AD3d 1185 [2012]; Matter of Michael H. v Carole S.D., 198AD2d 414 [1993]).
A nonparent may have standing to seek custody in the event "extraordinarycircumstances" warrant it (Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d 543, 545[1976]). Such extraordinary circumstances include " 'surrender, abandonment, persistingneglect, [or] unfitness' " by the parents (Matter of Dickson v Lascaris, 53 NY2d204, 208 [1981], quoting Matter of Bennett v Jeffreys, 40 NY2d at 544; see Matter of Herrera vVallejo, 107 AD3d 714 [2013]; Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. ofCity of N.Y. [Sarah P.], 216 AD2d 387 [1995]). Here, there are no allegations thatthe legal parents of the child surrendered, abandoned, or neglected the child, or wereunfit, and there are no allegations of any other extraordinary circumstances.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the proceeding for lack of standing was properlygranted. Skelos, J.P., Hall, Cohen and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.