| Matter of Dajahn M. |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 06575 [110 AD3d 812] |
| October 9, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Dajahn M., a Person Alleged to be aJuvenile Delinquent, Appellant. |
—[*1] Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Edward F.X. Hart andMarta Ross of counsel; Vanessa Kong on the brief), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, DajahnM. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Elkins, J.),dated April 13, 2012, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court dated February2, 2012, made after a hearing, finding that he committed acts, which, if committed by anadult, would have constituted the crimes of robbery in the third degree, grand larceny inthe fourth degree, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, adjudgedhim to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for a period of 12 months.The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated February 2, 2012.
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed theappellant on probation for a period of 12 months is dismissed as academic, without costsor disbursements; and it is further,
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs ordisbursements.
The appeal from so much of the order of disposition as placed the appellant onprobation for a period of 12 months has been rendered academic, as the period ofplacement has expired. However, because there may be collateral consequences resultingfrom the adjudication of delinquency, the appeal from so much of the order ofdisposition as adjudicated the appellant a juvenile delinquent, and which brings up forreview the fact-finding order, has not been rendered academic (see Family Ct Act§ 783; Matter of Dorothy D., 49 NY2d 212 [1980]).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (seeMatter of David H., 69 NY2d 792, 793 [1987]), we find that it was legally sufficientto establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant's identity as the person whocommitted the acts complained of (see Matter of Kalexis R., 79 AD3d 755, 756 [2010]; Matter of Rodolfo M., 79AD3d 752 [2010]; Matterof Brooklyn B., 77 AD3d 934, 935 [2010]). Moreover, in fulfilling ourresponsibility to conduct an [*2]independent review ofthe weight of the evidence (seeMatter of Danielle B., 94 AD3d 757, 758 [2012]; Matter of Hasan C., 59 AD3d617, 617-618 [2009]; cf. CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d342, 348 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder'sopportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see Matter of Leonel T., 78AD3d 1188, 1189 [2010]; Matter of Brooklyn B., 77 AD3d at 935). Uponreviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the Family Court's fact-findingdetermination with regard to the appellant's identity was not against the weight of theevidence (see Matter of Kalexis R., 79 AD3d at 756; Matter of RodolfoM., 79 AD3d at 752; Matter of Brooklyn B., 77 AD3d at 935). Rivera, J.P.,Lott, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.