| Koeppel-Vulpis v Lucente |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 06661 [110 AD3d 851] |
| October 16, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Allison Koeppel-Vulpis, Appellant, v Michael G.Lucente et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Russo Apoznanski & Tambasco, Westbury, N.Y. (Sonia Michelle Gassan ofcounsel), for respondents.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from (1)an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Brown, J.), entered February 3, 2012,which denied her motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, and (2) an orderof the same court entered June 5, 2012, which denied her motion for leave to renew andreargue her motion for summary judgment.
Ordered that the order entered February 3, 2012, is affirmed; and it is further,
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order entered June 5, 2012, as deniedthat branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to reargue her motion forsummary judgment is dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order denying reargument; andit is further,
Ordered that the order entered June 5, 2012, is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it isfurther,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants.
The plaintiff's contention that the Supreme Court erred in denying her motion forsummary judgment is without merit. A plaintiff driver is entitled to summary judgmenton the issue of liability if he or she demonstrates that the sole proximate cause of theaccident was the defendant driver's violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141 inturning left directly into the path of the plaintiff's oncoming vehicle, which was lawfullypresent in the intersection (seeReyes v Marchese, 96 AD3d 926 [2012]; Gause v Martinez, 91 AD3d 595 [2012]). The plaintifffailed to demonstrate her prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on the issue ofliability. The conflicting testimony submitted by the plaintiff regarding the circumstancessurrounding the accident raised triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant MichaelG. Lucente violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141 and, if so, whether suchviolation was the sole proximate cause of the accident (see Steiner v Dincesen, 95AD3d 877 [2012]; Gause vMartinez, 91 AD3d 595 [2012]; Boodlall v Herrera, 90 AD3d 590 [2011]).[*2]
The Supreme Court did not err in denying thatbranch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to renew. A motion for leave torenew shall be based, inter alia, upon new facts not offered on the prior motion thatwould change the prior determination, and shall contain reasonable justification for thefailure to present such facts on the prior motion (see CPLR 2221 [e]). Here, thepurported new facts set forth in the plaintiff's motion were known to her at the time shemade her motion for summary judgment, and she failed to demonstrate a reasonablejustification for failing to submit them at that time (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Wilkins, 97 AD3d527 [2012]; Matter ofLeone Props., LLC v Board of Assessors for Town of Cornwall, 81 AD3d 649[2011]). In any event, the purported new facts would not have changed the priordetermination (see Rose vLevine, 98 AD3d 1015 [2012]; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Wilkins, 97 AD3d 527[2012]), as they do not resolve the existing questions of fact. Mastro, J.P., Angiolillo,Leventhal and Chambers, JJ., concur.