Matter of Hodiantov v Aronov
2013 NY Slip Op 06683 [110 AD3d 881]
October 16, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, November 27, 2013


In the Matter of Raisa Hodiantov,Respondent,
v
Yuriy Aronov, Appellant.

[*1]Christopher J. Robles, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant.

Jennifer Reddin-Eliou, Whitestone, N.Y., for respondent.

In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Yuriy Aronovappeals from an order of protection of the Family Court, Queens County (Jolly, J.), datedJuly 24, 2012, which, after a fact-finding and dispositional hearing, and upon a relatedfact-finding order, made after the hearing, finding that he committed certain familyoffenses, directed him, inter alia, to stay away from the petitioner for a period up to andincluding July 24, 2014.

Ordered that upon the appeal from the order of protection, so much of thefact-finding order as found that Yuriy Aronov committed the family offense of disorderlyconduct is vacated; and it is further,

Ordered that the order of protection is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

"A family offense must be established by a fair preponderance of the evidence" (Matter of Thomas v Thomas,72 AD3d 834, 835 [2010]; see Family Ct Act § 832). "Thedetermination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolvedby the Family Court" (Matter ofKanterakis v Kanterakis, 102 AD3d 784, 785 [2013] [internal quotation marksomitted]). "The Family Court's determination regarding the credibility of witnesses isentitled to great weight on appeal, and will not be disturbed if supported by the record"(id.; see Matter of Cruzv Rodriguez, 96 AD3d 838 [2012]; Matter of Lamparillo v Lamparillo, 84 AD3d 1381 [2011]).

Here, a fair preponderance of the credible evidence adduced at the fact-findinghearing supported a finding that the appellant committed the family offense ofharassment in the second degree (see Penal Law § 240.26 [1]; Matter of Scanziani vHairston, 100 AD3d 1007, 1008 [2012]; Matter of Sperling v Sperling, 96 AD3d 1067 [2012]), aswell as the family offense of menacing in the third degree (see Penal Law§ 120.15; Matter ofBaginski v Rostkowski, 96 AD3d 1051 [2012]; Matter of Sinclair vBatista-Mall, 50 AD3d 1044 [2008]). However, there was insufficient evidencethat the appellant committed the family offense of disorderly conduct (see PenalLaw § 240.20; Cassie vCassie, 109 AD3d 337 [2013]; Matter of Aruti v Aruti, 88 AD3d 700, 701 [2011]; Matter of Hasbrouck vHasbrouck, 59 AD3d 621, 622 [2009]; Matter of Bartley v Bartley, 48 AD3d 678, 678-679[2008]).[*2]

Although we have concluded that the finding thatthe appellant committed the family offense of disorderly conduct must be vacated,nevertheless, under all of the circumstances of this case, we find no basis to disturb theorder of protection (see Matterof Maiorino v Maiorino, 107 AD3d 717 [2013]; Matter of Jackson v Idlett, 103AD3d 723 [2013]). Rivera, J.P., Lott, Sgroi and Miller, JJ., concur.


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