| Matter of Boyd v State Univ. of N.Y. at Cortland |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 06751 [110 AD3d 1174] |
| October 17, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Matthew Boyd, Petitioner, v StateUniversity of New York at Cortland et al., Respondents. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Jonathan D. Hitsous of counsel),for respondents.
Peters, P.J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court byorder of the Supreme Court, entered in Cortland County) to review a determination ofrespondent Vice President for Student Affairs of the State University of New York atCortland which, among other things, placed petitioner on disciplinary suspension.
In February 2011, petitioner, then a student at respondent State University of NewYork at Cortland (hereinafter SUNY Cortland), was charged with violating twoprovisions of SUNY Cortland's Code of Student Conduct (hereinafter the Code), namely,harassment and failure to abide by federal, state, and/or local laws. The charges werebased upon allegations that he harassed a female student attending the University ofDelaware (hereinafter the victim) through the use of phone calls, text messages and otherthreatening behavior, resulting in a Delaware warrant for his arrest. At the SUNYCortland disciplinary hearing, a University of Delaware police officer recounted hisinterview with the victim regarding the communications she allegedly received. Thevictim neither appeared nor testified. Following the hearing, the Hearing Panel foundpetitioner to be in violation of both provisions of the Code charged and recommended hisimmediate permanent dismissal to the Suspension Review Panel. After reviewing arecording of the hearing and written material submitted in the case, the Suspension [*2]Review Panel upheld "the findings and sanction."
Petitioner appealed to respondent C. Gregory Sharer, SUNY Cortland's VicePresident for Student Affairs, challenging the weight of the evidence and the process thatthe Hearing Panel afforded him. Upon his review, Sharer concluded that petitioner wasnot denied a fair hearing and confirmed the finding of guilt on both charges, butmodified the sanction by suspending petitioner until August 2015. Petitioner commencedthis proceeding seeking to annul the disciplinary determination, which was transferred tothis Court (see CPLR 7804 [g]).
We reject petitioner's contention that the Hearing Panel failed to substantially adhereto its rules and regulations published in the Code (see Matter of Schwarzmueller v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam,105 AD3d 1117, 1118 [2013]; Matter of Hyman v Cornell Univ., 82 AD3d 1309, 1310[2011]). Although petitioner correctly notes that the Code requires the "complainant" topresent his or her own case, the "complainant" is defined as "any person or persons whohave filed disciplinary charges against a student." Here, the complainant was SUNYCortland's Director of Judicial Affairs. Thus, petitioner's contention that the HearingPanel did not comply with the Code because the victim did not present the case isunavailing. Furthermore, as the victim was not called as a witness by either side andnothing in the Code establishes that the victim is a party to a disciplinary proceeding, wefind that the Hearing Panel substantially complied with its rule requiring it to affordpetitioner the opportunity to question all parties. Moreover, contrary to petitioner'sadditional assertion, the Hearing Panel substantially complied with the Code byproceeding with a four-member hearing panel consisting of two student justices and twofaculty justices (see Matter of Hyman v Cornell Univ., 82 AD3d at 1310), and hisclaim that the selection process for student and faculty members did not conform to theCode is not supported by the record.
We do agree, however, that petitioner was denied due process because the HearingPanel failed to set forth detailed factual findings in its disciplinary determination. In adisciplinary proceeding at a public institution of higher education, due process entitles astudent accused of misconduct to "a statement detailing the factual findings and theevidence relied upon by the decision-maker in reaching the determination of guilt"(Matter of Kalinsky v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 161 AD2d 1006, 1007[1990]; see Matter of Schwarzmueller v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 105AD3d at 1119; Matter of Rauer v State Univ. of N.Y., Univ. at Albany, 159AD2d 835, 836 [1990]). Recognized as one of the " 'rudimentary elements of fair play' "in this context (Matter of Kalinsky v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 161AD2d at 1007, quoting Dixon v Alabama State Bd. of Ed., 294 F2d 150, 159[1961], cert denied 368 US 930 [1961]), "[s]uch a statement is necessary topermit the student to effectively challenge the determination in administrative appealsand in the courts and to ensure that the decision was based on evidence in the record"(Matter of Kalinsky v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 161 AD2d at 1007).
Here, petitioner was charged with both harassment as defined under the Code as wellas violating Delaware law by committing the crimes of harassment and terroristicthreatening. The charges were based upon his alleged dissemination of variouscommunications to the victim on four separates dates between October 8, 2010 andNovember 1, 2010. Notably, Delaware law sets forth a number of different courses ofconduct that may constitute the crime of harassment (see 11 Del Code §1311 [a] [1], [2], [3], [4], [5]) and terroristic threatening (see 11 Del Code§ 621 [a] [1], [2], [3]). Yet, the Hearing Panel's determination contains only aconclusory statement that petitioner "harassed and threatened [the victim]." Although[*3]such determination states that it was "based upon thetestimony of the University of Delaware police officer and the incident report providedby the University of Delaware," it fails to set forth the specific conduct that constitutedthe basis for the finding of guilt on the charges of harassment and violating Delawarelaw, and wholly lacks any factual findings concerning the elements of the Delawarecrimes. Shockingly, it even fails to indicate which Delaware crime(s) petitioner wasfound to have committed.[FN*]The determinations of the Suspension Review Panel and Sharer suffer from the samedeficiencies, as they simply uphold the "findings" of the Hearing Panel. In our view, theabsence of any such detailed factual findings has precluded petitioner from effectivelychallenging the determinations of guilt and forecloses any meaningful appellate reviewby this Court (see Matter of Kalinsky v State Univ. of N.Y. at Binghamton, 161AD2d at 1007).
We therefore remit the matter to SUNY Cortland for the Hearing Panel to provide astatement to petitioner detailing the factual findings supporting the determinations ofguilt, after which petitioner shall be given the opportunity to challenge the determinationadministratively. In light of our decision, we do not reach petitioner's challenge to thesufficiency of the evidence supporting the disciplinary determination.
Stein, McCarthy and Spain, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is annulled,without costs, and matter remitted to respondent State University of New York atCortland for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.
Footnote *: Indeed, the only recordevidence concerning the elements of the Delaware crimes of harassment and terroristicthreatening was provided by the University of Delaware police officer at the disciplinaryhearing. When asked by the Hearing Panel to provide the elements of the Delawarecrimes, the officer replied that he "[did not] have them right now," but went on to testifyto his understanding of the legal definitions of those crimes. Notably, the officer'sexplanation of the crimes contained a substantially abridged and differing set of elementsfrom those found in the Delaware Criminal Code (see 11 Del Code§§ 621, 1311).