Matter of Xerox Corp. v New York State Tax AppealsTrib.
2013 NY Slip Op 06899 [110 AD3d 1262]
October 24, 2013
Appellate Division, Third Department
As corrected through Wednesday, November 27, 2013


In the Matter of Xerox Corporation, Petitioner, v New YorkState Tax Appeals Tribunal et al., Respondents.

—[*1]Hodgson Russ, LLP, Buffalo (Christopher L. Doyle of counsel), for petitioner.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Paul Groenwegen of counsel), forCommissioner of Taxation and Finance, respondent.

Spain, J. Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in this Court pursuant toTax Law § 2016) to review a determination of respondent Tax Appeals Tribunalwhich denied petitioner's request for a refund of corporate franchise tax imposed underTax Law article 9-A.

Petitioner is a New York corporation that manufactures and sells office equipmentand supplies and provides related services. It sells its goods and services outright and,more commonly, through a variety of contractual pay-over-time financing agreementsthat bundle the goods, services and/or supplies for its governmental andnongovernmental customers. At issue here are two types of financing agreementsprovided to petitioner's governmental customers: (1) fixed purchase option leases inwhich petitioner retains ownership of the equipment for the term of the agreement, at theend of which the customer has the option of purchasing it, and (2) equipment equityplans, known as installment sales, in which title is transferred to the customer at thebeginning of the contract term with the purchase price paid in installments that includeprincipal, interest and sometimes service or supply charges. Petitioner filed corporatefranchise tax returns (see Tax Law art 9-A) for years 1997, 1998 and 1999 inwhich it treated the subject financing agreements with its governmental customers(hereinafter the finance agreements) as "business capital" and the interest income portionof the government customers' monthly [*2]payments as"business income" (see Tax Law § 208 [7], [8]). In 2001, petitioner filedamended franchise tax returns that treated the subject finance agreements as "othersecurities" for purposes of the definition of "investment capital" under Tax Law §208 (5), thus reclassifying the interest income that it received under the financeagreements as "investment income" under Tax Law § 208 (6). Based upon thesechanges, petitioner requested refunds from respondent Department of Taxation andFinance for the tax years in issue.

In 2005, after an audit, the Department issued a notice of disallowance of the refundsrequested and, in 2008, after a conciliation conference, the refunds were denied and thedisallowance sustained. Upon petitioner's administrative appeal and the parties'stipulation,[FN1] an Administrative Law Judge determined that the interest income qualified asinvestment income and granted the refunds requested. On the Department's appeal,respondent Tax Appeals Tribunal reversed and denied the refunds, determining thatincome derived from the finance agreements is not "investment income" under Tax Law§ 208 (6) because the agreements are not "stocks, bonds [or] othersecurities," i.e., they do not constitute income from "investment capital" under TaxLaw § 208 (5). Petitioner instituted this CPLR article 78 proceeding seekingreview of the Tribunal's determination (see Tax Law § 2016).

Petitioner's corporate franchise tax for the years in issue was computed usingseparate calculations for its business income and its investment income (see TaxLaw former § 210 [1] [a]; [3] [a], [b]). The disputed issue here is whetherpetitioner's income from the subject finance agreements constitutes business income, asthe Tribunal concluded, or investment income, as petitioner contends.[FN2] Business income is defined as "entire net income minus investment income" (Tax Law§ 208 [8]); investment income, as relevant here, is defined as "income. . . [derived] from investment capital" less allowable deductions (Tax Law§ 208 [6]), which is "investments in stocks, bonds and other securities,corporate and governmental, not held for sale to customers in the regular course ofbusiness" (see Tax Law § 208 [5] [emphasis added]). The corporatefranchise tax statutes do not offer a definition of the term security or the phrase "othersecurities." The Department's regulations provide that the phrase "stocks, bonds andother [*3]securities," among other things, means "debtinstruments issued by . . . government[s]" (20 NYCRR 3-3.2 [c] [2]).Petitioner's main argument is that the finance agreements in issue constitute such debtinstruments and, thus, the income derived therefrom is investment income under TaxLaw § 208 (5) and (6). The Tribunal rejected this interpretation, and we confirm.

Under well-established law, "an agency's interpretation of the statutes it administersmust be upheld absent demonstrated irrationality or unreasonableness" (LorillardTobacco Co. v Roth, 99 NY2d 316, 322 [2003] [internal quotation marks andcitation omitted]; see Matter ofChesterfield Assoc. v New York State Dept. of Labor, 4 NY3d 597, 604 [2005];Matter of Island Waste Servs.,Ltd. v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 77 AD3d 1080, 1082 [2010],lv denied 16 NY3d 712 [2011]). "While as a general rule courts will not defer toadministrative agencies in matters of pure statutory interpretation, deference isappropriate where the question is one of specific application of . . . broadstatutory term[s]" by the agency charged with administering the statute, here, theDepartment (Matter of O'Brienv Spitzer, 7 NY3d 239, 242 [2006] [internal quotation marks and citationsomitted]; see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Roth, 99 NY2d at 322-323; Kurcsics vMerchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451, 459 [1980]; Matter of Mobil Intl. Fin.Corp. v New York State Tax Commn., 117 AD2d 103, 106-107 [1986]; compare Matter of Elmer W.Davis, Inc. v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin., 104 AD3d 50, 53 [2012]; Matter of Michael A. GoldsteinNo. 1 Trust v Tax Appeals Trib. of the State of N.Y., 101 AD3d 1496, 1497[2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 860 [2013]). Likewise, "[t]he interpretation given toa regulation by the agency which promulgated it and is responsible for its administrationis entitled to deference if that interpretation is not irrational or unreasonable" (Matter of 427 W. 51st St. OwnersCorp. v Division of Hous. & Community Renewal, 3 NY3d 337, 342 [2004][internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). "The task of evaluating the evidence andmaking a decision rests solely upon the administrative agency . . . and, ifthere are any facts or reasonable inferences from the facts to support the determination, itmust be confirmed" (Matter of Mobil Intl. Fin. Corp. v New York State TaxCommn., 117 AD2d at 107 [citations omitted]; see Matter of Liberman vGallman, 41 NY2d 774, 777 [1977]), regardless of "whether a rational alternativeconstruction exists" (Matter of Custom Shop Fifth Ave. Corp. v Tax Appeals Trib. ofState of N.Y., 195 AD2d 702, 703 [1993]). According deference to the Department'sinterpretation (see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v Roth, 99 NY2d at 322-323;Matter of Siemens Corp. v Tax Appeals Trib., 89 NY2d 1020, 1022 [1997]), weconclude that the Tribunal rationally determined that the finance agreements do notconstitute "stocks, bonds [or] other securities" within the meaning of Tax Law §208 (5) and (6) or 20 NYCRR 3-3.2 (c) and, thus, income derived therefrom is businessincome and not investment income.

The franchise tax statutes do not define a security or the phrase "other securities,"and the regulation similarly does not provide a test to determine what constitutes asecurity for franchise tax purposes, but merely lists generic instruments that are includedwithin the phrase "other securities," creating some ambiguity as to what is included (20NYCRR 3-3.2 [c]; see Matter of Mobil Intl. Fin. Corp. v New York State TaxCommn., 117 AD2d at 107). The parties agree that the finance agreements here donot constitute "stocks" or "bonds." By definition, to be included as "other securities" and,thus, investment capital, the agreements must be "securities" (Tax Law §208 [5] [emphasis added]). We discern no basis upon which to disturb the Tribunal'sreasoned determination that the agreements here do not, under any definition or test,qualify as "securities," and that classifying as securities what are essentially no more thanbasic sale or lease contracts between petitioner and its governmental customers, as urgedby petitioner, would be contrary to the statutory language and legislative intent.

To begin, under statutory principles of construction, in context the phrase "other[*4]securities" is limited to security instruments similar orof a like nature to stocks and bonds (see Uribe v Merchants Bank of N.Y., 91NY2d 336, 340 [1998] [under the principle of ejusdem generis—of the samekind—the scope of general statutory language, if unclear, is limited by specificterms or phrases that precede it, where the preceding terms/phrases are themselves of asimilar nature]; McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 239 (b)]).Further, in the absence of a statutory test or definition, we look to the "plain meaning" ofthe words (Matter of Raynor vLandmark Chrysler, 18 NY3d 48, 56 [2011] [internal quotation marks andcitation omitted]) and to the "well settled legal meaning" given a term or phrase in caselaw (Matter of Moran Towing & Transp. Co. v New York State Tax Commn., 72NY2d 166, 173 [1988] [internal quotation mark and citation omitted]; Matter of Yellow Book of N.Y.,Inc. v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin., 75 AD3d 931, 932 [2010], lvdenied 16 NY3d 704 [2011]).

In "determining whether a particular instrument is properly labeled a security, it isappropriate to look at its function and search for substance over form with emphasis oneconomic realty" (Matter of Pohatcong Invs. v Commissioner of Taxation & Fin.,156 AD2d 791, 792 [1989] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Here, noevidence was adduced that the agreements (1) were customarily, or ever, sold in the openmarket or on a recognized exchange or designed as a means of investment, as are stocksand bonds, (2) were commonly recognized by investors as securities, or (3) bear anysimilarity to stocks and bonds (see Matter of Mobil Intl. Fin. Corp. v New York StateTax Commn., 117 AD2d at 108; Matter of International Harvester Co. v StateTax Commn., 58 AD2d 125, 127 [1977]; cf. Matter of Avon Prods. v State TaxCommn., 90 AD2d 393, 394-395 [1982]).[FN3] The Tribunal properly looked to securities law to aid its interpretation of the Tax Law,as courts in this state have done (see Matter of Pohatcong Invs. v Commissioner ofTaxation & Fin., 156 AD2d at 792; Matter of Carret & Co. v State TaxCommn., 148 AD2d 40, 42 [1989]). Utilizing the seminal securities law testaccepted in New York for whether an interest constitutes a security, wefind—looking at the "economic realities [of] the transaction[s]"—that thesubject finance agreements generate income based on their specific contractual terms;they are not securities, as they do not involve "an investment of money in a commonenterprise with profits[FN4] to come solely [or substantially] from the efforts of [*5]others [i.e., the promoter or a third party]" (All SeasonsResorts v Abrams, 68 NY2d 81, 92 [1986] [internal quotation marks and citationsomitted]; see SEC v W.J. Howey Co, 328 US 293, 298-299, 301 [1946] [theHowey test]; People v First Meridian Planning Corp., 201 AD2d 145,151-152 [1994], affd 86 NY2d 608, 618-620 [1995]; People vFleishman, 163 AD2d 148 [1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 939 [1990];Matter of Carret & Co. v State Tax Commn., 148 AD2d at 42 [using theHowey test to ascertain meaning of "other securities" in Tax Law]). Likewise,under another securities law test recognized in New York, as contracts to rent orpurchase equipment at a contractual rate, the agreements are not used "for the purpose offinancing enterprises and promoting a distribution of rights in or obligations of suchenterprises" or "designed as a means of investment" (Matter of Waldstein, 160Misc 763, 767 [1936], as recognized in All Seasons Resorts v Abrams, 68 NY2d81, 92, 94 [1986]; see Matter of Pohatcong Invs. v Commissioner of Taxation &Fin., 156 AD2d at 792). Given that the finance agreements are not of a similar natureto stocks or bonds and do not fit within any recognized test or "well settled legalmeaning" for securities, the Tribunal rationally concluded that they cannot be deemedinvestment capital as "other securities" under Tax Law § 208 (5).

We reach a similar conclusion concerning the Tribunal's implicit rejection of theAdministrative Law Judge's conclusion, and petitioner's argument, that the financeagreements are "other securities" in that they are "debt instruments" for purposes of 20NYCRR 3-3.2 (c) (2). There is no evidence that the finance agreements were intended tobe considered as debt instruments for purposes of franchise tax law or otherwise. Further,petitioner did not demonstrate that they were "issued by" any governmental entity withinthe meaning of this regulatory provision (20 NYCRR 3-3.2 [c] [2]), or should beconsidered debts of the governmental customers within the meaning of the staterestrictions on the assumption of debt by governments (see NY Const, art VII,§ 11; art VIII, § 2; General Municipal Law § 109-b [6] [a]).Moreover, petitioner makes no persuasive policy or legal argument as to why the financeagreements should qualify as "debt instruments" and, thus, "investment capital" under thestatute and regulation where, as here, the lessee/purchaser of the equipment is agovernmental entity, but not "investment capital" when the lessee/purchaser is anongovernmental entity. Rejecting this anomalous interpretation, we read the regulation'sphrase "debt instruments" as not including these finance agreements, which are businesscapital whether the purchaser is a governmental or private entity (see 20 NYCRR3-3.2 [c] [2], [3]; [d] [1] [iii] ["corporate debt instruments" are excluded from "othersecurities" and are not capital investment when they are acquired by petitioner-taxpayerfor services rendered or for the sale, rental or other transfer of property, where theobligor—nongovernmental customer—is the recipient of services orproperty]). The interpretation urged by petitioner runs counter to the wording of theenabling statute, which clearly limits investment capital to "stocks, bonds and othersecurities" (Tax Law § 208 [5]), i.e., to investments in securities of a similar natureto stocks and bonds (see Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451, 459[1980]; accord Matter of NewYork State Superfund Coalition, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Envtl.Conservation, 18 NY3d 289, 296 [2011]).

Finally, petitioner's remaining arguments do not undermine the rationality of theTribunal's determination that the finance agreements in issue are business capital(see Tax Law § [*6]208 [7]) and do notqualify as investment capital as "other securities" within the meaning of Tax Law §208 (5) (see Matter of O'Brien v Spitzer, 7 NY3d at 242; Matter of 427 W.51st St. Owners Corp. v Division of Hous. & Community Renewal, 3 NY3d at 342).

Stein, J.P., McCarthy and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination isconfirmed, without costs, and the petition dismissed.

Footnotes


Footnote 1: The parties stipulated tothe record and evidence, the amount of the refund ($1.2 million) and a waiver of ahearing.

Footnote 2: The import of theclassification in dispute is that it affects petitioner's state corporate franchise taxobligation for the years at issue in that it determines the method by which the income isallocated between New York and other taxing jurisdictions (see Tax Law §209). Business income is allocated to New York based upon the amount of thetaxpayer's (i.e., petitioner's) property, receipts and payroll in this state, whereasinvestment income is allocated to New York according to the extent of the presence inNew York of the obligor or issuer of the stock, bond or other security that thetaxpayer invests in and derives income from (see Tax Law § 210 [3] [a],[b]). For a corporation such as petitioner that has a substantial presence in New York, itis often advantageous to classify income as investment income rather than as businessincome because a smaller portion of its income may be allocated to New York.

Footnote 3: While much of the caselaw interpreting the phrase "other securities" under Tax Law § 208 (5) wasdecided under prior versions of the applicable regulations, now 20 NYCRR 3-3.2 asamended in 1989, we find that they are highly instructive in the absence of evidence thatthe regulatory amendments were intended to effect a fundamental change in the meaningand understanding of the term "securities" or in our reliance on securities law todetermine whether an instrument is a security. That is, we read the old and newregulations alike as generally including within the phrase "other securities" only thoseinstruments that are of a similar nature to stocks and bonds, bearing the same essentialcharacteristics, unless a contrary intention is specifically indicated.

Footnote 4: Likewise, the financeagreements do not produce investment "profit" as contemplated in this context, as theydo not produce " 'either capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initialinvestment' or 'participation in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds' "(All Seasons Resorts v Abrams, 68 NY2d at 92, quoting United HousingFoundation, Inc. v Forman, 421 US 837, 852 [1975]).


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.