| Fauvell v Miglino |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 07150 [111 AD3d 596] |
| November 6, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Daniel J. Fauvell et al., Respondents, v GregMiglino et al., Appellants. |
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In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for tortious interference with contract, thedefendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the SupremeCourt, Suffolk County (Spinner, J.), entered February 16, 2012, as granted the plaintiffs'motion to preliminarily enjoin, inter alia, the defendants Greg Miglino and SouthCountry Central School District from acting in accordance with the terms of certaincontracts and denied the defendants' cross motion to dismiss the complaint.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs,the defendants' cross motion to dismiss the complaint is granted, and the plaintiffs'motion for a preliminary injunction is denied as academic.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged, with respect to the causes of action assertedon behalf of the plaintiff Daniel J. Fauvell, inter alia, that certain disciplinary actiontaken against Fauvell by the defendants South Country Central School District(hereinafter the School District) and the Board of Education of the South CountryCentral School District (hereinafter the Board of Education) was intended to inflict harmupon Fauvell and to allow the defendant Greg Miglino, then the president of the Boardof Education, to be named as the building services administrator of the School District.The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants tortiously interfered with and conspired tobreach the collective bargaining agreement between the School District and Fauvell.
With respect to the causes of action asserted on behalf of the plaintiff Samuel W.DiSibio, as an individual and as a taxpayer, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that Miglinofailed to disclose his interest in the building services administrator contract while he waspresident of the Board of Education prior to being hired as the School District's buildingservices administrator, in violation of General Municipal Law § 800 et seq.The plaintiffs also alleged that Miglino and the School District violated General BusinessLaw § 89-g when the School District allowed members of the South CountryAmbulance Company (hereinafter the ambulance company), of which Miglino was thepresident, to act as security personnel at Bellport High School, a school within theSchool District. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the School District violated CivilService Law § 50 (2) by failing to issue an announcement of the civil service testfor the building services administrator position.[*2]
The plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoinMiglino, the school district, and the Board of Education from performing underMiglino's employment contract with the School District and the Board of Education, andfrom performing under a purported contract between the ambulance company and theSchool District and the Board of Education. The defendants cross-moved to dismiss thecomplaint on the grounds, inter alia, that Fauvell failed to serve a notice of claim asrequired by Education Law § 3813 and that DiSibio lacked standing. The SupremeCourt, inter alia, granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and denied thedefendants' cross motion to dismiss the complaint.
Pursuant to Education Law § 3813, a plaintiff commencing a tort actionagainst a school district must serve a notice of claim upon the school district. "Service ofa notice of claim is a 'condition precedent to bringing an action against a school districtor a board of education' " (Matter of Silvernail v Enlarged City School Dist. ofMiddletown, 40 AD3d 1004, 1005 [2007], quoting Parochial Bus Sys. vBoard of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539, 547 [1983]; see Hwangbo v Nobles, 62AD3d 949, 950 [2009]; Power Cooling, Inc. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 48AD3d 536, 537 [2008]; James McCullagh Co., Inc. v South Huntington Union Free SchoolDist., 39 AD3d 480, 481 [2007]).
Here, the plaintiffs acknowledged in their motion papers that they had not served anotice of claim upon the Board of Education. Since the plaintiffs failed to satisfy thiscondition precedent, the Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the defendants'cross motion which was to dismiss the second, third, and fourth causes of action, assertedon behalf of Fauvell.
"A taxpayer suit under General Municipal Law § 51 'lies only when the actscomplained of are fraudulent, or a waste of public property in the sense that theyrepresent a use of public property or funds for entirely illegal purposes' " (Godfrey v Spano, 13 NY3d358, 373 [2009], quoting Mesivta of Forest Hills Inst. v City of New York,58 NY2d 1014, 1016 [1983]; see Duffy v Longo, 207 AD2d 860, 862 [1994]).Further, to establish "common-law taxpayer standing," a plaintiff must demonstrate thathe or she is "personally aggrieved by those actions in a manner different in kind anddegree from the community generally" and that "the failure to accord [him or her]standing would be in effect to erect an impenetrable barrier to any judicial scrutiny oflegislative action" (Matter ofSeidel v Prendergast, 87 AD3d 545, 546 [2011] [internal quotation marksomitted]; see Matter of Transactive Corp. v New York State Dept. of SocialServs., 92 NY2d 579, 587 [1998]; Diederich v Rockland County Police Chiefs' Assn., 33 AD3d653, 654 [2006]; Matter ofClark v Town Bd. of Town of Clarkstown, 28 AD3d 553, 554 [2006]).
Here, although DiSibio alleged that the defendants violated General Municipal Law§ 800 et seq., General Business Law § 89-e et seq. and CivilService Law § 50, he did not allege that they committed fraud or wasted publicresources in the sense of using public property or funds " 'for entirely illegal purposes' "(Godfrey v Spano, 13 NY3d at 373, quoting Mesivta of Forest Hills Inst. vCity of New York, 58 NY2d at 1016). Likewise, the plaintiffs failed to allege thatDiSibio was "personally aggrieved by [the defendants'] actions in a manner different inkind and degree from the community generally" (Seidel v Prendergast, 87 AD3dat 546 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). The plaintiffs simply allegedthat DiSibio and other "similarly situated taxpayers" were damaged financially by theSchool District's failure to comply with statutory mandates. Accordingly, the SupremeCourt erred in denying that branch of the defendants' cross motion which was to dismissthe first, fifth, and sixth causes of action, asserted on behalf of DiSibio.
The defendants' remaining contentions have been rendered academic in light of ourdetermination. Skelos, J.P., Balkin, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.