| Dischiavi v Calli |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 07289 [111 AD3d 1258] |
| November 8, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| Gary M. Dischiavi et al., Respondents-Appellants, vWilliam S. Calli, Jr., as Administrator C.T.A. of the Estate of William S. Calli, et al.,Appellants-Respondents, et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] Smith, Sovik, Kendrick & Sugnet, P.C., Syracuse (David R. Duflo of counsel), fordefendants-appellants-respondents Andrew S. Kowalczyk, Joseph Stephen Deery, Jr. andCalli, Kowalczyk, Tolles, Deery and Soja. Hiscock & Barclay, LLP, Syracuse (Robert A. Barrer of counsel), fordefendants-appellants-respondents Herbert Cully and Calli, Calli and Cully. Getnick Livingston Atkinson & Priore, LLP, Utica (Michael E. Getnick of counsel),for defendant-appellant-respondent Thomas S. Soja. George F. Aney, Herkimer, for defendant-appellant-respondent Robert Calli. Luibrand Law Firm, PLLC, Latham (Kevin A. Luibrand of counsel), forplaintiffs-respondents-appellants.
Appeals and cross appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County(James P. McClusky, J.), entered May 21, 2012. The order, inter alia, dismissed plaintiffs'legal malpractice causes of action insofar as they are premised on the failure tocommence a personal injury action and dismissed plaintiffs' legal malpractice causes ofaction against defendants Herbert Cully and Calli, Calli and Cully insofar as they arepremised on the failure of those defendants to commence a medical malpractice action.[*2]
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealedfrom is unanimously modified on the law by granting those parts of the motions ofdefendants-appellants-respondents with respect to the third cause of action in its entiretyand those parts of the motions of all defendants-appellants-respondents except RobertCalli with respect to the claim for punitive damages against them, and as modified theorder is affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiffs commenced this action seeking damages for, inter alia,breach of contract, legal malpractice and fraud, alleging, among other things, thatdefendants failed to commence timely legal actions to recover damages arising frominjuries sustained by Gary M. Dischiavi (plaintiff). Plaintiffs allege in their complaintthat plaintiff was injured as the result of an accident that occurred while he was on dutyas a City of Utica police officer in 1991, and that he was further injured as a result of hisensuing medical treatment. Although plaintiffs retained defendant law firm of Calli,Kowalczyk, Tolles, Deery and Soja (CKTDS) to represent them with respect to possibleclaims arising from those injuries, no action was ever instituted. Plaintiffs further allegethat defendants purported to have plaintiff examined by an expert physician but had alawyer examine him instead, purported to have other expert physicians review plaintiff'smedical records but had a veterinarian perform that review, misrepresented that they hadcommenced a personal injury action on plaintiffs' behalf, and created a fake settlementagreement for that "action." This case was previously before us on appeal, and wedetermined, inter alia, that Supreme Court erred in granting the motions and cross motionof various defendants for summary judgment dismissing the complaint in its entiretyagainst them (Dischiavi v Calli [appeal No. 2], 68 AD3d 1691, 1692-1694[2009]).
Upon remittal and the completion of discovery, various defendants again moved forsummary judgment dismissing the complaint, cross claims and/or counterclaims againstthem. The court dismissed the complaint insofar as asserted against certain defendantsand, as relevant on appeal, the remaining defendants, i.e.,defendants-appellants-respondents (hereafter, defendants), now appeal and plaintiffscross-appeal from all or parts of an order that, inter alia, denied plaintiffs' cross motionfor partial summary judgment and granted defendants' motions in part. Specifically, thecourt granted those parts of the motions seeking summary judgment dismissing the firstand second causes of action insofar as they are premised on defendants' failure tocommence a personal injury action. The court also granted that part of the motion ofdefendant law firm Calli, Calli and Cully and defendant Herbert Cully (collectively, CCCdefendants) for summary judgment dismissing the first and second causes of actionagainst them insofar as they are premised on their failure to commence a medicalmalpractice action, thereby resulting in the dismissal of those causes of action in theirentirety against the CCC defendants.
Defendants Andrew S. Kowalczyk, Joseph Stephen Deery, Jr., and CKTDS(collectively, CKTDS defendants), along with defendant William S. Calli, Jr. (Calli, Jr.),as administrator C.T.A. of the estate of former defendant William S. Calli, Sr., contendthat the court erred in denying their motions insofar as they concern the underlyingmedical malpractice claim. Specifically, the CKTDS defendants and Calli, Jr., contendthat the underlying medical malpractice claim lacks merit, and thus that plaintiffs couldnot recover damages based on the failure of those defendants to commence a timelyaction based on that claim. We conclude, however, that the court properly denied themotions to that extent inasmuch as the CKTDS defendants and Calli, Jr. failed to meettheir initial burden of establishing that plaintiffs' medical malpractice claim lacks merit(see generally Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853[1985]; Welch v State of NewYork, 105 AD3d 1450, 1451 [2013]). In any event, plaintiffs raised a triableissue of fact (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562[1980]).
In addition, the CKTDS defendants and defendant Thomas S. Soja contend that theymay not be held liable under a theory of partnership by estoppel because CKTDS wasdissolved prior [*3]to any alleged legal malpractice. Evenassuming, arguendo, that those defendants met their initial burden in that respect, wefurther conclude that the court properly determined that plaintiffs raised a triable issue offact with respect to that issue (see generally id.).
To the extent that defendants sought summary judgment dismissing the first andsecond causes of action on the ground that the applicable three-year statute of limitationshad expired prior to the commencement of this action (see CPLR 214 [6]; see generally Zorn v Gilbert, 8NY3d 933, 933-934 [2007]), we conclude that they met their initial burden on theirrespective motions. We further conclude, however, that plaintiffs raised a triable issue offact whether the doctrine of continuous representation tolled the statute of limitations(see generally Shumsky v Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164, 167-168 [2001]). The courttherefore properly determined that defendants were not entitled to the relief sought basedon the statute of limitations.
We agree with all defendants that the court erred in denying those parts of theirmotions seeking summary judgment dismissing the third cause of action, for fraud,against them. Thus, we modify the order accordingly. "The elements of a cause of actionfor fraud require a material misrepresentation of a fact, knowledge of its falsity, an intentto induce reliance, justifiable reliance by the plaintiff[s] and damages" (Eurycleia Partners, LP v Seward &Kissel, LLP, 12 NY3d 553, 559 [2009]; see Ross v Louise Wise Servs., Inc., 8 NY3d 478, 488[2007]; Lama Holding Co. v Smith Barney, 88 NY2d 413, 421 [1996]). "Where,as here, a fraud [cause of action] is asserted in connection with charges of professionalmalpractice, it is sustainable only to the extent that it is premised upon one or moreaffirmative, intentional misrepresentations . . . which have causedadditional damages, separate and distinct from those generated by the allegedmalpractice" (White of Lake George v Bell, 251 AD2d 777, 778 [1998], lvdismissed 92 NY2d 947 [1998]; see Tasseff v Nussbaumer & Clarke, 298AD2d 877, 878 [2002]; seegenerally Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Zahran, 100 AD3d 1549, 1550 [2012],lv denied 20 NY3d 861 [2013]). We agree with defendants that they met theirinitial burden on their motions by establishing that plaintiffs did not sustain anyadditional damages as a result of the alleged fraud, and plaintiffs failed to raise a triableissue of fact (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324-325[1986]). Contrary to plaintiffs' contention, this Court's prior order denying those parts ofthe respective defendants' initial motions and cross motions "pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a)(7) to dismiss the complaint, which w[ere] addressed to the sufficiency of the pleadings,did not establish the law of the case for the purpose of their subsequent motion[s]pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment, which [were] addressed to thesufficiency of the evidence" (Thompson v Lamprecht Transp., 39 AD3d 846, 847[2007]).
We further conclude that the court erred in denying those parts of the motionsseeking summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages exceptinsofar as that claim is asserted against defendant Robert Calli. Plaintiffs seek to hold allother defendants liable for punitive damages under a theory of vicarious liability. It iswell settled that, in order for a partnership or its members "to be held vicariously liablefor punitive damages arising from the conduct of its [partners], it must have 'authorized,participated in, consented to or ratified the conduct giving rise to such damages, ordeliberately retained the unfit [partner]' such that it is complicit in that conduct" (Melfi v Mount Sinai Hosp., 64AD3d 26, 42 [2009], quoting Loughry v Lincoln First Bank, 67 NY2d 369,378 [1986]; see 1 Mott St., Inc.v Con Edison, 33 AD3d 531, 532 [2006]). Here, the defendants other thanRobert Calli established that only Robert Calli may have engaged in conduct giving riseto punitive damages and that they did not engage in any acts that would render themcomplicit in such conduct. In response, plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of factwhether defendants, other than Robert Calli, engaged in conduct giving rise to punitivedamages or " 'authorized, participated in, consented to or ratified the conduct giving riseto such damages, or deliberately retained the unfit [partner]' " (Melfi, 64 AD3d at42). Consequently, the court erred in denying those parts of the motions seeking todismiss the claim for punitive damages except insofar as asserted against Robert Calli.We therefore further modify the order [*4]accordingly.
On their cross appeal, plaintiffs contend that the court erred in dismissing the firstand second causes of action insofar as they are premised upon defendants' failure tocommence a personal injury action. The court granted defendants' motions for summaryjudgment dismissing those causes of action to that extent based on its determination thatthe statute of limitations therefor had expired before plaintiffs retained any of thedefendants. Plaintiffs now contend that the statute of limitations for those causes ofaction was extended several times by amendments to General Municipal Law §205-e (2), which resulted in the revival of plaintiffs' causes of action until a time afterthey first retained CKTDS. That contention is not properly before us because it is raisedfor the first time on appeal, and "[a]n issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal. . . where it 'could have been obviated or cured by factual showings or legalcountersteps' in the trial court" (Oram v Capone, 206 AD2d 839, 840 [1994],quoting Telaro v Telaro, 25 NY2d 433, 439 [1969], rearg denied 26NY2d 751 [1970]). The revival statute on which plaintiffs rely applies to causes of actionthat "would have been actionable on or after January [1, 1987] had this section beeneffective" (§ 205-e [2]), and we conclude that defendants could have made afactual showing that plaintiffs' first and second causes of action insofar as they arepremised upon defendants' failure to commence a personal injury action were notactionable because they were precluded by plaintiff's receipt of benefits pursuant toGeneral Municipal Law § 207-c.
We have considered the further contentions of the parties and conclude that they arewithout merit. Present—Smith, J.P., Fahey, Peradotto and Lindley, JJ.