| Matell Contr. Co., Inc. v Fleetwood Park Dev., LLC |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 07456 [111 AD3d 681] |
| November 13, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Matell Contracting Co., Inc.,Appellant, v Fleetwood Park Development, LLC, Respondent, et al.,Defendants. |
—[*1] Duane Morris LLP, New York, N.Y. (Arthur C. Silverman and Brian J. Markowitzof counsel) and Cuddy & Feder LLP, White Plains, N.Y. (Joshua E. Kimerling ofcounsel), for respondent (one brief filed).
In an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, the plaintiff appeals from an order of theSupreme Court, Westchester County (Lefkowitz, J.), entered April 18, 2012, whichdenied its motion for summary judgment on the complaint and dismissing the first,second, and fifth affirmative defenses asserted by the defendant Fleetwood ParkDevelopment, LLC.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereofdenying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgmentdismissing the fifth affirmative defense asserted by the defendant Fleetwood ParkDevelopment, LLC, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of themotion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, with costs to the defendant Fleetwood ParkDevelopment, LLC.
In March 2009, the defendant Fleetwood Park Development, LLC (hereinafterFleetwood Park), the owner of certain leased property, entered into an agreementpursuant to which a new tenant was permitted to renovate the leased property for use as asupermarket. The tenant retained Matell Contracting Co., Inc. (hereinafter Matell), to actas general contractor for the project. On May 25, 2011, Matell filed a mechanic's lienagainst the property in the sum of $1,800,000, alleging that no payment had been madefor its work on the project.
Thereafter, Matell commenced this action to foreclose on the mechanic's lien against,among others, Fleetwood Park. Fleetwood Park asserted affirmative defenses, inter alia,alleging that it did not consent to the subject work (first affirmative defense), that themechanic's lien was not timely filed (second affirmative defense), and lack of privity(fifth affirmative defense). Matell moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on thecomplaint on the ground that Fleetwood Park consented to the subject work, and forsummary judgment dismissing Fleetwood Park's first, second, and fifth affirmativedefenses. Fleetwood Park opposed the motion. None of the other defendants opposedthat branch of Matell's motion which was for summary judgment on the complaint. In an[*2]order entered April 18, 2012, the Supreme Courtdenied the motion, and Matell appeals.
"A contractor who performs work for, or provides equipment to, a tenant maynonetheless impose a mechanic's lien against the premises where the owner of thepremises affirmatively gave consent for the work or equipment directly to the contractor,but not where the owner has merely approved or acquiesced in the undertaking of suchwork or the provision of such equipment" (Elliott-Williams Co., Inc. v Impromptu Gourmet, Inc., 28 AD3d706, 707 [2006]). "To sustain the lien, 'the owner must either be an affirmativefactor in procuring the improvement to be made, or having possession and control of thepremises assent to the improvement in the expectation that he [or she] will reap thebenefit of it' " (id., quoting Rice v Culver, 172 NY 60, 65-66 [1902]).
Here, while Matell presented evidence showing that Fleetwood Park had knowledgeof, and acquiesced in, the work performed to convert the leased property into asupermarket for the tenant's use, Matell failed to present any evidence showing thatFleetwood Park conveyed any affirmative consent directly to Matell for the work (see Vardon, Inc. v Suga Dev.,LLC, 36 AD3d 897 [2007]; Elliott-Williams Co., Inc. v ImpromptuGourmet, Inc., 28 AD3d at 707; Tri-North Bldrs. v Di Donna, 217 AD2d886, 887 [1995]). Therefore, Matell failed to make a prima facie showing that FleetwoodPark affirmatively consented to the subject work. Accordingly, the Supreme Courtproperly denied those branches of Matell's motion which were for summary judgment onthe complaint and dismissing the first affirmative defense asserted by Fleetwood Park,without regard to the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New YorkUniv. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).
Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Matell's motionwhich was for summary judgment dismissing the second affirmative defense asserted byFleetwood Park, which alleged that the lien was not timely filed. Pursuant to Lien Law§ 10 (1), notice of a lien "may be filed at any time during the progress of the workand the furnishing of the materials, or, within eight months after the completion of thecontract, or the final performance of the work, or the final furnishing of the materials,dating from the last item of work performed or materials furnished." In opposition toMatell's prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing thesecond affirmative defense, Fleetwood Park raised triable issues of fact as to whether thelast item of work was performed or the last materials were furnished for the subjectproject within eight months prior to the filing of the lien (see Alvarez v ProspectHosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Lien Law § 10). In order to show that workwas performed or materials furnished for the subject project within eight months prior tothe filing of the lien, Matell could not rely on evidence submitted for the first time inreply papers submitted to the Supreme Court (see L'Aquila Realty, LLC v Jalyng Food Corp., 103 AD3d692 [2013]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch ofMatell's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the second affirmativedefense asserted by Fleetwood Park.
However, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of Matell's motionwhich was for summary judgment dismissing the fifth affirmative defense asserted byFleetwood Park, which alleged lack of privity, since privity of contract is not aprerequisite to recovery on a mechanic's lien (see Spectrum Painting Contrs., Inc. v Kreisler Borg Florman Gen.Constr. Co., Inc., 64 AD3d 565, 576 [2009]; Kuhn v Kober, 203 AD2d536 [1994]; Rainbow Elec. Co. v Bloom, 132 AD2d 539 [1987]; Hartman vTravis, 81 AD2d 692 [1981]). Matell thus established its prima facie entitlement tojudgment as a matter of law dismissing the fifth affirmative defense asserted byFleetwood Park and, in opposition, Fleetwood Park failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The parties' remaining contentions are without merit. Mastro, J.P., Balkin, Leventhaland Lott, JJ., concur.