Matter of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v New YorkState Dept. of Envtl. Conservation
2013 NY Slip Op 07488 [111 AD3d 737]
November 13, 2013
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, December 25, 2013


In the Matter of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,et al., Respondents-Appellants,
v
New York State Department of EnvironmentalConservation, Appellant-Respondent. (Appeal No. 1.) In the Matter of Natural ResourcesDefense Council, Inc., et al., Appellants, v New York State Department ofEnvironmental Conservation, Respondent. (Appeal No. 2.)

[Recalled and vacated, see 120 AD3d 1235.]

—[*1]Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Cecelia C. Changand Brian A. Sutherland), for appellant-respondent in appeal No. 1 and respondent inappeal No. 2.

Nancy S. Marks, New York, N.Y. (Catherine Marlantes Rahm of counsel), forNatural Resources Defense Council, Inc., respondent-appellant in appeal No. 1 andappellant in appeal No. 2, and Reed W. Super, New York, N.Y., for Riverkeeper, Inc.,Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., Soundkeeper, Inc., Save the Sound, Peconic Baykeeper, Inc.,Raritan Baykeeper, Inc., doing business as NY/NJ Baykeeper, and HackensackRiverkeeper, Inc., respondents-appellants in appeal No. 1 and appellant in appeal No. 2(one brief filed).

In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of theNew York State Department of Environmental Conservation approving the issuance ofstate pollutant discharge elimination system general permit GP-0-10-002 for stormwaterdischarges from municipal separate storm sewer systems, and action for a judgmentdeclaring that state pollutant discharge elimination system general permit GP-0-10-002for stormwater discharges from municipal separate storm sewer systems is contrary tocertain state and federal laws, (1) the respondent/defendant New York State Departmentof Environmental Conservation appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an orderand judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Lefkowitz, J.),entered January 10, 2012, as amended by an order of the same court entered, upon theparties' consent, on April 18, 2012, as was in favor of the petitioners/plaintiffs andagainst it declaring that the general permit created an impermissible self-regulatorysystem that failed to ensure that small municipalities reduced their pollutant discharges tothe "maximum extent practicable," as required by 33 USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii)and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c), failed to specify compliance schedules with respect to effluentlimitations and water quality standards, as required by 6 NYCRR 750-1.14, andunlawfully failed to provide an [*2]opportunity for publichearings on proposed notices of intent before they were submitted to it, in violation of 33USC § 1342 (a) (1) and ECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix), granted that branch of thepetition which was to annul its determination approving the issuance of the generalpermit on the grounds that it was affected by error of law and was arbitrary andcapricious and, inter alia, in effect, directed it to issue revisions to the general permitconsistent with the disposition of the causes of action for a declaratory judgment, and thepetitioners/plaintiffs cross-appeal, as limited by their notices of appeal and brief, from somuch of the order and judgment entered January 10, 2012, as amended by the orderentered, upon the parties' consent, on April 18, 2012, as was in favor of therespondent/defendant New York State Department of Environmental Conservation andagainst them, in effect, declaring that the general permit did not fail to ensure that smallmunicipalities complied with state water quality standards and, thus, was not in violationof ECL 17-0811 (5), did not unlawfully fail to ensure that small municipalities monitoredtheir storm water discharges and, thus, was not in violation of 33 USC § 1318 (a),and did not fail to provide for public hearings on proposed stormwater managementplans and proposed watershed improvement strategies and, thus, was not in violation of33 USC § 1251 (e), and (2) the petitioners/plaintiffs separately appeal from theorder of the same court entered upon the parties' consent on April 18, 2012.

Ordered that the appeal from the order entered April 18, 2012, is dismissed, withoutcosts or disbursements, as that order was entered upon the parties' consent, and no appeallies from an order entered on consent (see CPLR 5511; Barry v Barry, 60 AD3d882 [2009]); and it is further,

Ordered that the order and judgment entered January 10, 2012, as amended April 18,2012, is affirmed insofar as cross-appealed from; and it is further,

Ordered that the order and judgment entered January 10, 2012, is reversed insofar asappealed from, on the law, that branch of the petition which was to annul thedetermination on the grounds that it was affected by error of law and was arbitrary andcapricious is denied, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, WestchesterCounty, for the entry of an appropriate amended judgment dismissing the proceeding anddeclaring, inter alia, that the general permit did not create an impermissibleself-regulatory system that failed to ensure that small municipalities reduced theirpollutant discharges to the "maximum extent practicable," as required by 33 USC §1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c), did not fail to specify complianceschedules with respect to effluent limitations and water quality standards, as required by6 NYCRR 750-1.14, and did not unlawfully fail to provide an opportunity for publichearings on proposed notices of intent before they were submitted to it, as required by 33USC § 1342 (a) (1) and ECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix); and it is further,

Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the New York State Department ofEnvironmental Conservation.

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 USC § 1251 et seq.[hereinafter the Clean Water Act]), was enacted to "restore and maintain the chemical,physical, and biologic integrity of the Nation's waters" (33 USC § 1251 [a]). Toeffectuate this purpose, the Clean Water Act established the national pollutant dischargeelimination system (hereinafter NPDES), which generally prohibits the discharge ofwater pollution from point sources into surface waters, except in compliance with aNPDES permit issued by the Administrator of the United States EnvironmentalProtection Agency (hereinafter the EPA) or a state pollutant discharge elimination system(hereinafter SPDES) permit issued by an EPA-authorized state agency (see 33USC § 1342). The Clean Water Act, as implemented by the EPA, authorizes theissuance of individual NPDES and SPDES permits to specific industrial pollutantdischargers or general NPDES and SPDES permits that cover multiple dischargerswithin a geographical area (see 40 CFR 122.2, 122.26 [c]; 122.28, 123.25 [a][11]).

The Environmental Conservation Law established a SPDES permit program toensure that New York had "adequate authority to issue permits regulating the dischargeof pollutants from [*3]new or existing outlets or pointsources into the waters of the state," in conformance with the Clean Water Act's rules andregulations and to participate in the NPDES created by the Clean Water Act (ECL17-0801). On October 28, 1975, the EPA authorized New York to issue NPDES permitsthrough the state's SPDES program, and the New York State Department ofEnvironmental Conservation (hereinafter the DEC) was empowered to administer theSPDES permit program pursuant to article 17, title 8, of the ECL (seeMemorandum of Agreement between the State of New York Department ofEnvironmental Conservation and the United States Environmental Protection Agency,dated October 28, 1975, as renewed and amended).

In 1987, the Clean Water Act was amended to establish a framework for regulatingmunicipal and industrial storm water pollutant discharges through the NPDES andSPDES permit system (see Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub L 100-4, § 405[1987] [codified at 33 USC § 1342 (p)]). A municipality's discharge of stormwater from a "municipal separate storm sewer system" (hereinafter an MS4) wasprohibited unless the municipality obtained an individual NPDES or SPDES permit orobtained coverage under a NPDES or SPDES general permit (see 33 USC§ 1342 [p] [3] [B]; 40 CFR 122.26 [a] [5]; 123.25 [a] [9], [11]; 122.28 [a] [2] [i];ECL 17-0808, 70-0117 [6] [b] [i]; 6 NYCRR 750-1.21 [b] [5]; 750-1.4 [b]).

On April 29, 2010, the DEC issued state pollutant discharge elimination systemgeneral permit GP-0-10-002, effective May 1, 2010, for stormwater discharges fromMS4s (hereinafter the General Permit). By its own terms, the General Permit is set toexpire on April 30, 2015.

The petitioners/plaintiffs (hereinafter the petitioners) commenced this hybridproceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the determination of the DEC toapprove the issuance of the General Permit, and action for a judgment declaring that theGeneral Permit was contrary to certain enumerated state and federal laws.

To the extent that the petitioners sought relief pursuant to article 78, thepetition/complaint (hereinafter the petition), in effect, alleged that the determination toapprove the issuance of the General Permit "was affected by an error of law" (CPLR7803 [3]) since it violated the enumerated state and federal laws, and was arbitrary andcapricious since the public hearing protocol adopted by the DEC was based, in part, on amisinterpretation of what constitutes a "permit application" within the meaning of theClean Water Act and the ECL that would trigger the need for a public hearing. To theextent that the petitioners sought declaratory relief, the petition, in effect, sought ajudgment declaring that the General Permit was contrary to each of the enumerated stateand federal laws.

The petition organized the alleged violations of state and federal law into fourgeneral groups, asserting that:

(1) the General Permit failed to ensure that small municipalities reduced theirpollutant discharges to the maximum extent practicable, in violation of 33 USC §1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c);

(2) the General Permit failed to ensure that small municipalities complied with statewater quality standards, in violation of ECL 17-0811 (5) and ECL 17-0813;

(3) the General Permit failed to ensure that small municipalities monitored theirstorm water discharges, in violation of 33 USC § 1318 (a) and ECL 17-0815 (8);and

(4) the General Permit did not provide for public participation in the permit process,in violation of 33 USC §§ 1251 (e) and 1342 (a) (1) and (j).

An order and judgment (one paper) was entered by the Supreme Court on January10, [*4]2012, in favor of the petitioners and against theDEC declaring that the General Permit created an impermissible self-regulatory systemthat failed to ensure that small municipalities reduced their pollutant discharges to the"maximum extent practicable," as required by 33 USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) andECL 17-0808 (3) (c), that the General Permit failed to specify compliance schedules withrespect to effluent limitations and water quality standards, as required by 6 NYCRR750-1.14, and that the General Permit unlawfully failed to provide an opportunity for apublic hearing on proposed notices of intent before they were submitted to the DEC, inviolation of 33 USC § 1342 (a) (1) and ECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix).

However, the order and judgment was in favor of the DEC and against thepetitioners declaring that the General Permit did not fail to ensure that smallmunicipalities complied with state water quality standards and, thus, was not in violationof ECL 17-0811 (5), did not fail to ensure that small municipalities monitored their stormwater discharges and, thus, was not in violation of 33 USC § 1318 (a), and did notfail to provide for public hearings on proposed stormwater management plans andproposed watershed improvement strategies and, thus, was not in violation of 33 USC§ 1251 (e).

In light of its determination that the general permit violated 33 USC § 1342 (a)(1); (p) (3) (B) (iii); ECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix); 17-0808 (3) (c) and 6 NYCRR 750-1.14,the Supreme Court also granted that branch of petition which was, in effect, pursuant toCPLR 7803 (3) to annul the DEC's determination to approve the issuance of the GeneralPermit on the ground that the determination was affected by error of law. Accordingly,the court, in effect, directed the DEC to issue revisions to the General Permit consistentwith its determination of the causes of action for a declaratory judgment.

The order and judgment was subsequently amended by an order entered April 18,2012, upon the parties' consent. The substance of the amendment is not relevant to thisappeal.

The DEC appeals from so much of the order and judgment, as amended by the ordermade upon the parties' consent, as was adverse to it. The petitioners cross-appeal from,inter alia, the remaining portions of the order and judgment, which were adverse to them.

Initially, since the parties charted a summary judgment course in addressing theseveral declaratory judgment causes of action, which present no factual disputes andinvolve only the legal interpretation of various statutes and regulations, it was notinappropriate for the Supreme Court, under the unique circumstances presented here, toreach the merits of those causes of action (see O'Hara v Del Bello, 47 NY2d 363,367-368 [1979]; Hendrickson vPhilbor Motors, Inc., 102 AD3d 251, 258-259 [2012]).

Contrary to the Supreme Court's conclusion, the General Permit did not violate 33USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) or ECL 17-0808 (3) (c). Under state and federal law,"[p]ermits for discharges from municipal storm sewers . . . shall requirecontrols to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable,including management practices, control techniques and system, design and engineeringmethods, and such other provisions as the Administrator or the State determinesappropriate for the control of such pollutants" (33 USC § 1342 [p] [3] [B] [iii];compare ECL 17-0808 [3] [c]).

Accordingly, the "[m]aximum extent practicable . . . is the statutorystandard that establishes the level of pollutant reductions that operators of regulatedMS4s must achieve" (64 Fed Reg 68722, 68754 [1999]; see 40 CFR 122.34 [a]).The "EPA has intentionally not provided a precise definition of [maximum extentpracticable] to allow maximum flexibility in MS4 permitting" (64 Fed Reg 68722, 68754[1999]). It has determined that "MS4s need the flexibility to optimize reductions in stormwater pollutants on a location-by-location basis" (id.). The "EPA envisions thatthis evaluative process will consider such factors as conditions of receiving waters,specific local concerns, . . . MS4 size, climate, implementation schedules,current ability to finance the program, beneficial uses of receiving water, hydrology,geology, and capacity to perform operation and maintenance" (id.).[*5]

To assist in this process, the EPA has "outline[d]six minimum control measures that constitute the framework for a storm water dischargecontrol program for regulated small MS4s that, when properly implemented, will reducepollutants to the maximum extent practicable" (64 Fed Reg 68722, 68752 [1999];see 40 CFR 122.34 [a]). The EPA has determined that, in most cases, the"[p]roper implementation of the measures will significantly improve water quality" (64Fed Reg 68722, 68753 [1999]). "[H]owever, small MS4 permittees should modify theirprograms if and when available information indicates that water quality considerationswarrant greater attention or prescriptiveness in specific components of the municipalprogram" (id.).

"In issuing the general permit, the NPDES permitting authority" is to "establishrequirements for each of the minimum control measures" (64 Fed Reg 68722, 68754[1999]). The minimum control measures are to be addressed by a municipality throughthe identification of "best management practices," which are to be utilized to addresseach of the minimum control measures (see 40 CFR 122.34 [a]). "Permitstypically will require small MS4 permittees to identify in their [notices of intent] the [bestmanagement practices] to be performed and to develop the measurable goals by whichimplementation of the [best management practices] can be assessed" (64 Fed Reg 68722,68754 [1999]).

"Upon receipt of the [notice of intent] from a small MS4 operator, the NPDESpermitting authority will have the opportunity to review the [notice of intent] to verifythat the identified [best management practices] and measurable goals are consistent withthe requirement to reduce pollutants under the [maximum extent practicable] standard, toprotect water quality, and to satisfy the appropriate water quality requirements of theClean Water Act" (64 Fed Reg 68722, 68754 [1999]). "If necessary, the NPDESpermitting authority may ask the permittee to revise their [sic] mix of [best managementpractices], for example, to better reflect the [maximum extent practicable] pollutionreduction requirement" (id.). "If, after implementing the six minimum controlmeasures there is still water quality impairment associated with discharges from the MS4,after successive permit terms the permittee will need to expand or better tailor its [bestmanagement practices] within the scope of the six minimum control measures for eachsubsequent permit" (id.).

The General Permit at issue on this appeal is consistent with the scheme for generalpermits envisioned by the EPA, and is designed to meet the maximum extent practicablestandard prescribed by 33 USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c).The General Permit requires entities seeking coverage to "develop, implement andenforce" a stormwater management plan designed to address pollutants of concern and"reduce the discharge of pollutants from the small MS4" to the maximum extentpracticable, so as "to protect water quality, and to satisfy the appropriate water qualityrequirements of the ECL and the Clean Water Act" (see General Permit at 14,95). A stormwater management plan must, inter alia, identify and describe the chosenbest management practices and include measurable goals for each such practice(see General Permit at 95). The General Permit provides applicants withresources, including examples of successful stormwater management plans, a "menu" ofbest management practices, and suggested measurable goals (see General Permitat 95).

It is noted, in the General Permit, that "[i]f a covered entity chooses only a few of theleast expensive methods, it is likely that [the maximum extent practicable standard] hasnot been met" (General Permit at 91) . "On the other hand, if a covered entity employs allapplicable [best management practices] except those where it can be shown that they arenot technically feasible in the locality, or whose cost would exceed any benefit to bederived, it would have met the standard" (General Permit at 91). The maximum extentpracticable standard requires covered entities to choose effective best managementpractices, and to reject applicable best management practices only where other effectivebest management practices that could be used to eliminate or control the discharge ofpollutants will serve the same purpose, the best management practices would not betechnically feasible, or the cost would be prohibitive (see General Permit at 91).

The petitioners nevertheless argued, and the Supreme Court concluded, that theGeneral Permit creates a self-regulatory system that does not ensure that entitiesoperating under the General Permit have satisfied the maximum extent practicablestandard articulated in 33 USC § [*6]1342 (p) (3)(B) (iii) and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c). Specifically, the petitioners contend that the GeneralPermit does not require any review of the notices of intent submitted by municipalitiesseeking coverage so as to ensure that the selected best management practices do, in fact,represent measures that will reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extentpracticable (see Environmental Defense Ctr., Inc. v United States Envtl. ProtectionAgency, 344 F3d 832 [9th Cir 2003]; see also Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. vUnited States Envtl. Protection Agency, 399 F3d 486 [2d Cir 2005]).

Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the General Permit does include a variety ofenforcement measures that are sufficient to comply with the maximum extent practicablestandard, as described in state and federal statutes (see 33 USC § 1342 [p][3] [B] [iii]; ECL 17-0808 [3] [c]).

In order to come within the ambit of the General Permit, a municipality must submita "complete and accurate" notice of intent (General Permit at 8). The public must begiven notice of each notice of intent that is submitted to the DEC, and public commentsare received for a minimum of 28 days thereafter (see General Permit at 8)."After the public comment period has expired, the [DEC] may extend the publiccomment period, require submission of an application for an individual SPDES permit oralternative SPDES general permit, or accept the [notice of intent] or [stormwatermanagement program] as complete" (General Permit at 8). Operators who submit acomplete notice of intent in accordance with the requirements of the General Permit areauthorized to discharge stormwater from small MS4s, under the terms and conditions ofthe General Permit, "upon written notification from the [DEC] that a complete [notice ofintent] has been received" (General Permit at 9).

DEC regulations further provide that "[p]ermits may include and the permittee shallcomply with such other terms, provisions, requirements or conditions as may benecessary to meet the requirements of ECL Article 17 and 40 CFR 122 . . .including but not limited to requirements to implement best management practices plans"(6 NYCRR 750-1.14 [f]). Moreover "[g]eneral permits may be issued, modified, andreissued, or terminated" by the DEC (6 NYCRR 750-1.21 [d]). In addition, the DEC"may require any discharger authorized to discharge in accordance with a general permitto apply for and obtain an individual SPDES permit or apply for authorization todischarge in accordance with another general permit" where, inter alia, "[t]he dischargeris not in compliance with the conditions of the general permit" (6 NYCRR 750-1.21 [e][1] [i]).

Under the General Permit itself and state implementing regulations in general, theDEC is vested with sufficient authority to enforce the statutory mandates of 33 USC§ 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c) to reduce pollution discharge tothe maximum extent practicable. Although the General Permit allows a municipality toidentify and develop the best management practices it will utilize in light of the particularcircumstances facing it, the ultimate determination of whether that municipality'sdischarges are covered by the General Permit lies with the DEC, since coverage is notafforded until the DEC accepts the notice of intent or stormwater management plan ascomplete, and issues written notification (see General Permit at 8-9). The DECmay refuse to accept a notice of intent that fails to set forth best management practicesadequately addressing the six required minimum control measures or otherwise failing tocomply with the maximum extent practicable standard (see General Permit at 14,95). Even after a notice of intent has been accepted as complete, the DEC may modifythe General Permit or require an entity covered under the General Permit to apply for aspecial individual permit on the ground that the entity has failed to reduce the dischargeof pollutants to the maximum extent practicable (6 NYCRR 750-1.21 [e] [1] [i]).

The petitioners have not demonstrated, nor have they even asserted, that thepermitting scheme implemented through the General Permit necessarily results incoverage of municipalities whose stormwater management plans do not meet themaximum extent practicable standard. Indeed, the petitioners have not demonstrated asingle instance where the General Permit has authorized discharges of pollutants incontravention of the maximum extent practicable standard.

The petitioners' argument that the entire permitting scheme is flawed constitutes asystemic challenge to the General Permit. The DEC adequately rebutted this allegation by[*7]establishing that it had the power to review the bestmanagement practices enumerated in a municipality's notice of intent and to reject amunicipality's stormwater management plan by exercising its power to reject a notice ofintent as incomplete. The determination of the DEC to exercise its authority to requirecompliance with the maximum extent practicable standard in any particular case mustnecessarily be evaluated with reference to the particular circumstances of that case, sincea determination of what constitutes the maximum extent practicable will vary dependingon the circumstances facing each municipality. Since the petitioners have not challengedthe DEC's assessment of any particular stormwater management plan on the ground thatit does not comply with the maximum extent practicable standard, such issues are notbefore this Court.

Since the petitioners failed to demonstrate that the General Permit violated 33 USC§ 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) or ECL 17-0808 (3) (c), the Supreme Court should haveawarded judgment in favor of the DEC declaring that the general permit did not create animpermissible self-regulatory system that failed to ensure that small municipalitiesreduced their pollutant discharges to the "maximum extent practicable," as required by 33USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL 17-0808 (3) (c). Furthermore, the court erredto the extent that it relied on alleged violations of 33 USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii)or ECL 17-0808 (3) (c) in annulling the DEC's determination to approve the issuance ofthe General Permit on the ground that it was affected by error of law.

The order and judgment of the Supreme Court was also in favor of the petitionersand against the DEC declaring that the general permit failed to specify complianceschedules with respect to effluent limitations and water quality standards, as required by6 NYCRR 750-1.14). The General Permit did not, however violate that provision(see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 US837, 842-843 [1984]; 40 CFR 123.35 [e]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should haveawarded judgment in favor of the DEC declaring that the General Permit did not fail tospecify compliance schedules with respect to effluent limitations and water qualitystandards, as required by 6 NYCRR 750-1.14. Furthermore, the court erred to the extentthat it relied on an alleged violation of 6 NYCRR 750-1.14 in annulling the DEC'sdetermination to approve the issuance of the General Permit on the ground that it wasaffected by error of law.

We disagree with the Supreme Court's determination that the General Permit wasissued in violation of 33 USC § 1342 (a) (1) and ECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix).Congress did not explicitly define "permit application" to refer only to applicationssubmitted for an individual permit or to notices of intent submitted to obtain coverageunder an existing general permit (see Texas Ind. Producers & Royalty Owners Assn.v Environmental Protection Agency, 410 F3d 964, 978 [2005]). Accordingly, unlessthe DEC's interpretation of "permit application" is arbitrary and capricious, it is entitledto deference in this regard (see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources DefenseCouncil, Inc., 467 US at 843; Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v Planning Bd. of Town ofSoutheast, 9 NY3d 219, 232 [2007]; Matter of 427 W. 51st St. Owners Corp. v Division of Hous. &Community Renewal, 3 NY3d 337, 342 [2004]). It was not arbitrary andcapricious for the DEC to limit the opportunity for public hearings to those situations inwhich a new general permit is proposed or an existing general permit is renewed, sinceany modifications to a draft general permit resulting from public comment and hearingswill extend to all covered entities (see Texas Ind. Producers & Royalty Owners Assn.v Environmental Protection Agency, 410 F3d at 978). Accordingly, the SupremeCourt should have awarded judgment in favor of the DEC declaring that the GeneralPermit did not unlawfully fail to provide an opportunity for a public hearing on proposednotices of intent before they were submitted to the DEC and, thus, was not in violation of33 USC § 1342 (a) (1) and ECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix). Furthermore, the court erredto the extent that it relied on alleged violations of 33 USC § 1342 (a) (1) or ECL17-0805 (1) (a) (ix) in annulling the DEC's determination to approve the issuance of theGeneral Permit on the grounds that it was affected by error of law or was arbitrary andcapricious.

We agree with the Supreme Court that the General Permit does not fail to ensurecompliance with State water quality standards (see ECL 17-0811 [5]; 17-0813).Federal law requires the EPA and the States to develop water quality standards forinterstate and intrastate waters, respectively (see 33 USC § 1313 [a];Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v Fox, 909 F Supp 153, 156 [1995]),and allows the EPA and States discretion in the development of a program to meet thosestandards (see 33 USC § 1313 [e]). Moreover, although Congressspecifically provided that permits [*8]issued toindustrial dischargers must be conditioned on compliance with effluentlimitations set forth in 33 USC § 1311 (see 33 USC § 1342 [p] [3][A]; Defenders of Wildlife v Browner, 191 F3d 1159, 1164-1165, opamended on other grounds on denial of reh 197 F3d 1035 [1999]), it specificallyprovided that permits for municipal dischargers with respect to municipal stormsewers "shall require controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximumextent practicable" (33 USC § 1342 [p] [3] [B] [iii]), without reference to anynumerical limitation established under the Clean Water Act in connection with anyparticular effluent. Accordingly, with respect to the municipal dischargers covered underthe General Permit, Congress, rather than imposing specific effluent limitations, vestedthe EPA and the States with discretion in imposing pollution controls sufficient to meetwater quality standards which could, but are not required to, incorporate effluentlimitations. Thus, the provisions of the General Permit challenged by the petitioners intheir cross appeal with respect to effluent limitations and water quality standards are notcontrary to law (see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council,Inc., 467 US at 843; Matter of 427 W. 51st St. Owners Corp. v Division of Hous.& Community Renewal, 3 NY3d at 342; Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v PlanningBd. of Town of Southeast, 9 NY3d at 232; Paramount Communications vGibraltar Cas. Co., 90 NY2d 507, 513-514 [1997]).

Furthermore, Congress did not specifically address the nature or extent of the publicparticipation that is required for the establishment of any effluent limitations that theEPA or the States, in the exercise of their discretion, seek to promulgate (see 33USC § 1251 [e]). The DEC's determination to provide for public participation inthe establishment of effluent limitations at the general permit issuance and renewalstages, but not after the issuance of the general permit, is not contrary to 33 USC §1251 (e) (see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,467 US at 843; Matter of 427 W. 51st St. Owners Corp. v Division of Hous. &Community Renewal, 3 NY3d at 342; Matter of Riverkeeper, Inc. v Planning Bd.of Town of Southeast, 9 NY3d at 232; Paramount Communications v GibraltarCas. Co., 90 NY2d at 513-514).

The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, that branch of the petition which was to annul the DEC's determinationon the grounds that it was affected by an error of law and was arbitrary and capriciousshould have been denied, and judgment should have been awarded to the DEC declaringthat the general permit did not create an impermissible self-regulatory system that failedto ensure that small municipalities reduced their pollutant discharges to the "maximumextent practicable," as required by 33 USC § 1342 (p) (3) (B) (iii) and ECL17-0808 (3) (c), did not fail to specify compliance schedules with respect to effluentlimitations and water quality standards, as required by 6 NYCRR 750-1.14, and did notunlawfully fail to provide an opportunity for public hearings on proposed notices ofintent before they were submitted to it, as required by 33 USC § 1342 (a) (1) andECL 17-0805 (1) (a) (ix), as well as that the general permit did not fail to ensure thatsmall municipalities complied with state water quality standards and, thus, was not inviolation of ECL 17-0811 (5), did not fail to ensure that small municipalities monitoredtheir storm water discharges and, thus, was not in violation of 33 USC § 1318 (a),and did not unlawfully fail to provide for public hearings on proposed stormwatermanagement plans and proposed watershed improvement strategies and, thus, was not inviolation of 33 USC § 1251 (e). Rivera, J.P., Leventhal, Austin and Miller, JJ.,concur. [Prior Case History: 35 Misc 3d 652.]


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