| People v Abraham |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 07495 [111 AD3d 756] |
| November 13, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Jerome Abraham, Appellant. |
—[*1] Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano,Nicoletta J. Caferri, and Laura T. Ross of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County(Latella, J.), rendered August 16, 2011, convicting him of attempted murder in thesecond degree, assault in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the seconddegree (four counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (four counts),and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree, after a nonjurytrial, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing,of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physicalevidence and his statements to law enforcement officials.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
"Probable cause to believe that the Vehicle and Traffic Law has been violatedprovides an objectively reasonable basis for the police to stop a vehicle and. . . there is no exception for infractions that are subjectively characterizedas 'de minimis' " (People vPealer, 20 NY3d 447, 457 n 2 [2013]). Here, the record supports the hearingcourt's determination to credit a police officer's testimony that he observed a vehicle inwhich the defendant was a passenger, inter alia, make a turn without signaling, whichjustified the stop of the vehicle for a traffic infraction (see Vehicle and TrafficLaw § 1163 [a]; People vDavis, 103 AD3d 810, 811 [2013]; People v Glover, 84 AD3d 977, 978 [2011]). Contrary tothe defendant's contention, the officer's testimony was not incredible and did not appearto have been patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections (see People v Lewis, 107 AD3d826, 826-827 [2013]). We reach the same conclusion with respect to the officer'stestimony regarding an unmarked pill bottle that he observed in plain view during thestop (see id.).
The defendant also takes issue with the hearing court's finding that the driverconsented to a search of the trunk. Contrary to the defendant's contention, there wasnothing incredible about the officer's testimony on this point. Moreover, to the extent thatthe defendant's consent argument is based on a theory that the driver's consent wasinvoluntary, this contention is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Boucher, 97AD3d 597, 598 [2012]) and, in any event, is without merit (see People v Edwards, 46AD3d 698, 699 [2007]; People v Dobson, 285 AD2d 737, 738 [2001];People v Artis, 201 AD2d 488, 489 [1994]).[*2]
Accordingly, because the stop of the vehicle waslawful, and because the physical evidence seized either was in plain view or wasobtained after the driver consented to a search, the Supreme Court properly denied thosebranches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidenceand his statements to law enforcement officials. The defendant's remaining contentionsconcerning the suppression of testimony regarding police officers' observations and ofstatements and testimony of a female witness are unpreserved for appellate review and, inany event, without merit. Dillon, J.P., Sgroi, Cohen and Miller, JJ., concur.