| People v Booker |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 07499 [111 AD3d 759] |
| November 13, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Jay Booker, Appellant. |
—[*1] Charles J. Hynes, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Rhea A.Grob, and Claibourne I. Henry of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County(Mangano, Jr., J.), rendered May 26, 2011, convicting him of assault on a peace officer,police officer, fireman or an emergency medical services professional and theft ofservices, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting hisconviction of assault on a peace officer, police officer, fireman or an emergency medicalservices professional is unpreserved for appellate review, as his general motion todismiss the indictment, made at the close of his case, failed to specify any grounds fordismissal (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492 [2008]; People v Flores, 88 AD3d902, 903 [2011]; People vRivera, 74 AD3d 993 [2010]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the lightmost favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]),we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonabledoubt with respect to that crime (see Penal Law §§ 120.08, 10.00[10]; People v Hutchinson,57 AD3d 565 [2008]). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct anindependent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d342, 348 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity toview the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People vMateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]; Peoplev Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we aresatisfied that the verdict of guilt as to that crime was not against the weight of theevidence (see People vRomero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
Under the circumstances of this case, including the seriousness of the crime and thedefendant's three subsequent arrests, the denial of youthful offender treatment was aprovident exercise of the Supreme Court's discretion (see CPL 720.20 [1]).Mastro, J.P., Skelos, Balkin and Roman, JJ., concur.