| HSBC Mtge. Servs. v Talip |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 07936 [111 AD3d 889] |
| November 27, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| HSBC Mortgage Services, Respondent, v IqbalTalip et al., Appellants, et al., Defendants. |
—[*1] Fein, Such & Crane, LLP, Syracuse, N.Y. (John A. Cirando, Bradley E. Keem, andElizabeth deV. Moeller of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendants Iqbal Talip and Jessica Pooranappeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of (1) an order of the Supreme Court,Queens County (Rosengarten, J.), entered February 3, 2011, as denied those branches oftheir motion which were to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale of the same courtentered September 24, 2010, upon their default in appearing or answering the complaint,and to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them based on the plaintiff'salleged failure to comply with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304, and (2) an orderof the same court entered October 3, 2011, as denied those branches of their motionwhich were for leave to renew those branches of their prior motion which were to vacatethe judgment of foreclosure and sale entered September 24, 2010, and to dismiss thecomplaint insofar as asserted against them based on the plaintiff's alleged failure tocomply with the notice requirements of RPAPL 1304.
Ordered that the orders are affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.
The Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the appellants' motion whichwere to vacate a judgment of foreclosure and sale, entered upon their default inappearing or answering the complaint, and to dismiss the complaint insofar as assertedagainst them based on the plaintiff's alleged failure to comply with the noticerequirements of RPAPL 1304. Contrary to the appellants' contention, they failed toestablish that the default judgment should be vacated in the interests of substantial justice(see Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 68 [2003]; Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys.,Inc. v Dort-Relus, 107 AD3d 861, 862 [2013]; Pritchard v Curtis, 101 AD3d1502, 1504-1505 [2012]).
The Supreme Court also properly denied those branches of the appellants' motionwhich were for leave to renew those branches of their prior motion which were to vacatethe judgment of foreclosure and sale and to dismiss the complaint insofar as assertedagainst them based on the plaintiff's alleged failure to comply with the noticerequirements of RPAPL 1304. Contrary [*2]to theappellants' contention, they did not demonstrate that there had been a change in the lawthat would change the prior determination (see CPLR 2221 [e] [2]; Frenchman v Lynch, 97 AD3d632, 633 [2012]; Matter ofDeRaffele Mfg. Co., Inc. v Kaloakas Mgt. Corp., 48 AD3d 807, 809 [2008]).Mastro, J.P., Leventhal, Lott and Roman, JJ., concur.