| Matter of Tuxedo Land Trust, Inc. v Town Bd. of Town ofTuxedo |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 08255 [112 AD3d 726] |
| December 11, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Tuxedo Land Trust, Inc., et al.,Appellants, v Town Board of Town of Tuxedo et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Jacobowitz & Gubits, LLP, Walden, N.Y. (Alyse D. Terhune of counsel), forrespondents Town Board of Town of Tuxedo, Planning Board of Town of Tuxedo,David Maikisch, and Town of Tuxedo. Sive, Paget & Riesel, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Steven Barshov of counsel), forrespondent Tuxedo Reserve Owner, LLC.
In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to review adetermination of the Town Board of the Town of Tuxedo dated November 22, 2010,which, among other things, approved a findings statement pursuant to the StateEnvironmental Quality Review Act (ECL art. 8) and approved an amendment to a 2004special permit and preliminary plat approval in connection with a proposed developmentproject, and action for related declaratory relief, the petitioners/plaintiffs appeal, aslimited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County(Lefkowitz, J.), entered March 5, 2012, as granted those branches of the motion of therespondents/defendants Town Board of Town of Tuxedo, Planning Board of Town ofTuxedo, David Maikisch, and Town of Tuxedo, and the separate motion of therespondent/defendant Tuxedo Reserve Owner, LLC, which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) (3) and 7804 (f) to dismiss the first through fifth and twelfth causes of action insofaras asserted against each of them for lack of standing.
Ordered that on the Court's own motion, the notice of appeal from so much of theorder as granted those branches of the motions which were pursuant to CPLR 7804 (f) todismiss so much of the first through fifth and twelfth causes of action as sought reliefpursuant to CPLR article 78 is treated as an application for leave to appeal from thatportion of the order, and leave to appeal is granted (see CPLR 5701 [c]); and it isfurther,
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costspayable to the respondents/defendants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.[*2]
Tuxedo Reserve Owner, LLC (hereinafter theowner), owns a parcel of approximately 2,400 acres of land in the Town of Tuxedowhich is the subject of this hybrid proceeding and action. In 2004, following reviewpursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8; hereinafterSEQRA), the Town Board of the Town of Tuxedo (hereinafter the Town Board) grantedthe owner a special permit and preliminary plat approval permitting a mixed usedevelopment of more than 1,000 dwelling units as well as nonresidential development. In2007 the owner applied for amendments, which were granted. In this hybrid proceedingand action, the petitioners/plaintiffs (hereinafter the petitioners) challenge the granting in2010 of a third application for amendments, after review of certain aspects of theamendments pursuant to SEQRA. In the order and judgment appealed from, the SupremeCourt granted those branches of the separate motions of the respondents/defendantswhich were to dismiss, insofar as asserted against each of them, the first through fifth andtwelfth causes of action, each of which allege violations of SEQRA, on the ground thatthe petitioners lacked standing to assert those causes of action.
To establish standing under SEQRA, a petitioner must show (1) an environmentalinjury that is in some way different from that of the public at large, and (2) that thealleged injury falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected or promoted bySEQRA (see Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761,772-774 [1991]; Matter ofVillage of Chestnut Ridge v Town of Ramapo, 45 AD3d 74, 89-90 [2007]; Matter of Barrett v DutchessCounty Legislature, 38 AD3d 651, 652 [2007]). An injury in fact may beinferred from a showing of close proximity of the petitioner's property to the proposeddevelopment (see Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d668, 687 [1996]; Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash v Board of Zoning & Appeals ofTown of N. Hempstead, 69 NY2d 406, 414 [1987]). Generally, the relevant distanceis the distance between the petitioner's property and the actual structure or developmentitself, not the distance between the petitioner's property and the property line of the site(see Matter of Gallahan v Planning Bd. of City of Ithaca, 307 AD2d 684 [2003];see also Matter of Barrett v Dutchess County Legislature, 38 AD3d at 654; Matter of Ziemba v City ofTroy, 37 AD3d 68, 71 [2006]). Here, the individual petitioners' properties werenot located in sufficient proximity to the proposed development to give rise to standing(see Matter of Barrett vDutchess County Legislature, 38 AD3d 651 [2007]; Matter of Long Is. Contractors'Assn. v Town of Riverhead, 17 AD3d 590 [2005]; Matter of Rediker vZoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Philipstown, 280 AD2d 548 [2001]). Theirremaining contentions are without merit.
Since the standing of the petitioner organizations—Tuxedo Land Trust, Inc.,and the Torne Valley Preservation Association—is dependent upon the standing ofthe individual petitioners (seeMatter of Finger Lakes Zero Waste Coalition, Inc. v Martens, 95 AD3d 1420,1421 [2012]; Matter ofBloodgood v Town of Huntington, 58 AD3d 619, 622 [2009]), the petitionerorganizations also lack standing.
Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the separatemotions of the respondents/defendants which were to dismiss the first through fifth andtwelfth causes of action insofar as asserted against each of them for lack of standing.Dillon, J.P., Dickerson, Cohen and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.