| People v Greenfield |
| 2013 NY Slip Op 08550 [112 AD3d 1226] |
| December 26, 2013 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v DavidM. Greenfield, Appellant. |
—[*1] Richard J. McNally Jr., District Attorney, Troy (Kelly L. Egan of counsel), forrespondent.
Spain, J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Rensselaer County(Ceresia, J.), rendered March 1, 2011, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimeof attempted murder in the second degree.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of attempted murder in the seconddegree for his actions in the early morning hours of July 8, 2010, when he repeatedlystabbed his long-term domestic partner in the neck, chest and shoulder as she lay halfasleep in their apartment in the City of Troy, Rensselaer County. Defendant later signed awritten statement to police admitting that he stabbed the victim. Sentenced as a secondfelony offender to a prison term of 25 years with five years of postrelease supervision,defendant appeals.
Addressing defendant's claims directed at the jury's verdict, upon review of theevidence adduced at trial we conclude that it was supported by legally sufficient evidenceand was not contrary to the weight of credible evidence (see People v Bleakley,69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). To establish defendant's guilt of attempted murder in thesecond degree, the People were required to prove that defendant, acting with intent tocause the death of another, engaged in conduct which tended to effect the commission ofthat crime (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.25 [1]; People v Molina, 79 AD3d1371, 1375 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 861 [2011]). "Where those elementsconverge, an attempted murder has occurred, regardless of whether the defendant haskilled or even injured his or her intended target" (People v Fernandez, 88 NY2d777, 783[*2][1996]). While defendant preserved hischallenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence of his intent by his specific motions todismiss, that motion did not raise his current legal insufficiency claim directed at theproof of whether he came close to causing the victim's death, which is not preserved(see People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10, 19 [1995]). In any event, in addressing hisweight of the evidence challenge to this conviction, we necessarily review the adequacyof the evidence as to each element (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]).
There was no dispute that, without provocation, defendant straddled the victim andthen stabbed her multiple times with knives he had taken from their kitchen, as she layhalf asleep in their bed; when she tried to get up, he pushed her down and continuedstabbing her, appearing angry, and then called 911 and reported what he had done. Whenpolice arrived, the victim was lying in bed covered in blood, which was all over theapartment and on defendant; defendant told police that the knives were in the sink, thathe had recent health problems, and that they had been "fighting lately" and "he couldn'ttake it anymore." Transported to the police station, defendant signed a written statementadmitting that he and the victim had "been having problems for a long time," that he hadtried to leave her but always went back, and he "figured it was just as easy to stab her";he admitted that he stabbed her "fast six or seven times below the throat" and continueddoing so, stopping when he "had enough" or "realized it wasn't doing anything." Viewingthe evidence in the light most favorable to the People and considering the surroundingcircumstances, we find that there was legally sufficient evidence to allow a rational jurorto infer that defendant acted with the intent to cause the victim's death (see People v Naradzay, 11NY3d 460, 466-467 [2008]; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621 [1983];People v Bracey, 41 NY2d 296, 301 [1977]; People v Bonney, 69 AD3d 1116, 1118 [2010], lvdenied 14 NY3d 838 [2010]; People v Rose, 122 AD2d 484, 486-487[1986]).
Further, although a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, viewing theevidence in a neutral light, we do not find that the jury erred in crediting the victim'stestimony, which was consistent with defendant's admissions to police after the attack(see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). Defendant testified, admitting that hestabbed the victim as she described, but claiming that he did not remember doing so. Herepudiated portions of his statement to police, but not his admission to the stabbing.While he asserted that he did not intend to hurt her, the jury obviously and, in our view,rationally, discredited this denial, given the nature of his actions and his admissions. ThePeople also proved that defendant came dangerously near to causing the victim's death(see People v Kassebaum, 95 NY2d 611, 618 [2001], cert denied 532 US1069 [2001]; People v Acosta, 80 NY2d 665, 670 [1993]; People v Cooley, 50 AD3d1548, 1549 [2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 957 [2008]). Even if the jury hadcredited defendant's expert—who concluded that the victim's injuries were not lifethreatening—over the People's witness—the emergency room physicianwho treated her and found that her injuries were life threatening—this would nothave undermined the jury's conclusion that defendant came dangerously near to causingthe victim's death, as "the crime of attempted murder does not require actual physicalinjury to a victim at all" (People v Fernandez, 88 NY2d at 783).
We agree, however, with defendant's claim that County Court committed reversibleerror when it denied his challenge for cause to prospective juror No. 81. A prospectivejuror may be challenged for cause on several grounds, including that he or she has a prior"relationship" with either a prospective witness, the victim, or counsel for the People orthe defendant "of such a nature that it is likely to preclude him [or her] from rendering animpartial verdict" (CPL 270.20 [1] [c]). Both "[t]he frequency of contact and nature ofthe parties' relationship are to be [*3]considered indetermining whether disqualification is necessary" (People v Furey, 18 NY3d 284, 287 [2011]). Known as"implied bias," the existence of such a relationship that is likely to preclude an impartialverdict "requires automatic exclusion from jury service regardless of whether theprospective juror declares that the relationship will not affect [his or] her ability to be fairand impartial [a]nd such bias . . . cannot be cured with an expurgatory oath"(id. [internal citations omitted]). The rationale is that "the risk of prejudicearising out of the close relationship . . . [is] so great that recital of an oath ofimpartiality could not convincingly dispel the taint" (People v Branch, 46 NY2d645, 651 [1979]), that is, the relationship "creates the perception that the accused mightnot receive a fair trial before an impartial finder of fact" (People v Furey, 18NY3d at 287).
Here, prospective juror No. 81 stated during voir dire that he is a federal lawenforcement agent (with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives) andhas, over the years, worked "hand in hand" on "quite a few" cases with the RensselaerCounty District Attorney's office, although "not many" in the past two or three years, andthat he had a good professional relationship with that office. He then disclosed that hewas, presently, actively working on a case in an investigative capacity with that DistrictAttorney's office. Defense counsel challenged this prospective juror for cause based uponhis ongoing working law enforcement relationship with the District Attorney's office,which County Court denied.
Of course, not all relationships, particularly professional ones, between a prospectivejuror and relevant persons, including counsel for either side, require disqualification forcause as a matter of law (see id.). Trial courts are directed to look at myriadfactors surrounding the particular relationship in issue, such as the frequency, recency orcurrency of the contact, whether it was direct contact, and the nature of the relationshipas personal and/or professional (see id. at 287-288; People v Scott, 16 NY3d589, 595 [2011]; People v Rentz, 67 NY2d 829, 830-831 [1986]; Peoplev Branch, 46 NY2d at 650-651; People v Rowe, 253 AD2d 831, 831 [1998],lv denied 92 NY2d 985 [1998] [relationship "remote in all respects" with theDistrict Attorney's office and trial prosecutor did not render jurors biased]; see also People v Green, 108AD3d 782, 784 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1074 [2013]) or merely "anodding acquaintance" (People v Provenzano, 50 NY2d 420, 425 [1980]).Indeed, any facet of the relationship likely to preclude the prospective juror from beingimpartial should be considered by the trial court (see CPL 270.20 [1] [c];People v Colon, 71 NY2d 410, 418-419 [1988], cert denied 487 US 1239[1988]). Neither prospective juror No. 81's status as a law enforcement officer (seePeople v Pickren, 284 AD2d 727, 727 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 923[2001]) nor his former, solely professional relationship with the District Attorney'soffice, which was largely remote in time or—more recently—infrequent(see People v Scott, 16 NY3d at 595; cf. People v Furey, 18 NY3d at288; People v Branch, 46 NY2d at 651), required his disqualification for causehere.
However, we find that the prospective juror's current, ongoing investigativework on a pending matter in cooperation with and under the direction of theprosecuting agency required that juror's dismissal for cause (see People v Lynch,95 NY2d 243, 248 [2000] [student intern employed at prosecutor's office should havebeen dismissed for cause]; cf. People v Scott, 16 NY3d at 595 [formerprofessional relationship, "distant in time and limited in nature," did not requiredisqualification]; People v Rowe, 253 AD2d at 831). The nature of thatrelationship as purely professional, while certainly a very weighty factor, is not alonedeterminative of the absence, or presence, of implied bias, as other factors must be takeninto consideration, such as the frequency, scope and recency of the contact (see e.g.People v Scott, 16 NY3d at 595 [looks at recency and scope]; People vRentz, 67 NY2d at 830-831 [juror with professional relationship [*4]with two witnesses and personal one with one witnessshould have been disqualified]; People v Branch, 46 NY2d at 650-651 [looked at"direct contact" with the District Attorney and that juror had "worked directly" with trialprosecutor, in addition to having personal relationship with trial prosecutor]; People v Wlasiuk, 90 AD3d1405, 1412 [2011] [juror failed to disclose professional relationship as coworker tovictim]; People v Littebrant,55 AD3d 1151, 1154 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 818 [2009] [juror withprofessional and long-term personal relationship with key defense witness properlyexcused for cause]).
Under the circumstances presented here, we conclude that the prospective juror No.81's current law enforcement cooperative relationship with the prosecuting agency"create[d] the perception that the accused might not receive a fair trial before an impartialfinder of fact" (People v Furey, 18 NY3d at 287), requiring that he be dismissedfor cause on defendant's motion (see CPL 270.20 [1] [c]). The erroneous denialof that defense challenge for cause requires reversal because the defense peremptorilychallenged the juror in issue and exhausted its peremptory challenges before thecompletion of jury selection (see CPL 270.20 [2]). It is for this reason that trialcourts, which we recognize are required to make rapid-fire rulings during jury selection,have been advised to "exercise caution" (People v Furey, 18 NY3d at 287) and"lean toward disqualifying a prospective juror of dubious impartiality, rather than testingthe bounds of discretion by permitting such a juror to serve . . . [in order toensure] the right of an accused to a trial by an impartial jury" (People v Branch,46 NY2d at 651).
In light of the foregoing, we need not address defendant's remaining claims,including his contention that he was penalized with a significantly longer prison sentencefor declining a plea offer and electing to proceed to trial.
Peters, P.J., Lahtinen and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment isreversed, on the law, and matter remitted to the County Court of Rensselaer County for anew trial.