| Matter of Talisman Energy USA, Inc. v New York State Dept. ofEnvtl. Conservation |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 00150 [113 AD3d 902] |
| January 9, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Talisman Energy USA, Inc., Appellant, vNew York State Department of Environmental Conservation et al.,Respondents. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Andrew B. Ayers of counsel), forNew York State Department of Environmental Conservation and another, respondents. Reed Smith, LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (Stefanie A. Lepore of counsel), forWestern Land Services, Inc. and others, respondents. Biltekoff & Pullen, LLP, Amherst (Seth D. Pullen of counsel), for Epsilon EnergyUSA, Inc., respondent.
Rose, J.P. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Zwack, J.), enteredJanuary 16, 2013 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in acombined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment,to review, among other things, several determinations of respondent Department ofEnvironmental Conservation regarding the integration of the various ownership interestsin the rights of natural gas extracted by petitioner's wells.
Petitioner is a driller and developer of natural gas wells in New York, including fourwells that are the subject of this proceeding/action. Respondents Western Land Services,Inc., Buck Mountain Associates, Inc., Austin Exploration Corporation, LLC, Bryon J.Cook, William F. Cook and Epsilon Energy USA, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referredto as respondents) are [*2]the partial owners or managethe partial owners of the natural gas extracted by petitioner. At issue here is whether theLegislature's substantial amendments made in 2005 to ECL article 23, which governs oiland natural gas exploration, development and production in New York, apply to thewells in question.
A more comprehensive history of the development of the law regarding theproduction of oil and gas in New York may be found in our prior holding in Matter of Western Land Servs.,Inc. v Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y. (26 AD3d 15 [2005],lv denied 6 NY3d 713 [2006]). To briefly summarize, prior to 2005, respondentDepartment of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter DEC) issued spacing ordersdetermining which owners had the right to be compensated by the well operator for theextraction of natural gas from an underground pool (see ECL former 23-0501).DEC would then join the interests of the various owners of the pool and issue integrationorders that defined the rights and obligations of the parties in terms that it deemed "justand reasonable" (ECL 23-0901 former [3]). This resulted in conflicts between welloperators and the various owners regarding the question of reasonable compensation andthe degree of involvement of the owners in the risks and rewards involved in drilling awell (see Senate Introducer Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2005, ch 386 at 5).
To address these conflicts, the Legislature amended ECL article 23 in 2005, enactingchanges to well permitting, spacing and the integration process (see L 2005, ch386). As relevant here, DEC no longer determines the rights and obligations of theowners (see ECL 23-0901 [3]). Rather, the owners may choose between threelevels of ownership with varying rights and obligations consistent with their desired levelof participation in the exploration and drilling of the well (see ECL 23-0901 [3]).
The amendments took effect on August 2, 2005 and apply "to any oil or gas wellpermit or spacing order issued on or after such effective date" (L 2005, ch 386,§ 10 [emphasis added]). Here, the four wells in question were transition wells, inthat petitioner obtained the permits for these wells prior to the effective date of the 2005amendments, but the spacing orders had not been issued as of that date. Petitionerchallenged the applicability of the 2005 amendments to such wells. RespondentCommissioner of Environmental Conservation then issued an interim decision finding,among other things, that the 2005 amendments applied to the integration proceedingsinvolving the four transition wells at issue here. Petitioner disagreed and, after DECissued its final integration orders allowing respondents to choose their level of ownershippursuant to ECL 23-0901 (3), petitioner commenced this combined CPLR article 78proceeding and declaratory judgment action. Following joinder of issue, Supreme Courtdismissed the combined proceeding and action, prompting this appeal.
We affirm. Initially, we must reject petitioner's contention that applying the 2005 lawto transition wells constitutes a retroactive application of the law. The statute governswell permits or spacing orders issued on or after its effective date (see L 2005, ch386, § 10). The statute therefore contemplates the existence of transition wellssuch as the four in question here. Inasmuch as "[a] statute is not retroactive. . . when made to apply to future transactions, merely because suchtransactions relate to and are founded upon antecedent events" (McKinney's Cons Lawsof NY, Book 1, Statutes § 51, Comment at 87; see Matter of Raynor v Landmark Chrysler, 18 NY3d 48,57 [2011]), the fact that the new law governs the integration of a well that had alreadybeen permitted but not spaced does not render it retroactive.[*3]
We also reject petitioner's contention that theCommissioner's decision conflicts with this Court's prior decision in Matter ofWestern Land Servs., Inc. v Department of Envtl. Conservation of State of N.Y.(supra). In that case, we stated that the 2005 legislation "expressly applies only tothose gas wells permitted after its effective date" (id. at 19). This statement,however, was made in the context of interpreting the pre-2005 law, and the 2005legislation was cited only in response to a claim that it had rendered the appeal moot(id.). Accordingly, Matter of Western Land Servs. does not establishprecedent as to the issue now before us (see Robinson Motor Xpress, Inc. v HSBC Bank, USA, 37AD3d 117, 123-124 [2006]).
Turning to the applicability of the 2005 amendments to transition wells, "[t]heprimary consideration of courts in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect tothe intention of the Legislature" (Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 463[2000] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), and "[s]uch intent and meaningis best determined from the plain language of the statutory text" (Matter of Doe v City ofSchenectady, 84 AD3d 1455, 1458 [2011]). Further, "[a]lthough the words of astatute control if unambiguous, consideration may also be given to correspondinglegislative history" (State ofNew York v Getty Petroleum Corp., 89 AD3d 262, 265 [2011]; see Riley vCounty of Broome, 95 NY2d at 463). Giving the language of the enactmentprovision its plain meaning (see L 2005, ch 386, § 10), we conclude thatthe amendments apply to the spacing orders for the wells in question here.
Petitioner argues that, even if the amended law applies to the spacing orders, it doesnot apply to integration orders for transition wells. We are, however, unpersuaded. "Inconstruing a statute, a court must attempt to harmonize all its provisions and to givemeaning to all its parts, considered as a whole, in accord with legislative intent" (Matter of Kittredge v Planning Bd.of Town of Liberty, 57 AD3d 1336, 1339 [2008] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Guidarelli vBrassard, 88 AD3d 1147, 1148 [2011]; Matter of Lewis Family Farm, Inc. v New York State AdirondackPark Agency, 64 AD3d 1009, 1013-1014 [2009]). Pursuant to ECL article 23,DEC is directed to undertake the integration process when the interests of the variousowners of the mineral rights within a spacing unit must be integrated to carry out thepolicy goals of the statute (see ECL 23-0901 [2], [3]). Therefore, integrationcannot occur until a spacing unit has been established identifying the interested parties.Under petitioner's argument, the spacing unit for transition wells would be establishedpursuant to the amended law, but the subsequent integration would be dictated by theformer law. Inasmuch as the 2005 amendments were intended "to eliminate uncertaintyin the unitization and integration process[es]" by "[a]dd[ing] a new, streamlined statutoryprocedure for the integration of interests in a [spacing] unit" (Senate Introducer Mem inSupport, Bill Jacket, L 2005, ch 386 at 4-5), we cannot agree with petitioner that theLegislature intended such an unharmonious statutory scheme where the former law,which resulted in the uncertainty in the integration process that the amendments wereintended to eliminate, would still be applicable to integration orders issued after the newlaw's enactment.
Nor do we agree with petitioner that the integration orders issued by DEC werecontrary to the intent of the amended law. As reflected in the orders, respondents choseto be integrated participating owners (see ECL 23-0901 [3] [a] [2]). It isanticipated that such owners agree to participate in the well and to pay all associatedcosts prior to the well being dug (see ECL 23-0901 [3] [a] [2]). Here, the wellswere already productive prior to respondents' election of their ownership status and theywere allowed to become integrated participating owners without having to assume thefinancial risks of well exploration and development normally associated with that statusof ownership. While we agree with petitioner that this frustrates the purpose of the newlegislation to some degree, the statute reflects that the Legislature contemplated the [*4]existence of transition wells at the time of the amendments(see ECL 23-0503 [5]; L 2005, ch 386, § 10), and not including differentterms for the integration of transition wells is an indication that the omission wasintended (see Commonwealth ofthe N. Mariana Is. v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 21 NY3d 55, 60[2013]; Matter of CommunityRelated Servs., Inc. v Carpenter-Palumbo, 84 AD3d 1450, 1452 [2011], lvdenied 17 NY3d 717 [2011]). In our view, the omission was a determination by theLegislature that, in the limited situations involving transition wells in existence at thetime of the amendments, the interest in eliminating uncertainty in the integration ofinterests outweighs the disadvantages to well operators presented by owners who makeownership status choices with knowledge concerning the productivity of the well.
Having failed to establish that the 2005 amendments are inapplicable to the spacingand integration of transition wells, petitioner's combined proceeding and action wasproperly dismissed. Petitioner's remaining arguments have been considered and found tobe lacking in merit.
Lahtinen, McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed,without costs.