| Matter of Mott v Central N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 00153 [113 AD3d 911] |
| January 9, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| In the Matter of Louis Mott, Respondent, v Central NewYork Psychiatric Center et al., Appellants. Workers' Compensation Board,Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York City (Steven Segall of counsel),for Workers' Compensation Board, respondent.
Peters, P.J. Appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board, filed July26, 2012, which ruled that the employer is not entitled to reimbursement for certainbenefits paid to claimant.
Claimant, a guard at a state-run psychiatric center, suffered a work-related injury tohis left elbow on July 1, 2008. His claim for workers' compensation benefits wasestablished and he was awarded benefits from July 2, 2008 to September 7, 2009. Duringthis period, claimant used his five days of allotted annual personal leave time andreceived full payment of wages for that time. The employer thereafter requestedreimbursement at the workers' compensation benefit rate for the advance payment ofcompensation during claimant's disability, including for the time charged againstclaimant's personal leave time. The Workers' Compensation Board ultimately ruled thatthe employer was not entitled to reimbursement related to claimant's personal leave time.The employer and its workers' compensation carrier appeal.
Workers' Compensation Law § 25 (4) (a) provides that "[i]f the employer hasmade [*2]advance payments of compensation, or hasmade payments to an employee in like manner as wages during any period of disability,[the employer] shall be entitled to be reimbursed out of an unpaid installment orinstallments of compensation due." Further, "[a]n employer can be reimbursed forcompensation paid to a claimant even if that compensation was paid in accordance with acontract or a collective bargaining agreement" (Matter of Houda v Niagara Frontier Hockey, 16 AD3d 926,928 [2005]; see Matter of Jefferson v Bronx Psychiatric Ctr., 55 NY2d 69, 71[1982]), and reimbursement must be awarded to the employer "unless suchreimbursement would achieve a disproportionate result, either to the employer oremployee" (Matter of Jones v Chevrolet-Tonawanda Div., GMC, 87 AD2d 924,925 [1982], affd 57 NY2d 851 [1982]; accord Matter of Silvanic vWall-To-Wall Sound & Video, 188 AD2d 996, 996 [1992]).
The circumstances presented here are distinguishable from Matter of Poupard vMohonasen Cent. School Dist. (56 NY2d 764, 765 [1982]) and Matter ofJefferson v Bronx Psychiatric Ctr. (55 NY2d at 71), the cases relied on by the Board.There, the employees charged time during disability to their accrued sick leave creditsand, pursuant to their respective collective bargaining agreements, such used sick leavecredits could not be restored. Because the employees could later convert their accruedsick leave credits into retirement service credits, the loss of those credits resulted in apermanent benefit to the employers. The Court of Appeals thus concluded that an awardof reimbursement for the payment of the accrued sick leave, coupled with the permanentbenefit of the reduced sick leave credits, would result in a disproportionate benefit to theemployers and a net detriment to the employees. Accordingly, reimbursement was denied(id.).
In the current case, personal leave credits, as opposed to sick leave credits, may notbe accrued from year to year or converted into cash or retirement credits (see 4NYCRR 21.6 [b]). Thus, in our view, the use by claimant of his personal leave timeduring disability did not result in a permanent benefit to the employer or a net detrimentto claimant, as claimant did not surrender "valuable vested rights" in return for thepayment of full wages (Matter of Jefferson v Bronx Psychiatric Ctr., 55 NY2d at71; see Matter of Morgan v New York State Dev. Ctr., 166 AD2d 765, 765-766[1990]; see also Matter of Knaszak v Buffalo Forge Co., 15 AD2d 971, 972[1962]). Rather, here, the denial of reimbursement for payments related to personal leavecredits would result in claimant receiving both full wages and compensation benefits forthe time in question. Such a result is disfavored and requires that reimbursement begranted to the employer (seeMatter of Pawlewski v Buffalo Bd. of Educ., 53 AD3d 834, 835 [2008];Matter of Silvanic v Wall-To-Wall Sound & Video, 188 AD2d at 996; Matterof Jones v Chevrolet-Tonawanda Div., GMC, 87 AD2d at 925). In light of ourdetermination, the employer and carrier's remaining contention is academic.
Lahtinen, Stein and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is reversed,without costs, and matter remitted to the Workers' Compensation Board for furtherproceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.