| People v Safran |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 00536 [113 AD3d 878] |
| January 29, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v David J. Safran, Appellant. |
—[*1] Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Michael Blakey of counsel),for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County(Cohen, J.), rendered September 20, 2011, convicting him of criminal possession of aforged instrument in the second degree (24 counts) and resisting arrest, upon his plea ofguilty, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was arrested when he was found to be in possession of a largequantity of fraudulent temporary motor vehicle registration tags. The defendant contendsthat the People should have prosecuted him for violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law§ 403-a, which provides that falsifying any temporary indicia of registration shallbe a traffic infraction, rather than criminal possession of a forged instrument in thesecond degree. The defendant's claim is without merit. When two or more statutes makepunishable the same conduct, it is generally left to the People, in their discretion, tochoose which offense to charge (see People v Walsh, 67 NY2d 747, 749[1986]; People v Eboli, 34 NY2d 281, 287-290 [1974]). "[T]he existence of astatutory prohibition against a particular type of conduct . . . will not bedeemed to constitute the exclusive vehicle for prosecuting that conduct unless theLegislature clearly intended such a result" (People v Mattocks, 12 NY3d 326, 333 [2009] [internalquotation marks omitted]). Since there is no showing that the Legislature, in enactingVehicle and Traffic Law § 403-a, intended to foreclose or limit the prosecution ofthe falsification of temporary indicia of registration to only that charge, the People actedwithin their discretion in charging the defendant with criminal possession of a forgedinstrument in the second degree.
The defendant claims that his plea of guilty was not knowing and voluntary."Whether a plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary is dependent upon a number offactors 'including the nature and terms of the agreement, the reasonableness of thebargain, and the age and experience of the accused' " (People v Garcia, 92 NY2d869, 870 [1998], quoting People v Hidalgo, 91 NY2d 733, 736 [1998]). Here,the defendant, who had the assistance of a legal advisor, and who had an extensivecriminal history, knowingly and voluntarily admitted his guilt after a thorough andcomplete plea allocution. The defendant indicated that he was entering the plea"voluntarily," stated that no one had forced or coerced him to enter the plea of guilty, andaverred that he was guilty of the subject crimes. Further, the defendant was fully apprisedof the consequences of his plea, i.e., [*2]that his plea ofguilty would be considered a conviction, and that if he were ever convicted of anotherfelony, he would be subject to an enhanced sentence. In addition, the defendant offeredhis plea after he was advised by the court of his rights to trial by jury or to a bench trial,to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, to present witnesses on his own behalf,to remain silent, and to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly,contrary to the defendant's contention, his plea of guilty was knowingly, voluntarily, andintelligently entered (see People v Fiumefreddo, 82 NY2d 536, 543 [1993]; People v Figueroa, 100 AD3d1016 [2012]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit. Balkin, J.P., Chambers,Austin and Roman, JJ., concur.