| People v Barkley |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 00546 [113 AD3d 1002] |
| January 30, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Third Department |
| The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v TroyA. Barkley, Appellant. |
—[*1] Alexander Lesyk, Special Prosecutor, Norwood, for respondent.
Peters, P.J. Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County(Richards, J.), rendered September 24, 2012, which revoked defendant's probation andimposed a sentence of imprisonment.
In September 2007, defendant was convicted of driving while intoxicated, pursuantto Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2), and sentenced to, as relevant here, fiveyears of probation. Subsequently, defendant admitted to violating the conditions of hisprobation based upon multiple felony convictions in New Jersey. As a result, CountyCourt vacated defendant's sentence of probation and sentenced him to a prison term of 1to 3 years followed by a three-year conditional discharge with interlock ignitionconditions. Defendant now appeals.
We affirm. Defendant first contends that the imposition of the three-year conditionaldischarge, in addition to his prison sentence, constituted a violation of the constitutionalprohibition against double jeopardy. However, "[a]s long as the Legislature intended toimpose cumulative punishments for a single offense, . . . no constitutionaldouble jeopardy claim is implicated" (People v Gonzalez, 99 NY2d 76, 82[2002]). As relevant here, when a person is convicted of driving while intoxicated underVehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (2), "the court may sentence such person to aperiod of imprisonment . . . and shall sentence such person to aperiod of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with [Penal Law §65.00] and shall order the installation and maintenance of a functioning ignition interlockdevice" (Penal [*2]Law § 60.21 [emphasis added]).Further, the sentence imposed was permissible in all respects, inasmuch as Penal Law§ 65.05 (3) requires that the period of conditional discharge for a felony be threeyears, and Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1193 (1) (b) (ii) requires that the ignitioninterlock condition be imposed for no less than six months. Finally, defendant'scontention that his sentence was harsh and excessive is without merit, inasmuch as hereceived the minimum legally permissible sentence (see Penal Law § 70.00[2], [3]; People v Iadicicco,100 AD3d 1147 [2012]; People v Caban, 89 AD3d 1321, 1323 [2011]).
Stein, McCarthy and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.