| Matter of Dashawn R. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 00668 [114 AD3d 686] |
| February 5, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Dashawn R., a Person Alleged to be aJuvenile Delinquent, Appellant. |
—[*1] Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Pamela Seider Dolgowof counsel; Ingrid Gustafson on the brief), for respondent.
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3,Dashawn R. appeals from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County(Ambrosio, J.), dated February 25, 2013, which, upon a fact-finding order of the samecourt dated January 7, 2013, made after a hearing, finding that he committed acts, which,if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in thesecond degree, attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree, and assault in the thirddegree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent, and placed him on probation for aperiod of 12 months. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order and thedenial, after a hearing, of that branch of the appellant's omnibus motion which was tosuppress identification testimony.
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the appellant's contentions, the showup procedure by which thecomplainant identified him was reasonable under the circumstances, having beenconducted in close spatial and temporal proximity to the incident (see People v Guitierres, 82AD3d 1116 [2011]; Matter of Kassan D., 282 AD2d 747 [2001]).Furthermore, there was no evidence of undue suggestiveness (see People v Guy, 47 AD3d643 [2008]; Matter ofLouis C., 6 AD3d 430 [2004]).
The appellant contends that his right to a speedy fact-finding hearing was violated(see Family Ct Act § 340.1 [2]; Matter of George T., 99 NY2d 307[2002]; Matter of Frank C., 70 NY2d 408, 413-414 [1987]). This contention isunpreserved for appellate review, as no objection on that ground was raised during thefact-finding hearing (see Matterof Gregory N., 108 AD3d 553 [2013]; Matter of Yarras F., 5 AD3d 481 [2004]). In any event, thecontention is without merit, since counsel repeatedly consented to adjourn theproceedings (see Family Ct Act § 340.1), thereby waiving speedyfact-finding hearing objections and tolling the 60-day statutory period within which thefact-finding hearing must be commenced (see Matter of Curnelle T., 17 AD3d 472 [2005]). Contraryto the appellant's contentions, counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to dismissthe petition on speedy fact-finding hearing grounds (see Matter of Shaheen P.J., 29 AD3d 996 [2006]). Theappellant's counsel provided meaningful representation (see Matter of John M.P., 54AD3d 1041, 1042 [2008]; cf. People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708 [1998];People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 [1981]).[*2]
The appellant's contention that the Family Courtfailed to hold a proper dispositional hearing is unpreserved for appellate review (see Matter of Toni Ann O., 56AD3d 563 [2008]) and, in any event, is without merit (see Matter of Timothy C., 31AD3d 1222 [2006]).
The Family Court providently exercised its discretion in placing the appellant onprobation for a period of 12 months (see Matter of Racheal M., 108 AD3d 770 [2013]).Contrary to the appellant's contentions, the Family Court imposed the least restrictivedisposition in accordance with the requirements of Family Court Act § 352.2.
The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit. Skelos, J.P., Dillon, Halland Roman, JJ., concur.