| Matter of Joyner v New York State Div. of Parole |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 01004 [114 AD3d 792] |
| February 13, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| In the Matter of Kevin Joyner, Appellant, v NewYork State Division of Parole, Respondent. |
—[*1] Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Michael S. Belohlavekand Matthew W. Grieco of counsel), for respondent.
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the NewYork State Division of Parole dated February 16, 2011, which, after a hearing, denied thepetitioner's application to be released to parole, the petitioner appeals (1) from ajudgment of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Slobod, J.), dated March 29, 2012,which denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding, and (2), as limited by his brief,from so much of an order of the same court dated June 26, 2012, as denied that branch ofhis motion which was for leave to reargue his petition.
Ordered that the appeal from the order is dismissed, without costs or disbursements,as no appeal lies from an order denying reargument; and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The petitioner's contention that the amendment to Executive Law § 259-c (4)(see L 2011, ch 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 38-b) shouldbe applied retroactively and entitles him to a de novo parole hearing because hisadministrative appeal of the respondent's denial of his application for parole was stillpending on the amendment's effective date, is without merit. "[S]tatutes arepresumptively prospective in their application absent an express legislative intent to thecontrary" (Morales v Gross, 230 AD2d 7, 9 [1997]; see Matter of Mulligan vMurphy, 14 NY2d 223, 226 [1964]; Nelson v HSBC Bank USA, 87 AD3d 995, 997 [2011])."However, remedial legislation should be given retroactive effect in order to effectuateits beneficial purpose" (Matter of Gleason [Michael Vee, Ltd.], 96 NY2d 117,122 [2001]). Here, the subject amendment to Executive Law § 259-c (4) wasenacted March 31, 2011, but not made effective until September 30, 2011 (see L2011, ch 62, § 1, part C, § 1, subpart A, § 49 [f]). The Legislature'ssix-month postponement of the effective date indicates that it did not intend for theamendment to be given retroactive effect (see Matter of Mulligan v Murphy, 14NY2d at 226; Matter ofDavidson v Evans, 104 AD3d 1046 [2013]; but see Matter of Thwaites v New York State Bd. of Parole, 34Misc 3d 694, 699 [2011]).
The petitioner's remaining contention is without merit. Mastro, J.P., Rivera, Sgroiand Cohen, JJ., concur.