| People v Strahin |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 01078 [114 AD3d 1284] |
| February 14, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Anthony Strahin, Appellant. |
—[*1] Frank A. Sedita, III, District Attorney, Buffalo (Danielle N. Soluri of counsel), forrespondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Christopher J. Burns,J.), rendered May 29, 2012. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty,of burglary in the second degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon a plea of guilty ofburglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [2]), defendant contends thatSupreme Court erred in refusing to suppress tangible evidence found in his vehicle andhis statements to the police, which he alleges were the fruit of an illegal search andseizure of his vehicle. We reject that contention. Although we agree with defendant thatthe police "effectively seized [his] vehicle when [they] pulled into the [driveway] behinddefendant's vehicle in such a manner as to prevent defendant from driving away" (People v Layou, 71 AD3d1382, 1383 [2010]; seePeople v Dean, 73 AD3d 801, 802 [2010]; see generally People vCantor, 36 NY2d 106, 111-112 [1975]), we conclude that the police had reasonablesuspicion to justify such a seizure (see People v Bolden, 109 AD3d 1170, 1172 [2013]; People v Richardson, 70AD3d 1327, 1328 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 756 [2010]; People v Van Every, 1 AD3d977, 978-979 [2003], lv denied 1 NY3d 602 [2004]). Among other facts andcircumstances, the burglary victims identified defendant, their nephew, as a possiblesuspect; the police determined that the make and model of the vehicle registered todefendant matched the make and model of a vehicle the victims observed in geographicand temporal proximity to the burglary; and the police observed that the damage todefendant's vehicle matched the description of the vehicle observed by the victims(see Van Every, 1 AD3d at 978; see also Bolden, 109 AD3d at 1172;Richardson, 70 AD3d at 1328; see generally People v Casillas, 289AD2d 1063, 1063-1064 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 752 [2002]).
Contrary to the further contention of defendant, we conclude that the police hadprobable cause to arrest him based upon their observation of property in defendant'svehicle that matched the description of property stolen from the victims (see People v Green, 68 AD3d1780, 1780-1781 [2009], lv denied 14 NY3d 841 [2010]; People v LaBoy, 43 AD3d453, 454 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 991 [2007]; People v Saunders,180 AD2d 542, 542 [1992], lv denied 79 NY2d 1054 [1992]). There is no meritto defendant's related contention that the court erred in crediting the police testimony thatthe stolen property was in plain view. It is well established that "[t]he credibilitydeterminations of the suppression court 'are entitled to great deference on appeal and willnot be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record' " (People v Bush, 107 AD3d1581, 1582 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 954 [2013]). Contrary to defendant'scontention, the police officer's testimony that he observed a bag containing jewelrybetween the driver's seat and the center console of the vehicle is not "unbelievable as amatter of law, manifestly untrue, physically impossible, contrary to experience, orself-contradictory" (People vJames, 19 AD3d 617, 618 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 829 [2005]), andwe therefore see no basis to disturb the court's credibility determination (seeBush, 107 AD3d at 1582).[*2]
Defendant further contends that the court erred inrefusing to suppress his statements to the police because the People allegedly failed toestablish that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Mirandarights. We reject that contention. "Where, as here, a defendant has been advised of hisMiranda rights and within minutes thereafter willingly answers questions duringinterrogation, 'no other indication prior to the commencement of interrogation isnecessary to support a conclusion that the defendant implicitly waived those rights' "(People v Goncalves, 288 AD2d 883, 884 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d729 [2002], quoting People v Sirno, 76 NY2d 967, 968 [1990]; see People v Guilford, 21NY3d 205, 208 [2013]). Thus, the record supports the court's determination thatdefendant "understood his Miranda rights and implicitly waived them when hewillingly answered the officer[s'] questions after receiving the Mirandawarnings" (Goncalves, 288 AD2d at 884; see People v Hale, 52 AD3d 1177, 1178 [2008]; People v Gill, 20 AD3d434, 434 [2005]). Present—Centra, J.P., Peradotto, Lindley, Sconiers andWhalen, JJ.