| Stiff v City of New York |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 01160 [114 AD3d 843] |
| February 19, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| Douglas Stiff, Appellant, v City of New York etal., Respondents. |
—[*1] Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Leonard Koerner andEdward F. X. Hart of counsel), for respondents.
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals,as limited by his brief, from so much of an order the Supreme Court, Queens County(Flug, J.), dated August 16, 2012, as granted that branch of the defendants' motion whichwas for summary judgment dismissing the state law causes of action on the ground thatthe plaintiff did not serve a timely notice of claim under General Municipal Law §50-e (1).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Timely service of a notice of claim is a condition precedent to the commencement ofan action sounding in tort against a municipality (see General Municipal Law§ 50-e [1] [a]; Matter ofRyan v New York City Tr. Auth., 110 AD3d 902 [2013]; Tully v City of Glen Cove, 102AD3d 670 [2013]; Decoteau v City of New York, 97 AD3d 527 [2012]; Matter of Groves v New York CityTr. Auth., 44 AD3d 856 [2007]). The purpose of the requirement that notice ofa tort claim be given to a municipality or public authority within 90 days after the claimarises is to protect the municipality or authority from stale tort claims and to provide itwith an opportunity to timely and effectively investigate the claim (see Vallejo-Bayas v New YorkCity Tr. Auth., 103 AD3d 881 [2013]; Palmer v Society for Seamen's Children, 88 AD3d 970[2011]; Casias v City of NewYork, 39 AD3d 681 [2007]; Matter of Andrew T.B. v Brewster Cent. School Dist., 18 AD3d745 [2005]).
Here, the plaintiff's cause of action accrued on September 8, 2004, when he allegedlywas assaulted by another inmate at Rikers Island. Thus, he had until December 7, 2004,to serve a notice of claim. The plaintiff did not serve his notice of claim until December10, 2004, three days after the expiration of the statutory period. Moreover, he neversought leave to serve a late notice of claim, or to deem his notice of claim timely filednunc pro tunc, within the one-year-and-90-day statute of limitations period.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants'motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the state law causes of action (see Robinson v Board of Educ. ofCity Sch. Dist. of City of N.Y., 104 AD3d 666 [2013]; McShane v Town ofHempstead, [*2]66 AD3d 652 [2009]). Mastro, J.P.,Hall, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.