| Godbolt v Verizon N.Y. Inc. |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 01561 [115 AD3d 493] |
| March 11, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Thomas Godbolt, Appellant, v Verizon New YorkInc., Respondent. |
—[*1] Seyfarth Shaw LLP, New York (Robert S. Whitman of counsel), for respondent. Community Service Society, New York (Paul Keefe of counsel), for amicicuriae.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Marcy S. Friedman, J.), entered January23, 2013, which granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing thecomplaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated from his employment on the basis of his raceand his past criminal convictions, in violation of the State and City Human Rights Laws(Executive Law § 296 et seq.; Administrative Code of City of NY §8-107 [1] [a]; [7]) and Correction Law § 752.
Defendant explained that it terminated plaintiff because he failed to disclose his priorcriminal convictions on his employment applications, which plaintiff admitted, anddemonstrated that every one of its employees who were found to have falsified anemployment application was terminated (see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305[2004]; Bennett v Health Mgt.Sys., Inc., 92 AD3d 29 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 811[2012]).
Plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact. He presented no evidence that defendant'sproffered reason for his termination was pretextual and identified no evidence that hewas treated differently from similarly situated employees because of his race or criminalhistory. There is no evidence to support his claim that the investigator exceeded hisinvestigative authority or that his investigation was animated by racial bias. The fact thatthe investigation, which initially was focused on claims of intoxication at work, foundevidence of unrelated criminal convictions did [*2]notrender the investigation unreasonable or improper.
Even under the mixed-motive analysis applicable to City Human Rights Law claims,plaintiff's claim fails, because there is no evidence from which a reasonable factfindercould infer that race or criminal history played any role in defendant's decision toterminate him (see Bennett, 92 AD3d at 40-41).
Plaintiff relies on one remark made in an email exchange that took place weeks afterthe decision to terminate him was made and that concerned the resolution of his union'sgrievance following the termination. In the email, one of defendant's employeesresponsible for making the decision to terminate plaintiff declined to reconsider thepenalty because of the nature of plaintiff's convictions and his concern about the liabilitythat defendant would assume if plaintiff committed a similar crime while on companytime. However, "[s]tray remarks such as [this], even if made by a decision maker, do not,without more, constitute evidence of discrimination" (Melman v Montefiore Med. Ctr., 98 AD3d 107, 125 [1stDept 2012]). Indeed, plaintiff did not demonstrate a nexus between the employee'sremark and the decision to terminate him (see e.g. Mete v New York State Off. of Mental Retardation & Dev.Disabilities, 21 AD3d 288, 294 [1st Dept 2005]).
We decline to hold, as urged by plaintiff and amici, that the stray remarks doctrinemay not be relied on in determining claims brought pursuant to the City Human RightsLaw, even as we recognize the law's "uniquely broad and remedial purposes"(Bennett, 92 AD3d at 34 [internal quotation marks omitted]). The doctrine is notinconsistent with the intentions of the law, since statements "constitute evidence ofdiscriminatory motivation when a plaintiff demonstrates that a nexus exists between theallegedly discriminatory statements and a defendant's decision to discharge the plaintiff"(Schreiber v Worldco, LLC, 324 F Supp 2d 512, 518 [SD NY 2004]; seeTomassi v Insignia Fin. Group, Inc., 478 F3d 111, 115-116 [2d Cir 2007]).
We have considered plaintiff's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Sweeny, DeGrasse, Manzanet-Daniels and Gische, JJ.[Prior Case History: 2013 NY Slip Op 30100(U).]