Banker v Vitanza
2014 NY Slip Op 01566 [115 AD3d 690]
March 12, 2014
Appellate Division, Second Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 30, 2014


Brooks Banker, Respondent,
v
Salvatore Vitanza etal., Appellants.

[*1]William J. Florence, Jr., Peekskill, N.Y. (Richard J. O'Keeffe of counsel), forappellant Salvatore Vitanza.

Rizzo & Kelley, Poughkeepsie, N.Y. (Christina M. Bookless of counsel), forappellant Michael J. Tighe.

Brooks Banker, New York, N.Y., respondent pro se.

In an action to recover damages for fraud, the defendants separately appeal from anorder of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Lubell, J.), dated April 25, 2013, whichdenied their separate motions pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaintinsofar as asserted against each of them as barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with one bill of costs, and thedefendants' separate motions to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against each ofthem are granted.

A cause of action alleging fraud must be commenced within six years after the dateon which the cause of action accrued or within two years after the time the plaintiffcould, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the alleged fraud, whichever is later(see CPLR 213 [8]; Espie v Murphy, 35 AD3d 346, 347 [2006]). "The test asto when a plaintiff, with reasonable diligence, could have discovered an alleged fraud isan objective one" (Prand Corp.v County of Suffolk, 62 AD3d 681, 682 [2009]; see Prestandrea v Stein,262 AD2d 621, 622 [1999]; TMG-II v Price Waterhouse & Co., 175 AD2d 21,22-23 [1991]).

Here, the plaintiff did not commence the instant action until more than six years afterthe date on which the fraud cause of action accrued and more than two years after he,with reasonable diligence, could have discovered the alleged fraud (see Mizuno v Barak, 113AD3d 825 [2014]; Prand Corp. v County of Suffolk, 62 AD3d at 682;Espie v Murphy, 35 AD3d at 347; TMG-II v Price Waterhouse & Co.,175 AD2d at 22-23). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted thedefendants' separate motions pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the complaintinsofar as asserted against each of them as time-barred. Mastro, J.P., Chambers, Austinand Miller, JJ., concur.


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