| People v Rosado |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 01775 [115 AD3d 884] |
| March 19, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Second Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Nicholas Rosado, Appellant. |
—[*1] Kenneth P. Thompson, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Jodi L.Mandel, and George E. Spencer of counsel), for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County(McKay, J.), rendered January 25, 2012, convicting him of burglary in the second degree,upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People vContes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish thedefendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility toconduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunityto view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People vMateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410 [2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]; Peoplev Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we aresatisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d633 [2006]).
The defendant's challenge to the trial court's Sandoval ruling (see Peoplev Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371 [1974]) is without merit. The defendant failed to meet hisburden of demonstrating that the prejudicial effect of admitting evidence regarding hisprior convictions so outweighed the probative worth of that evidence that exclusion waswarranted (see id. at 378; People v Harris, 74 AD3d 984, 984-985 [2010]). The prioroffenses bore directly upon the defendant's veracity and willingness to place his interestsabove those of society (seePeople v Fotiou, 39 AD3d 877, 878 [2007]; People v McLaurin, 33 AD3d 819 [2006]). The mere factthat the prior convictions into which inquiry was permitted were similar or even identicalin nature to the instant offenses did not warrant their preclusion (see People v Dahlbender, 23AD3d 493, 494 [2005]; People v Pender, 221 AD2d 573 [1995]; Peoplev Torres, 110 AD2d 794, 795 [1985]). By precluding the prosecutor from elicitingthe underlying facts of the defendant's convictions, the Supreme Court avoided anyundue prejudice to the defendant (see People v Thompson, 99 AD3d 819 [2012]; People v Myron, 28 AD3d681, 683 [2006], cert denied 549 US 1326 [2007]). Moreover, the fact thatone of the convictions was remote does not, in and of itself, require preclusion of thatconviction for impeachment purposes (see People v Fotiou, 39 AD3d at 878;People v Myron, 28 AD3d at 683).[*2]
The defendant waived his contention regardingthe Supreme Court's participation in reading back certain trial testimony by expresslyconsenting, beforehand, to the use of that procedure (cf. People v Genyard, 84 AD3d 1398, 1399 [2011];People v Moody, 300 AD2d 510 [2002]; see generally People v Geraci,85 NY2d 359, 366 n 2 [1995]). Skelos, J.P., Lott, Roman and Cohen, JJ., concur.