| Matter of Sierra Club v Village of Painted Post |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 02166 [115 AD3d 1310] |
| March 28, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, Fourth Department |
| In the Matter of Sierra Club et al., Respondents, v Villageof Painted Post et al., Appellants, and Wellsboro and Corning Railroad, LLC,Respondent. |
—[*1] Richard J. Lippes & Associates, Buffalo (Richard J. Lippes of counsel) and RachelTreichler, Hammondsport, for petitioners-respondents. Jane E. Tsamardinos, Albany, for New York State Conference of Mayors andMunicipal Officials, amicus curiae. James Bacon, New Paltz, for Community Watersheds Clean Water Coalition, Inc.,amicus curiae. Katherine Hudson, Watershed Program Director, White Plains, for Riverkeeper, Inc.and Katherine Sinding, New York City, for Natural Resources Defense Council, AmiciCuriae.
Appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court, Steuben County(Kenneth R. Fisher, J.), entered April 8, 2013 in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article78. The judgment, insofar as appealed from, denied in part the motion of respondentsVillage of Painted Post, Painted Post Development, LLC, and SWEPI, LP to dismiss thepetition and granted petitioners summary judgment on the first cause of action.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment insofar as appealed from is unanimouslyreversed on the law without costs, the motion of respondents-appellants is granted in itsentirety and the petition is dismissed against them.
Memorandum: The Village of Painted Post (Village), Painted Post Development,LLC and SWEPI, LP (collectively, respondents) appeal from a judgment insofar as itdenied that part [*2]of their motion pursuant to CPLR3211 and 3212 with respect to the first cause of action and awarded petitioners summaryjudgment on that cause of action. Supreme Court otherwise granted respondents' motionand dismissed the second and third causes of action. In denying that part of respondents'motion with respect to the first cause of action, the court concluded that petitioner JohnMarvin was the only petitioner who had standing to bring the proceeding and that thesole ground upon which he had standing was his "proximity and [his] complaint of trainnoise newly introduced into his neighborhood." Based upon its determination thatMarvin had standing, the court refused to dismiss the petition with respect to theremaining petitioners despite their lack of standing (see generally Saratoga CountyChamber of Commerce v Pataki, 100 NY2d 801, 813 [2003], cert denied540 US 1017 [2003]; Maraia vOrange Regional Med. Ctr., 63 AD3d 1113, 1115 [2009]). We agree withrespondents that Marvin lacked standing, and we thus conclude that the court erred inrefusing to dismiss the petition against them.
There is no dispute that "[c]ourts surely do provide a forum for airing issues of vitalpublic concern, but so do public hearings and publicly elected legislatures, both of whichhave functioned here. By contrast to those forums, a litigant must establish its standing inorder to seek judicial review" (Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77NY2d 761, 769 [1991]). "With the growth of litigation to enforce public values, such asprotection of the environment, the subject of standing has become a troublesome one forthe courts" (id. at 771). " '[I]njury in fact' has become the touchstone" forstanding (id. at 772), because "[t]he existence of an injury in fact—anactual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated—ensures that the party seekingreview has some concrete interest in prosecuting the action" (id.).
It is well established that "[s]tanding requirements 'are not mere pleadingrequirements but [instead are] an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case[,]' andtherefore 'each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on whichthe plaintiff bears the burden of proof' " (Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Common Council of City ofAlbany, 13 NY3d 297, 306 [2009]). Where, as here, the proceeding does notinvolve a "zoning-related issue . . . , there is no presumption of standing toraise" a challenge under the State Environmental Quality Review Act ([SEQRA] ECL art8) based solely on a party's proximity (Matter of Save Our Main St. Bldgs. v GreeneCounty Legislature, 293 AD2d 907, 908 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 609[2002]; see Matter of RentStabilization Assn. of N.Y.C., Inc. v Miller, 15 AD3d 194, 194-195 [2005],lv denied 4 NY3d 709 [2005]; Matter of Oates v Village of WatkinsGlen, 290 AD2d 758, 761 [2002]). In such a situation, the party seeking to establishstanding must establish that the injury of which he or she complains "falls within the'zone of interests,' or concerns, sought to be promoted or protected" (Society ofPlastics Indus., 77 NY2d at 773), and that he or she "would suffer direct harm, injurythat is in some way different from that of the public at large" (id. at 774; seeMatter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 76 NY2d 428, 433[1990]).
While we agree with petitioners that noise falls within the zone of interests sought tobe protected by SEQRA (seeMatter of Long Is. Contractors' Assn. v Town of Riverhead, 17 AD3d 590,594-595 [2005]; Matter of McGrath v Town Bd. of Town of N. Greenbush, 254AD2d 614, 616 [1998], lv denied 93 NY2d 803 [1999]; see generallyECL 8-0105 [6]), we conclude that respondents met their burden of establishing as amatter of law that Marvin did not sustain an injury that was different from that of thepublic at large.
This CPLR article 78 proceeding concerns Village resolutions that authorized thesale and export of excess water from the municipal water supply. To assist in theexportation of the water, the resolutions permitted the construction of a transloadingfacility to load the water onto trains that would then transport the water to the buyer inPennsylvania. Respondents, in support of their motion, established that the trains thatwould transport the water would utilize an existing rail line that traversed the entireVillage. In his affidavit in opposition to respondents' motion, [*3]Marvin contended that his house was "one-half block fromthe railroad line" and that, following commencement of the water shipments, he began tohear "train noises frequently, sometimes every night." Marvin averred that he "heardeither the train whistle or the diesel engines themselves or both." The noise was allegedlyso loud that it "woke [him] up and kept [him] awake repeatedly." Notably, Marvin raisedno complaints concerning noise from the transloading facility itself.
The maps of the area submitted by respondents and petitioners in connection with themotion demonstrate that the rail line at issue runs through the entire Village, along amain thoroughfare. One image also establishes that there are a multitude of houses alongthe path of the railroad, many of which are closer to the rail line than Marvin's residence.As noted in an affidavit from two Village residents submitted by petitioners in oppositionto the motion, the noise from the moving trains affected many of the Village residents, alarge number of whom expressed their concerns at a village board meeting.
Inasmuch as we are dealing with the noise of a train that moves throughout the entireVillage, as opposed to the stationary noise of the transloading facility, we conclude thatMarvin will not suffer noise impacts "different in kind or degree from the public at large"(Society of Plastics Indus., 77 NY2d at 778). "[S]tanding cannot be based on theclaim that a project would indirectly affect . . . noise levels . . .throughout a wide area" (Save Our Main St. Bldgs., 293 AD2d at 909 [internalquotation marks omitted]; see Society of Plastics Indus., 77 NY2d at 775;Oates, 290 AD2d at 760-761; cf. Matter of Muir v Town of Newburgh,N.Y., 49 AD3d 744, 746 [2008]). Here, as in Save Our Main St. Bldgs.,because "none of the individual petitioners alleges a unique, direct environmentalinjury," none of the organizational petitioners can be found to have standing (id.at 909).
Based on our determination, we do not address respondents' remaining contentions.Present—Scudder, P.J., Centra, Peradotto, Lindley and Whalen, JJ.