People v Alligood
2014 NY Slip Op 02191 [115 AD3d 1346]
March 28, 2014
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
As corrected through Wednesday, April 30, 2014


The People of the State of New York, Respondent, vEkisha N. Alligood, Appellant.

—[*1]Timothy P. Donaher, Public Defender, Rochester (James Eckert of counsel), fordefendant-appellant.

Sandra Doorley, District Attorney, Rochester (Geoffrey Kaeuper of counsel), forrespondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (David D. Egan, J.),rendered August 21, 2009. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, ofgrand larceny in the third degree and criminal possession of a forged instrument in thesecond degree (six counts).

It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting her upon a juryverdict of grand larceny in the third degree (Penal Law § 155.35 [1]) and sixcounts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (§170.25). The counts charging criminal possession of a forged instrument involved sixpension checks payable to defendant's father, a resident in the long-term care unit ofMonroe Community Hospital (MCH). In 2006, defendant endorsed those checks to herlandlord with the forged signature of her father, in partial payment of her rent. Accordingto defendant, she negotiated the checks pursuant to the authority granted her by a powerof attorney executed by her father in 2003. However, the People established that, in2004, the bank issuing the pension checks notified MCH that the father's checks werebeing diverted to defendant under a power of attorney allegedly signed by the father in2003. After learning of the diversion of the pension checks, MCH staff assisted the fatherin preparing a letter to the issuing bank directing that the pension checks were to bemailed to him at MCH and informing the issuing bank that the father had not signed apower of attorney in 2003 and in fact had revoked a prior power of attorney executed in2001. Over defendant's hearsay objection, Supreme Court admitted the letter in evidenceas a CPLR 4518 (a) "business record." Although a defense witness who owned a liquorstore testified that defendant's father had walked into his store in 2003 and signed adocument that the store owner notarized, the People established that in 2003 the fathersuffered from a number of debilitating medical conditions that rendered him unable toambulate on his own, and he had not in any event left MCH since at least 2001.

Even assuming, arguendo, that the court erred in admitting in evidence the letterprepared by MCH staff and signed by the father, we conclude that any error is harmless.The People presented overwhelming evidence establishing that the father had not, andcould not have, walked into the liquor store in Rochester in 2003 and executed a powerof attorney naming [*2]defendant as his power ofattorney, and there is no significant probability that the jury would have acquitteddefendant if the letter had not been admitted in evidence (see People v Crimmins,36 NY2d 230, 241-242 [1975]; People v Glover, 4 AD3d 852, 852 [2004], lv denied2 NY3d 740 [2004]). We agree with defendant that the court erred in allowing thePeople to present expert testimony on the law pertaining to the execution and revocationof a power of attorney and the duties of the agent thereunder (see People vJohnson, 76 AD2d 983, 984 [1980]; see generally Colon v Rent-A-Center,276 AD2d 58, 61-62 [2000]). However, inasmuch as the evidence overwhelminglyestablished that the father did not execute the power of attorney proffered by defendantand there is no significant probability that the "jury's verdict . . . would havebeen different" without the expert testimony, the error is harmless (People v Clyde, 18 NY3d145, 154 [2011]). Defendant failed to preserve for our review the majority of theinstances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct that she now contends deprived her of afair trial, and we note that objections otherwise made by defense counsel were largelysustained by the court, with no request by defendant for further relief, including a mistrial(see People v Williams, 8NY3d 854, 855 [2007]). In any event, "[r]eversal on grounds of prosecutorialmisconduct 'is mandated only when the conduct has caused such substantial prejudice tothe defendant that [s]he has been denied due process of law' " (People v Rubin,101 AD2d 71, 77 [1984], lv denied 63 NY2d 711 [1984]), and that cannot besaid here (see id. at 77-78). Present—Smith, J.P., Fahey, Peradotto, Carniand Sconiers, JJ.


NYPTI Decisions © 2026 is a project of New York Prosecutors Training Institute (NYPTI) made possible by leveraging the work we've done providing online research and tools to prosecutors.

NYPTI would like to thank New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, New York State Senate's Open Legislation Project, New York State Unified Court System, New York State Law Reporting Bureau and Free Law Project for their invaluable assistance making this project possible.

Install the free RECAP extensions to help contribute to this archive. See https://free.law/recap/ for more information.