| People v King |
| 2014 NY Slip Op 02246 [116 AD3d 424] |
| April 1, 2014 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| The People of the State of New York,Respondent, v Shauna King, Appellant. |
—[*1] Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Christopher P. Marinelli ofcounsel), for respondent.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Ronald A. Zweibel, J.), renderedSeptember 8, 2010, as amended February 9, 2011, convicting defendant, after a jury trial,of assault in the second degree (two counts), reckless endangerment in the first degree,criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, identity theft in thesecond degree, and assault in the third degree, and sentencing her, as a second felonyoffender, to an aggregate term of 9 to 12 years, unanimously affirmed.
Defendant challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting herreckless endangerment and possession of a forged instrument convictions. Defendant'slegal sufficiency claims are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest ofjustice. As an alternative holding, we reject them on the merits. We also rejectdefendant's argument that these verdicts were against the weight of the evidence (see People v Danielson, 9NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). Initially, we find no basis for disturbing any of thejury's credibility determinations.
With respect to reckless endangerment, defendant's depraved indifference to humanlife was established by evidence that while fleeing from the police by car aftercommitting other crimes, defendant violated various traffic laws, struck multiple cars andtwo people, including a police officer in her path, and nearly struck additionalpedestrians and cars before being forced by traffic to stop (see e.g. People vTart, 305 AD2d 137 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 624 [2003]).Unlike the defendant in Peoplev Prindle (16 NY3d 768 [2011]), which also involved a high speed chase, thisdefendant made no effort to avoid hitting persons and vehicles; instead, she continuedher grossly reckless driving even after she knocked a pedestrian into the air and was wellaware that she was endangering people's lives (see People v Heidgen, 22 NY3d 259, 276 [2013];People v Gomez, 65 NY2d 9, 12 [1985]).
With respect to possession of a forged instrument, the evidence establisheddefendant's accessorial liability for possession of a forged driver's license recovered fromthe codefendant (see Penal Law § 20.00). The evidence supports theconclusion that the forged license, used in an effort to steal merchandise, was aninstrumentality of a joint criminal enterprise involving both defendants and was thusjointly possessed by both of them (see e.g. Matter of Kadeem W., 5 NY3d 864 [2005]; People v Ramos, 59 AD3d269 [1st Dept 2009], lv denied 12 NY3d 858[*2][2009]).
The court properly exercised its discretion in imposing reasonable limits ondefendant's cross-examination of the People's witnesses (see People v Corby, 6 NY3d231, 234-235 [2005]). Defendant received sufficient latitude in which to impeachthe credibility of police and medical witnesses. Since defendant never asserted aconstitutional right to pursue any precluded lines of inquiry, her constitutional claim isunpreserved (see People vLane, 7 NY3d 888, 889 [2006]), and we decline to review it in the interest ofjustice. As an alternative holding, we find no basis for reversal (see Delaware v VanArsdall, 475 US 673, 678-679 [1986]).
Although, in explaining the elements of second-degree identity theft, the courtincorrectly described attempted fourth-degree grand larceny as a felony, when in fact it isa misdemeanor, this could not have prejudiced defendant. Under the circumstances of thecase, an attempt to commit fourth-degree grand larceny would satisfy the requirements ofPenal Law § 190.79 (3), and there is no reasonable possibility that the juryconvicted defendant of identity theft on an improper theory (see People v Whitecloud, 110AD3d 626 [1st Dept 2013]).
Defendant did not preserve her remaining arguments concerning the court's charge,including those relating to its instruction on depraved indifference, or any of herchallenges to the prosecutor's summation, and we decline to review them in the interestof justice. As an alternative holding, we find no basis for reversal.Concur—Mazzarelli, J.P., Sweeny, Andrias, Manzanet-Daniels and Kapnick, JJ.